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Foreword 
Assistance to the automotive industry, while exceeding that for most other 
Australian industries, has been greatly reduced over the past two decades. 
Following a public inquiry by the Productivity Commission in 2002, assistance is 
scheduled to be further reduced to align more closely with the manufacturing norm 
by 2015. 
On 14 February 2008, the Australian Government commissioned a review of the 
current assistance program by a panel headed by the former Premier of Victoria, the 
Hon. Steve Bracks. The panel is to report by the end of July 2008. When 
announcing the review, it was foreshadowed that the Government would separately 
request the Productivity Commission to undertake modelling of economy-wide 
effects of future assistance options. This study responds to that request. 
Models can capture many, but not all, of the economy-wide ramifications of 
changes in industry assistance. Moreover, as policy changes become smaller, 
models may be too blunt to rank nuanced options. Accordingly, the Commission 
has complemented its modelling with analysis of other factors which potentially 
bear on the outcomes.   
The Commission’s modelling indicates that there would be economy-wide benefits 
from  reductions in assistance to the automotive sector, particularly for tariffs, and 
that the benefits would be larger under the program currently in place than options 
entailing lesser reductions. In the Commission’s assessment, these conclusions are 
not materially affected by consideration of influences not captured directly by the 
model.  
In preparing its study, the Commission had early meetings with Mr Bracks and the 
Review Secretariat. Three modelling experts refereed the modelling, with ‘work-in 
progress’ discussed at a technical workshop attended by them, as well as by 
members of the secretariat and other officials. The Commission is grateful to all for 
their cooperation and input. 
 
Gary Banks AO 
Chairman  
 
 30 May 2008
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Overview 
The Commission was asked by the Government to undertake modelling of the 
economy-wide effects of assistance options and scenarios identified by the current 
Bracks Review of Australia’s automotive industry. The options cover a number of 
combinations of tariffs and levels of assistance provided under the Automotive 
Competitiveness and Investment Scheme (ACIS).  
Assessing economy-wide effects of any policy intervention requires identification 
and summation of all the costs and benefits that flow from it. For instance, changes 
in industry assistance alter the economic returns from different activities. This 
induces changes in the pattern of resource allocation across the economy (requiring 
adjustments by labour and capital), as well as levels of investment and, through 
various mechanisms, productivity. These changes in turn affect industry output, 
exports and imports, prices (including the ‘terms of trade’) and, hence, national 
production and income.  
Policy role of modelling   
No model can replicate the economy and all its complex interactions. But 
economy-wide general equilibrium (GE) models can capture many of these effects 
in a stylised way. They trace through the impacts of changes in prices brought about 
by changes in assistance policies across the economy, capturing so-called 
‘allocative’ efficiency impacts, changes in use of labour and of capital, and 
consequent terms of trade effects. These models can also provide a disaggregated 
picture of the economy, simulating potential changes in the size of particular 
industries (including the assisted industry) and levels of regional activity.  
By giving an indication of the magnitude of resource impacts, GE models have 
played an important role in most previous reviews of assistance to the automotive 
and other industries in Australia. Particularly when assistance levels were very high, 
GE models exposed the substantial ‘export tax’ effect of industry assistance and the 
potential for large income gains from reducing that assistance and allowing labour 
and capital to move to higher-valued uses in the Australian economy. They also 
exposed the substantial transfers from consumers and taxpayers to assisted 
industries.  
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But GE modelling becomes less insightful the smaller the policy ‘shock’. This is 
because the resource impacts correspondingly diminish and can be confounded by 
‘noise’ from the model’s many simplifying assumptions. While remaining valuable 
for understanding the impacts of policy change, in such circumstances GE models 
may be too blunt to rank nuanced policy options.   
Moreover, many potentially important effects of changes in assistance regimes are 
not directly estimated by these models. For example, policy-related innovation and 
‘spillover’ effects, as well as technological change and costs of adjustment, are not 
captured. While such effects can be incorporated (for example, as a productivity 
shock to the model), estimating their magnitude requires separate analysis.  
This means that although modelling can make an important contribution, it must be 
complemented by additional analysis of ‘exogenous’ factors to enable a complete 
assessment of the economy-wide effects of assistance options.  
The modelling task in context 
The automotive industry has long received government assistance significantly 
above levels afforded other Australian industries (box 1). The general tariff rate for 
passenger motor vehicles and components, which was reduced to 10 per cent in 
2005, remains at least twice the rate applying since 1996 to most other 
manufacturing activities (excluding the textiles, clothing and footwear sector, the 
subject of a parallel review). Budgetary assistance also remains substantial 
(primarily through the ACIS program, providing around $0.5 billion in duty credits 
per year), representing about one-third of direct financial assistance to the 
manufacturing sector.  
In its 2002 inquiry into the industry, the Commission recommended that the tariff 
be reduced to the norm for the manufacturing sector of 5 per cent in 2010, 
cushioned by an extension of the ACIS program to 2010. It was considered that 
further, yet still gradual, exposure to competitive pressures would encourage the 
industry to continue to enhance its competitiveness. Indeed, the anticipated benefits 
of increased competition in driving workplace and other efficiencies played a 
greater role than modelled resource effects in the Commission’s recommendations. 
The recommended program also provided the industry with the decade of policy 
certainty that it sought, to facilitate investment. (Reinforcing this objective, the 
Commission made no recommendations to modify other assistance schemes 
pending the phase down of tariffs and ACIS.) 
While the Government of the day agreed that the tariff would be reduced to 
5 per cent in 2010, ACIS funding was substantially increased and its duration 
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extended beyond what had been recommended. In doing this, the Government 
reaffirmed its primary objective of easing the industry’s continued transition to a 
more competitive, low assistance environment. And, while endorsing the need for 
policy certainty domestically, a further inquiry by the Commission in 2008 was 
foreshadowed, to determine whether changes in legislated tariff reductions might be 
warranted in the light of economic conditions at that time.  
 
Box 1 The Australian automotive industry receives a range of 
assistance 
The Commission estimates that the automotive industry received around $1.1 billion in 
support in 2006-07, from three sources:  
• a tariff of 10 per cent on imported passenger vehicles and related components 
(except those subject to preferential tariffs under bilateral trade agreements), which 
is scheduled to fall to 5 per cent in 2010 and remain at that level until (at least) 2015 
• a tariff of 5 per cent on light commercial and 4WD vehicles and related components 
• the Automotive Competitiveness and Investment Scheme (ACIS) which provides 
around $0.5 billion a year and which will provide more than $4 billion in subsidies 
(provided as import credits) between 2006 and 2015. 
Additional support is provided by:  
• virtually prohibitive tariffs of $12 000 per imported second-hand vehicle (other than 
for specialist use) 
• fringe benefits tax provisions which favour fleet sales (local cars account for around 
three-quarters of the fleet market) and the luxury car sales tax which primarily 
affects imported vehicles 
• government purchasing preferences for vehicles manufactured or imported by local 
vehicle producers. 
The industry also has access to a range of support measures generally available to 
business, such as R&D grants and tax concessions (the automotive industry accounts 
for about one-third of all such assistance), TRADEX (which refunds tariff duty paid on 
inputs for exported products), and funding for specific ‘strategic’ investments via the 
Strategic Investment Coordination program. It also receives support from State 
Governments via payroll tax concessions, grants and low interest loans.  
In addition, the industry has received ad hoc financial support from State Governments 
and the Australian Government. The latter recently announced a Green Car Innovation 
Fund which is to deliver support of $500 million over the period 2011 to 2015.  
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The Review Panel’s options  
The Bracks Review has a broad remit, in part reflecting concerns about a number of 
pressures on the industry, including recent exchange rate appreciation, an 
acceleration of the longer-term shift in preferences away from larger ‘family’ 
vehicles, as well as increased imports from the United States and Thailand resulting 
from preferential trade agreements with those countries.  
The policy options that the Commission was requested to model include various 
changes to the mix, nature and level of assistance provided through tariffs and 
ACIS, but not other forms of assistance (table 1). The Review Panel also sought 
modelling of a scenario in which the Australian dollar achieved parity with the US 
dollar. 
Table 1 The policy options modelled 
 Tariff remains at 10% Tariff 5% as scheduled Tariff reduced to 0%
ACIS stays at Stage 2 Option 5 (current 
assistance regime) 
Options 2 & 3 (ACIS 
modelled as credits 
and grants) 
Not modelled
ACIS to Stage 3  Option 4 Option 1 Not modelled
ACIS discontinued as 
scheduled 
Option 6 Reference case 1 
(policy as scheduled) 
Option 7
Some technical considerations  
To model these options, the Commission used the model known as MMRF 
(developed by the Centre of Policy Studies at Monash University). This model 
provides a decomposition of impacts by State and Territory (box 2). In 
‘comparative-static’ mode, the model provides a ‘snapshot’ of policy impacts in the 
‘long run’ — when the economy has fully adjusted. 
The model database was updated with the most recent official data, with the 
automotive industry being disaggregated into car assembly and components 
manufacture.  
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Box 2 The MMRF model provides a regional perspective  
The MMRF model is a well-documented model with a proven track record. It was most 
recently used by the Commission in its study Potential Benefits of the National Reform 
Agenda (PC 2006). The model was updated with the most recent available information 
about the economy (to 2005-06) and disaggregated further to identify separately car 
assemblers and component manufacturers.  
Unlike single-industry or sectoral models, the MMRF model is designed to capture the 
economy-wide impacts of policy changes by representing the Australian economy as a 
combination of the economies (and industries) of all States and Territories. 
Consequently, it allows analysis of the effects of policy at the jurisdiction and industry 
levels. This is especially useful given the concentration of the industry in Victoria and 
South Australia.  
A comparative-static version of MMRF was used, which means that simulation results 
do not relate to a particular year, and particular adjustment paths cannot be inferred. 
While a time dimension may be insightful in some applications, a comparative-static 
model was preferred for this study because it captures the long-term implications of 
changing industry policy, while avoiding the need to formulate long-range (and often 
contentious) forecasts about the economy and automotive industry for a ‘base case’ 
scenario.   
 
Also, as requested by the Review Panel, the newly-announced Green Car 
Innovation Fund (GCIF) was incorporated in all simulations as part of the model 
‘database’ policy environment. This was done by treating it as an additional 
production subsidy to the industry, though it remains unclear whether the GCIF will 
generate additional vehicle production. If it simply compensated vehicle producers 
for replacing existing vehicle models with production of hybrid and other green 
vehicles or features that are less commercially viable, there would be a productivity 
loss and no net expansion in output. 
The modelling results are broadly as anticipated  
In line with the long-standing incremental approach to assistance reductions for this 
industry, the various options being modelled involve relatively small policy-induced 
price changes to an industry accounting for less than 1 per cent of GDP. Relative to 
the economy, the estimated net impacts appear small. For example, the ‘reference 
case’ scenario R1, which models the scheduled reduction in the tariff to 5 per cent 
in 2010 and removal of ACIS by 2015, yields a 0.06 per cent gain in annual national 
output and a 0.06 per cent increase in the community’s ‘economic welfare’ (as 
measured by real adjusted GNE). Nevertheless, these small percentages equate to 
around $600 million and $500 million respectively. Furthermore, they would accrue 
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each year in perpetuity, and would be sizeable in present value terms. (Table 2 
provides a sample of results.) 
Table 2 Benefits from tariff cuts dominate ACIS cuts, but a commodity-
induced appreciation dominates both  
Tariff: to 5%  to 5%  10%  to 0  to 5% 
ACIS: to 0  Stage 2  to 0  to 0  Stage 3 
Other settings:       ‘Commodity 
boom’  
National aggregates        
Real adjusted GNE ($ million) 517  496  23  1458  11 677 
Real GDP ($ million) 598  568  31  1677  13 715 
Exports  (% change) 0.40  0.32  0.08  0.97  -2.94 
Imports  (% change) 0.27  0.26  0.01  0.75  2.27 
Sectoral aggregates (% change)        
Agriculture  0.07  0.05  0.02  0.14  -1.56 
Mining  0.36  0.26  0.10  0.81  14.47 
Food processing  0.09  0.07  0.03  0.21  -3.01 
Manufacturing  -0.12  -0.07  -0.05  -0.22  -3.99 
Services  0.05  0.05  0.00  0.15  0.82 
Automotive assembly (% change)        
Output  -4.60  -2.93  -1.68  -8.52  -11.18 
Employment  -5.47  -3.50  -1.99  -10.14  -13.07 
Exports  -2.86  1.14  -3.97  0.97  -28.74 
Components (% change)     
Output  -1.37  -1.16  -0.22  -3.12  -3.72 
Employment  -1.78  -1.53  -0.24  -4.13  -6.57 
Exports  4.12  4.43  -0.30  11.77  -25.68 
Indeed, the modelling consistently indicates that further reductions in automotive 
assistance, particularly tariffs, could be expected to yield net economy-wide 
benefits. The larger the reduction, the larger the gain to the wider community and 
economy.  
• Moreover, the projected net benefits mask the much larger gains to Australian 
car buyers and taxpayers. In addition to around $1 billion in tariffs they pay on 
car imports, more than $1 billion is redistributed each year to the automotive 
industry (a majority of which is foreign owned).  
• The automotive industry is projected to contract as a result of reductions in 
assistance (more so for car assembly than component manufacture), but this 
reduction is more than offset by expansion of activity in the services and mining 
sectors. As a result, there are projected (small) declines in aggregate economic 
activity in South Australia, and to a lesser extent in Victoria, but increases in 
Western Australia and Queensland. Nonetheless, output per person in all States 
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and Territories is estimated to increase.  
• The modelling also suggests that reducing tariffs is significantly more beneficial 
to the community than reducing ACIS. As well as different levels of assistance 
currently provided by tariffs and subsidies, this reflects the additional impost 
tariffs place on the purchase price of cars compared with direct budgetary 
support (which instead places the funding burden on taxpayers, typically in a 
less distorting manner than tariffs). That said, the model does not capture the 
complexity of the tax system in Australia and likely underestimates the benefits 
of reducing the tax burden and, hence, the benefits from reducing ACIS.  
Of course, the simulations are sensitive to the many assumptions underlying the 
model and, as noted earlier, must be considered in conjunction with a range of other 
potentially important impacts. A number of ‘sensitivity’ scenarios were modelled to 
test the robustness of the results. These involved different model ‘closures’ and 
different key parameters, but none significantly affected the estimates or the 
qualitative differences across simulations.  
The assumed export demand elasticities are of particular relevance for the current 
exercise. The Commission used an export demand elasticity of 10 (that is, a 
1 per cent decrease in the price of Australia’s commodity exports leads to a 
10 per cent increase in the quantity demanded). Essentially, this means that 
additional exports can only be sold with a (small) decrease in their price, leading to 
a deterioration in the terms of trade. Sensitivity analysis undertaken with an export 
demand elasticity of 5 still showed net benefits from assistance reductions, though 
negligible. Of course, if sufficiently low elasticities were assumed, the projected fall 
in the terms of trade driven by higher export volumes following a tariff reduction 
could outweigh the projected gains from reallocating resources, reducing national 
income. However, such low elasticities are generally regarded as implausible, given 
that Australia’s exports comprise a small share of world trade.  
Moreover, relatively low elasticities often are used in GE models to proxy the 
impact of frictions in the economy not captured in the model, and so do not 
necessarily represent a considered assessment of the actual degree of market power 
in trade. At any rate, even if Australian exporters of some commodities do possess 
market power, maintaining protection of the automotive industry would be a very 
blunt and relatively costly way of exploiting it (box 3).  
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Box 3 Export elasticities and terms of trade effects  
The theoretical proposition that small tariffs may add to national income by taxing 
foreigners has sometimes been invoked in reviews of tariff policy. However, because of 
the informational requirements and risk of retaliation by trading partners, it has rarely 
become a practical policy rationale.  
At issue is whether Australia has the degree of market power in world markets required 
to achieve this result (whether indirectly through protection of the automotive industry 
or by directly taxing or restricting key exports such as iron ore, wheat and wool). The 
weight of evidence is that even for these commodities, in the longer term, Australian 
industries are more likely ‘price takers’ than ‘price makers’. For example, despite many 
in-depth reviews, there is scant evidence that the single export desk for wheat was 
able to capture price premiums in world markets by exploiting market power.  
Even if exporters had market power in world markets, the efficient response would be 
to tax exports of the commodities in question directly, taking into account 
developments in international markets. Relying on indirect linkages between the 
automotive industry (or any other import-competing industry) and resources used in the 
export sector would be a haphazard and risky approach.   
 
Accounting for exogenous effects  
As noted at the outset, while GE modelling is the most useful tool available, it can 
shed light on only a subset of the economy-wide ramifications of changes in 
industry assistance. Other considerations must also be accounted for.  
• One is adjustment costs. Some workers will lose their jobs as assistance is 
reduced and owners of capital may also suffer losses if the value of plant and 
equipment falls. (Though losses incurred by foreign owners do not diminish 
Australian wealth.) In the Commission’s assessment, however, adjustment costs 
would be mitigated by the current buoyant economic conditions and the 
likelihood that manufacturers and their employees have already adjusted, at least 
in part, to the previously scheduled reductions in industry assistance. However, 
adjustment may be ‘lumpy’ rather than incremental, with job losses concentrated 
in locations where firms close. Even in such cases, it would make more sense to 
facilitate workers to adjust rather than incur the ongoing costs of supporting 
additional activity that would otherwise be unprofitable. On the Commission’s 
reckoning, each job currently ‘saved’ in the industry requires around $300 000 in 
support each year from the Australian community.  
• Second, automotive assistance policies, if carefully targeted, might generate 
spillover benefits to the economy which could be forfeited if assistance were 
reduced. But tariffs and ACIS mainly cause the industry to be larger than 
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otherwise, and are not targeted at developing skills or supporting types of 
research and development that would generate significant benefits outside the 
industry itself.  
– Assisted ‘green car’ production is unlikely to lead either to innovation 
spillovers or lower greenhouse emissions. The GCIF will likely encourage 
some buyers to switch from taxed, more efficiently produced imported hybrid 
and fuel-efficient vehicles to subsidised, higher cost, locally-produced ones 
— without markedly increasing ‘green car’ sales overall. Moreover, with an 
Emissions Trading Scheme in prospect, policies that directly encourage or 
prescribe production and use of particular emission reduction technologies 
are not needed and may be counterproductive.  
• The model does not capture economies of scale, the presence of which could 
mean that a relatively small reduction in assistance triggers the closure of some 
firms because their unit costs rise as sales fall. On the other hand, economies of 
scale can assist lower-cost firms which are able to capture some of the sales from 
plants that close (for example, in the car fleet market). From this perspective, 
industry protection may encourage industry fragmentation, rather than drive 
efficient integration and achievement of scale economies. In addition, firms with 
economies of scale in other industries, by reducing their costs as output expands, 
could benefit more from reductions in automotive assistance than estimated by 
the model.  
• Also not modelled are impacts on productivity that might flow from increased 
competitive pressures on the industry. In its 2002 inquiry, the Commission 
observed the potential for large efficiency gains from further workplace 
flexibility within enterprises, and it is probable that many of these gains remain 
untapped. The key is cooperation at the workplace level to facilitate operational 
improvements, but relaxing previously-announced assistance reductions could 
reduce the impetus for agreement.  
– A number of other sources of cost savings have not been modelled. Adhering 
to an agreed program of reductions in assistance may reduce future lobbying 
by industries to gain or retain assistance, and the costs that this entails. Cost 
savings could also come from reducing program compliance and 
administrative burdens on firms and government.  
Related considerations  
As noted earlier, the Review Panel sought modelling of a scenario in which the 
Australian dollar achieved parity with the US dollar. Simulating this within a 
GE model is problematic — instead the Commission modelled a terms of trade 
improvement to show possible effects of higher export commodity prices generated 
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by a continued ‘minerals boom’. Not surprisingly, as shown in table 2, the resultant 
large real appreciation swamps the effects of reductions in industry assistance, 
causing the automotive industry, along with other manufacturing industries, to 
contract relative to mining and the non-traded (services) sector.  
That said, delaying scheduled assistance reductions would impede scarce resources 
from flowing to their highest-valued uses in the economy, reducing the scope for 
Australia to benefit from rising world commodity prices. Moreover, sheltering one 
industry from these pressures would place greater adjustment burdens on other 
industries.  
Other market developments, such as changing consumer preferences and the 
negotiation of preferential trade agreements, have not been modelled, but are 
unlikely to overturn the projected benefits of assistance reductions either. For 
example, consumer preferences change in all markets and businesses that pick such 
trends succeed. Indeed, it is plausible that government policies (including the 
relatively higher tariff for passenger motor vehicles compared with SUVs and 
government purchasing preferences) have skewed production towards larger 
‘family’ cars, blunting the incentive for the industry to respond to changes in buyer 
preferences. The promised inducement for the production of hybrid and other green 
car models and features poses similar risks.  
Summing up the economy-wide effects 
In the Commission’s assessment, modelling of the various assistance options, in 
conjunction with these broader considerations, suggests that economy-wide gains 
are greater under the current assistance reduction program. Reducing tariffs to 
5 per cent by 2010 and removing ACIS by 2015 can be expected to have a positive 
pay off. By comparison, the options that would prolong higher assistance for this 
industry would be likely to impose costs on the community as a whole.  
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1 Background and approach to the 
study 
1.1 Introduction 
Concentrated in Victoria and South Australia, the Australian motor vehicles and 
parts (MVP) industry (box 1.1) includes three foreign-owned vehicle assemblers 
and around 200 component producers. It accounts for approximately 0.6 per cent of 
Australia’s gross value added and employment, with exports totalling around 
$5 billion, or some 40 per cent of its production. Several hundred specialised 
tooling and service providers are also linked to the industry’s supply chain. 
This study disaggregates the MVP industry into car assembly, car component 
manufacturing, and production of other vehicles and related components. The 
‘automotive industry’ is defined as the cars and components sectors only, and is the 
focus of this study. It accounts for around 75 per cent of the value added of the 
MVP industry. 
Although automotive assistance has been wound down over the past 25 years, the 
automotive industry continues to command much higher levels of assistance than 
most other Australian industries. For example, tariffs on imported cars and 
components are generally at 10 per cent — double or more than those applying to 
most other imports — and the industry obtains substantial budgetary assistance 
from the Australian Government. The resultant assistance to the industry is 
estimated to have amounted to some $1.13 billion in 2006-07, equivalent to around 
$23 500 per automotive worker (chapter 2). The industry also receives ad hoc 
assistance from State Governments, and benefits from other measures such as 
government purchasing preferences (detailed in chapter 2). 
In recent years, the industry has faced heightened competitive pressures from 
imports, which have been attributed to four main sources, namely: 
• the 35 per cent appreciation of the Australian dollar (in trade-weighted terms) 
since 2002 which, while reducing the price of imported intermediate inputs used  
in vehicle production, has also made imported vehicles cheaper for Australian 
consumers 
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Box 1.1 The Australian motor vehicle and parts industry:  
some facts and figures 
• There are three vehicle producers — Holden, Ford and Toyota — all of which are 
subsidiaries of major overseas producers. They produce four passenger vehicle 
models (and derivatives of those models) at three plants in Melbourne and 
Adelaide, augmenting this range with vehicles sourced from affiliates overseas.  
• More than 200 firms produce automotive components for use as both original 
equipment in new vehicles and for the replacement market. While many of these 
firms are located in Melbourne and Adelaide, significant component production also 
occurs in Sydney and in a number of major regional centres. There are also several 
hundred, mainly small, firms around Australia producing replacement components 
and accessories exclusively for the ‘aftermarket’.  
• Numerous small firms provide specialised tooling to vehicle and component 
producers. Most of these are located in Victoria, with the remainder in New South 
Wales and South Australia (ABS 2005g). Vehicle and component producers also 
have some in-house tooling capacity, but this is mainly used for maintenance and 
repair.  
• Several firms provide specialist automotive engineering, design, testing and 
customising services, although much of this activity is undertaken in-house by 
vehicle and component producers.  
• Employment is around 68 000, including some 23 000 in vehicle assembly. The 
industry accounts for around 6 per cent of both value added and employment in the 
manufacturing sector and around 0.6 per cent of value added and employment in 
the economy as a whole (ABS 2007a). It is of greater significance to the South 
Australian and Victorian economies, and to particular cities and regions within them. 
• The local vehicle market has been growing steadily over the past decade. However, 
much of this growth has been for smaller passenger and all-terrain/four-wheel-drive 
vehicles that, apart from sales of the Ford Territory, are currently imported. 
• Most locally-produced vehicles are large models, with three-quarters of domestic 
sales made to fleet customers, of which 25 per cent are government purchases 
(Bracks 2008a). Domestic demand for large vehicles has stagnated in recent years, 
contributing to a decline in the industry’s share of the local passenger vehicle 
market from around 70 per cent in the early nineties to 25 per cent in 2006 (DIISR 
2006).  
• The industry has largely offset the impact of this fall in market share by increasing 
exports. Exports, which now account for more than 40 per cent of production 
compared with less than 9 per cent in the early 1990s, were valued at around 
$5 billion in 2007. Major export markets include the Middle East, the United States, 
New Zealand and Korea.  
 
• a further shift in consumer preferences from the large cars produced 
domestically, towards imported smaller and more fuel efficient cars, in the 
context of a substantial increase in the real price of oil (which more than doubled 
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over the five years from 2001-02). 
• the effects of a reduction in automotive tariffs, from 15 to 10 per cent, in 2005 
• tariff preferences for automotive imports from Thailand and the United States, 
provided under preferential trade agreements (PTAs) that commenced in 2005. 
Vehicle imports have increased more sharply over the last five years. Although total 
domestic sales have also increased over this period and automotive exports have 
continued to grow, local production has fallen significantly from its peak in 2003 
(figure 1.1). 
Figure 1.1 Production, imports and exports of cars in Australia, 1982–2007 
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Data sources: DIISR (1999, 2006); FCAI (2008a).  
These developments have added to pressures for rationalisation within the industry, 
which in turn have been reflected in some recent plant closures. Most notably, in 
March 2008 Mitsubishi ceased manufacturing operations in Adelaide, following 
lacklustre sales of its 380 model, and Ford has foreshadowed the closure of its 
Geelong engine plant from 2010. The components sector has also struggled against 
pressures such as escalating prices for raw materials, which have caused a number 
of businesses to cease production (Bracks 2008a).  
Such developments have brought calls for a pause to legislated reductions in tariffs, 
which are currently scheduled to fall to 5 per cent in 2010, or for further increases in 
other forms of assistance.  
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1.2 The Bracks Review and the Commission’s study 
On 14 February 2008, the Australian Government commissioned a review of the 
automotive industry by a panel headed by the former Premier of Victoria, the 
Honourable Steve Bracks. The Bracks Review is to assess the challenges and 
opportunities currently facing the automotive industry, and to make 
recommendations on government policies and assistance arrangements for the 
industry in the years ahead.  
In announcing the review, the Minister for Innovation, Industry, Science and 
Research charged the review with the task of ‘laying down a new set of principles to 
make the industry sustainable into the future’ and ensuring ‘that government 
programs [for the industry] are effective and efficient’. The review is also intended 
to ‘particularly consider the impact of global concern about climate change on the 
industry and the impact of changing consumer vehicle preferences’ (Carr 2008c). 
The panel is scheduled to report by the end of July 2008. 
When announcing the review, the Minister foreshadowed that: 
The Government will separately request the Productivity Commission to undertake 
modelling on economy-wide effects of future assistance options. The Commission’s 
modelling will be released publicly to inform the panel’s examination of the industry, 
public debate, and the Government’s deliberations in this area. (Carr 2008c) 
The Commission subsequently received a letter from the Assistant Treasurer, on 
14 April 2008, formally requesting that it undertake this study (appendix A). 
Whereas the Bracks Review has been requested to work with the automotive 
industry ‘to overcome barriers to success and … take advantage of new 
opportunities’ (Carr 2008c), the emphasis of the Commission’s task is to focus on 
the economy-wide effects of future assistance options for the industry. Taking an 
economy-wide approach involves gauging the effects of the various policy options 
on all parts of the economy — including firms and workers in other industries as 
well as consumers and taxpayers. It also requires consideration of impacts across 
different parts of Australia.  
1.3 Background to the current assistance regime 
In the past, the automotive industry has received extremely high levels of assistance, 
delivered predominantly through tariffs, import quotas, local content schemes and 
similar protective arrangements. A series of inquiries by the Commission’s 
predecessor bodies, dating from the 1970s (IAC 1974, 1981; IC 1990, 1997), found 
that the industry was one of Australia’s most highly assisted. Indeed, when the 
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industry’s ‘effective rate of assistance’ (ERA) peaked in the mid-1980s, it was 
almost six times higher than the average rate for manufacturing industries.1  
The Commission’s inquiries revealed that behind these protective walls had grown a 
fragmented, inward-looking and uncompetitive industry. The arrangements were 
found to be imposing high costs on consumers and on other industries, and 
modelling confirmed that the distortions in the allocation of resources across the 
economy were creating net costs for Australia overall.  
As noted earlier, Australian governments have significantly reduced automotive 
assistance since the mid-1980s. Assistance has also been recalibrated, with less 
emphasis on import protection and more on budgetary support, including for 
adjustment and innovation.  
Over this period, the automotive industry has undergone a major rationalisation and 
transformation. In its most recent inquiry into automotive assistance, conducted in 
2002, the Commission reported that domestic vehicle assemblers and component 
producers had become more specialised, adopted more innovative and efficient 
production practices, lifted quality standards, undertaken greater product 
innovation, adopted more flexible and productive work practices, and become more 
export-oriented. Although the industry still had some significant weaknesses 
(especially in relation to workplace relations), the Commission found that the 
industry’s efficiency and competitiveness had improved considerably.  
While reforms to the industry’s assistance were found to have played a strong role 
in these improvements, they were also facilitated by macro- and micro-economic 
reform generally (including more flexible industrial relations and lower 
infrastructure costs) and other economic developments (including a significant 
depreciation in the exchange rate from the early 1980s).  
Modelling and ‘exogenous’ considerations in the Commission’s 2002 
policy assessment 
The principal task of the Commission’s 2002 inquiry was to advise the Government 
on assistance for the automotive industry beyond 2005, when key elements of the 
previous assistance arrangements were due to terminate.  
                                                 
1  The ERA is a measure of net assistance to an industry divided by the industry’s value added (see 
chapter 2 for further details). The ERA for the motor vehicle and parts industry peaked at almost 
140 per cent in 1984-85, when the average ERA for the manufacturing sector was 23.4 per cent 
(PC 2000). Today, the ERA for the automotive industry is around 15 per cent, (see chapter 2) 
compared to 4.5 per cent for the manufacturing sector overall (PC 2008a). 
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In contrast to its approach in earlier inquiries, which were conducted when 
automotive assistance was much higher, the Commission noted that making 
assessments about appropriate assistance arrangements for the years after 2005 was 
more complicated.  
The previously high levels of automotive assistance had led to significant 
distortions in resource allocation across the economy. Hence, reducing assistance 
offered the prospect of a significant net gain to the community from a better 
allocation of resources — an outcome reflected in quantitative modelling 
undertaken at the time. These so called ‘static resource allocation’ gains were 
judged, in those earlier reviews, to greatly outweigh the accompanying adjustment 
costs — particularly given the opportunity for the industry to mitigate adjustment 
pressures through improvements in productivity and quality.  
But with assistance to the industry to be much lower by 2005, the Commission 
found in its 2002 inquiry that the allocative gains likely to ensue from further 
reductions in government support would be commensurately smaller. Indeed, the 
quantitative modelling undertaken for the inquiry suggested that the gains could 
even be outweighed for a period by consequent small, but adverse, shifts in the 
‘terms of trade’ (the price of Australia’s exports relative to its imports). 
With the static resource allocation effects becoming smaller and, it appeared, 
largely offset by terms of trade effects, the Commission indicated that policy 
judgements depended more than previously on considerations that were not directly 
captured in quantitative modelling. These ‘exogenous’ considerations, such as 
potential productivity gains, industry-specific market failures and adjustment costs, 
had always been part of the policy calculus; they now assumed greater significance 
in formulating future assistance policy. 
Among the key exogenous issues raised in favour of assistance were that process 
and skills development in the automotive sector generated ‘spillover’ benefits, and 
that assistance was necessary to ensure that local automotive producers were able to 
capture globally mobile capital, ahead of rivals in other countries. However, the 
Commission did not find such spillover and ‘investment competition’ arguments for 
greater assistance compelling. Among other things, it found that generally-available 
measures such as an Research and Development (R&D) tax concession, which 
could be accessed by all industries, were the preferable means of realising any such 
benefits.  
Nor did the Commission see merit in arguments by industry participants that 
changes in assistance to the Australian automotive industry should be made 
contingent on reforms in overseas markets. It noted, among other things, that such a 
policy would effectively sideline the range of domestic considerations that are 
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relevant to Australia’s decision on whether to further reduce automotive tariffs 
(such as costs to consumers and other businesses), and could greatly delay the 
benefits of further reform. 
On the question of whether assistance should be linked to currency movements, the 
Commission concurred with the view put by the Federation of Automotive Product 
Manufacturers that:  
To argue that the tariff should be reduced when the dollar is down is to suggest that it 
should be increased when the Australian dollar is strong. This would not be good policy 
and would create enormous uncertainty for the future. (PC 2002, p. 151) 
On the other hand, the Commission did see a number of exogenous matters as 
enhancing the case for continuing with reductions in automotive assistance. These 
included the scope for such reductions to induce further improvements in the 
industry’s productivity, as earlier reforms had achieved. There were also risks that 
halting reform may indicate that the government was susceptible to industry 
lobbying for preferment, encouraging the diversion of entrepreneurial effort away 
from more productive activities. The Commission was also cognisant of the 
substantial and ongoing costs to car buyers, taxpayers and other Australian 
businesses entailed in assistance to the automotive sector. 
The Commission’s 2002 recommendations and the Government’s 
response 
Recognising the desire of the automotive industry for policy clarity and certainty 
and the benefits they would bring, the Commission’s recommendations covered the 
decade from 2005 to 2015. Its key recommendations were that: 
• after the scheduled decline in automotive tariffs to 10 per cent in 2005, they 
should remain at that level until 2010, when they should be reduced to 5 per cent 
• the Automotive Competitiveness and Investment Scheme (ACIS) be extended, 
largely in its prevailing form, as a transitional mechanism until the end of 2010.  
Although there were reservations about the effects of ACIS, the Commission 
supported an extension of the scheme until 2010 on the basis that it would help ease 
the industry’s transition to the lower tariff environment it had recommended. 
Similarly, the Commission expressed concerns about some other forms of assistance 
to the industry, such as government purchasing preferences, but held back from 
recommending reforms to these areas in the transitional period to 2015, during 
which automotive tariffs were to fall to 5 per cent.  
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While recognising that adoption of its recommendations would generate further 
pressures for rationalisation within the industry, the Commission indicated that they 
had been designed to minimise the potential for disruptive change in the industry. It 
noted, however, that diverse pressures for adjustment would remain, and that any 
pronounced or regionally concentrated adjustment could warrant specific measures 
to assist affected employees or regions. 
The Australian Government announced a new assistance package for the 
automotive industry in December 2002. The package mirrored the Commission’s 
recommendations regarding tariffs, but entailed an increase in the quantum of 
assistance provided under ACIS and extended the scheme until 2015. In announcing 
the new arrangements, the Government stated: 
The new look package goes far beyond what was recommended by the Productivity 
Commission Review, adding an extra 50% or $1.4 billion over the 10 year continuation 
of the scheme. … Similar to its predecessor, the post-2005 Automotive 
Competitiveness and Investment Scheme will be a transitional scheme that will 
encourage competitive investments by firms in the automotive industry in order to 
achieve sustainable growth. (Macfarlane 2002) 
1.4 The Commission’s approach to this study 
Whereas the Commission’s 2002 review of automotive assistance was a full public 
inquiry, entailing the release of a draft ‘position’ paper and providing extensive 
scope for public consultation and the testing of ideas and arguments, this present 
commissioned study is a more limited exercise. As outlined earlier, the Commission 
has been tasked with modelling the economy-wide effects of assistance options and 
scenarios outlined by the Bracks Review of the automotive industry. However, the 
purpose of the study is not only to inform the Review’s examination of the industry, 
but also to help inform the public discussion and the Government’s deliberations 
(Carr 2008c). 
The model used in this report is a version of the Monash Multi-Regional 
Forecasting model, a general equilibrium model based on the one used in the 
Commission’s report on the Potential Benefits of the National Reform Agenda 
(PC 2006) and subsequently released publicly. It includes a detailed representation 
of the automotive industry at the State/Territory level, and provides an indication of 
how policy changes affect different parts of the Australian economy. For this report, 
the model has been disaggregated to identify vehicle assemblers and component 
manufacturers separately. Thus, in measuring how each jurisdiction’s economy and 
the national economy adapt to the modelled scenarios, the model reflects the 
influence of: 
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• differences in the size and structure of each jurisdiction’s economy 
• the relationship between various parts of the automotive industry and other parts 
of the economy. 
The model is used to simulate different policy scenarios detailed in chapter 3. The 
scenarios include, but are not limited to, the options indicated in the request from 
the Assistant Treasurer (appendix A). The options include various changes to the 
mix, nature and level of assistance provided through tariffs and ACIS. Importantly, 
they exclude changes to other government policies benefitting the automotive 
industry such as the tariff on second-hand vehicles, government purchasing 
preferences, and generally available measures such as TRADEX and the 
125 per cent tax concession for expenditure on R&D (see chapter 2).  
While shedding light on a number of issues relevant for considering future 
assistance for the automotive industry, economic modelling also has limitations. 
Accordingly, as in the 2002 inquiry, this study has examined the sensitivity of 
parameters and features of the model used, and has sought to take into account key 
exogenous factors that influence the effects of assistance policies and/or the merits 
of those policies, together with its primary modelling assessments. 
The Commission’s modelling approach and some preliminary results were reviewed 
by a panel of expert modellers at a work-in-progress technical workshop, held on 
28 April 2008. Participants included three referees, as well as representatives of the 
Automotive Review Secretariat, the Australian Government Treasury, and the 
Department of Innovation, Industry, Science and Research. A summary of the 
referee comments and a description of how those comments have been incorporated 
into the modelling are set out in appendix B. 
Where relevant, the Commission has also drawn on findings from its earlier reviews 
and modelling exercises, together with information provided in the Bracks 
background and discussion papers.  
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2 Current assistance to the industry 
To be able to model the effects of changes in assistance, a detailed understanding of 
how assistance arrangements operate is required. In this chapter, the current 
arrangements — how they are implemented and the levels of support — are 
outlined. The focus is on those measures that are explicitly referred to in the task 
requested of the Commission (appendix A), namely: 
• tariffs 
• two budgetary measures — the Automotive Competitiveness and Investment 
Scheme (ACIS) and the proposed Green Car Innovation Fund (GCIF). 
Other policies that assist the automotive industry in Australia (box 2.1) are also 
outlined briefly, but were not modelled in this study. 
2.1 Tariff assistance 
A 10 per cent Most-Favoured-Nation (MFN) tariff currently applies to most imports 
of new cars and related automotive components into Australia.1 Under current 
plans, this rate is due to fall to 5 per cent on 1 January 2010. (This will equate to the 
general tariff rate that, since 1996, has already applied to most other manufactured 
imports.) Currently, a 5 per cent tariff is applied to light commercial and 4WD 
vehicles and related components. This is not scheduled to change. 
Tariffs lower than the MFN rate apply to imports from some countries under 
preferential trade agreements (PTAs). Australia has entered into four bilateral trade 
agreements — with New Zealand, Singapore, the United States and Thailand — and 
several other concessional arrangements are in place.2 Although tariffs still apply to 
some automotive imports from these countries (but not to those from New Zealand, 
                                                 
1 The MFN rate applies to imports from all World Trade Organization (WTO) member countries 
for which no preferential agreement exists. The MFN rate varies from zero to 10 per cent, 
depending on the product involved. 
2 For example, Canada and Australia grant each other preferential tariffs on a limited range of 
products under the Canada–Australia Trade Agreement, which was established in 1960 and 
amended in 1973 (DFAT 2007). Australia also has preferential agreements under Generalised 
System of Preferences arrangements, as well as with countries of the South Pacific and Papua 
New Guinea.  
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(table 2.1).3  
 
Box 2.1 Policies that assist the Australian automotive industry 
The automotive industry in Australia benefits from a range of policy measures, in 
addition to tariffs and ACIS (and, by 2011, the GCIF).  
Industry-specific initiatives 
• Tariff of $12 000 on imports of second-hand vehicles (other than for specialist use), 
which effectively precludes competition from this source. 
• Purchasing preferences (of some governments and statutory bodies) for vehicles 
manufactured or imported by local vehicle producers. These effectively provide a 
subsidy to companies with a local presence. 
• The fringe benefits tax concession on private use of company cars, which is seen as 
especially important to local manufacturers, given their reliance on fleet sales. 
• Ad hoc support by State/Territory and Australian Governments, such as through 
payroll tax concessions, grants and low-interest loans, often to attract new 
investment, to prevent a threatened plant closure or to provide support for 
adjustment following a closure.  
• AutoCRC (the Cooperative Research Centre for Advanced Automotive Technology). 
Created in December 2005, it is partly funded by the Australian Government, and 
involves nine car assemblers and component manufacturers, two State 
Governments and ten research institutions. It aims to deliver ‘smarter, safer, cleaner 
manufacturing and vehicle technologies’.  
General policies 
• The Export Market Development Grants Scheme, which provides taxable grants to 
reimburse up to 50 per cent of designated export promotion expenses (focusing on 
small and medium enterprises). 
• TRADEX, which provides upfront exemptions from customs duty and GST on 
imported goods that are intended for direct export or are used in the manufacture of 
exported goods. 
• R&D grants and tax concessions — including the 125 per cent R&D concession, the 
Premium 175 per cent tax concession, and the R&D tax offset (which is available to 
companies with an annual turnover of less than $5 million). 
Sources: AutoCRC (2008); PC (2002, 2008a).  
 
                                                 
3 Australia is also currently considering or negotiating PTAs with India, Korea, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, China, Japan, ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) and the Gulf 
Cooperation Council (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab 
Emirates). On 27 May 2008, the Australian Government announced that it had concluded PTA 
negotiations with Chile. The agreement is expected to be formally signed in late July 2008 and 
take effect on 1 January 2009 (Crean 2008). 
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Given these PTAs, the actual nominal tariff on automotive products — as 
represented by a trade-weighted average (box 2.2) — is lower than 10 per cent. 
Preferential arrangements may not necessarily reduce the level of assistance 
provided to the Australian industry, however, particularly if they result in so-called 
‘trade diversion’ rather than ‘trade creation’ (box 2.3). 
Table 2.1 Preferential and MFN tariff rates, automotive industry, 2005 
Country  Carsa Components Others
No. of tariff lines  24 84 100
Canada Minimum  (%) 0 0 0
 Maximum (%) 0 10 10
MFN Minimum  (%) 5 0 0
 Maximum (%) 10 10 10
Minimum  (%) 0 0 0New Zealand,  
Papua New Guinea, 
Singapore Maximum (%) 0 0 0
Thailand Minimum  (%) 5 0 0
 Maximum (%) 10 10 10
United States Minimum  (%) 5 0 0
 Maximum (%) 10 10 10
a
  ‘Cars’, ‘components’ and ‘others’ are the sectors as defined in the process of disaggregating the MMRF 
database (chapter 3). Australia does not import all automotive products from each country listed.  
Source: Appendix C. 
The net assistance provided to an industry can be measured by the net subsidy 
equivalent and effective rate of assistance, which account for the effects of all forms 
of assistance on the prices of an industry’s outputs, as well as the effects of 
assistance on the prices of an industry’s inputs (box 2.3). Effective rates provide an 
indication of the extent to which assistance allows an industry to attract and hold 
economic resources. Industries with relatively high effective rates of assistance are 
more likely, as a result of their assistance, to be able to attract resources away from 
those with lower rates (PC 2008a).  
In 2006-07, the estimated effective rates of assistance due to tariffs alone were 
4.2 per cent for car assemblers and 8.8 per cent for components manufacturers.  
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Box 2.2 Some tariff concepts 
Ad valorem tariffs are applied as a percentage of the ‘free on board’ value of the 
imported good (such as 10 per cent). 
Specific tariffs are applied as a given dollar amount per unit of the imported good to 
which they are applied (such as $12 000 per car). A specific tariff on a good can be 
converted to an ad valorem equivalent by dividing the tariff revenue by the value of 
the imports concerned. 
Trade-weighted average tariffs account for the fact that different tariff rates apply to: 
• different goods produced by an industry  
• goods imported from different countries. 
They are calculated as the weighted sum of each import from each country, that is: 
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where Mij represents the value of imports M of product j from partner country i, and tij is 
the tariff rate applied to those imports. Thus, for example, a high tariff rate receives a 
low weight if few of the goods to which it is applied are actually imported. 
Sources: Appendix D; PC (2008a).  
 
2.2 Budgetary assistance 
In addition to tariff protection, various forms of budgetary assistance are available 
to the automotive industry. Some of these are specific to it, while others are also 
available to other industries (box 2.1; PC 2007b, 2008a). Of those that target the 
automotive industry, ACIS and the recently-announced GCIF are briefly examined 
below, to provide an understanding of the approach taken to incorporating these 
measures in the modelling. 
The Automotive Competitiveness and Investment Scheme  
ACIS was introduced in 2001 as a transitional measure to help the automotive 
industry adjust to lower tariffs and to increased international competition, 
containing some elements of the earlier Export Facilitation Scheme and Duty Free 
Allowance (PC 2002). As noted in chapter 1, the transitional nature of the program 
was re-emphasised by the (then) Australian Government when it announced 
changes to assistance arrangements following the Commission’s 2002 inquiry.  
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Box 2.3 Estimating assistance to the car and components sectors 
Broadly speaking, effective rates of assistance (ERAs) are calculated as the net 
assistance provided to an industry divided by the industry’s unassisted value-added. 
The Commission publishes assistance estimates for a range of industries, including 
motor vehicles and parts (MVP), annually in its Trade & Assistance Review publication. 
For 2006-07, the MVP industry was estimated to have received a net subsidy 
equivalent of $1.26 billion from the tariff and budgetary measures covered in the 
estimates. The accompanying ERA was 12.2 per cent (PC 2008a). For this study, the 
Commission has disaggregated these estimates into separate estimates for cars and 
components (and ‘others’), in line with the scope of the automotive assistance 
arrangements being modelled.  
Tariffs and tariff preferences 
The estimates of tariff assistance are derived in part by assuming that MFN rates 
approximate the ‘price wedge’ created by tariffs. The estimates abstract from the 
effects of tariff concessions provided under preferential trade agreements (PTAs). 
The tariff concessions provided under PTAs need not result in any significant impact on 
prices in the domestic market and, thus, on assistance provided by the general (MFN) 
tariff regime. This would be the case if automotive producers in the partner country 
effectively ‘pocketed’ the tariff concession, rather than reduced their prices below the 
prevailing (tariff-inflated) price of rival vehicles made elsewhere. For example, 
automotive imports from Thailand have grown significantly since the Thailand-Australia 
PTA took effect in 2005 (although it is understood that many of these are in the ‘other’ 
vehicles and components category that are outside the focus of the current study). 
While an empirical matter, in the car segment it appears plausible that the main effect 
of the agreement has been to induce a switch in the source of some imports, rather 
than induce significant reductions in the price of those imports. To the extent that this is 
so, the MFN rate would remain the most appropriate measure of the ‘price wedge’ 
created by automotive tariffs and these related concessions. 
However, to the extent that concessions provided by PTAs result in a reduction in the 
prices of cars and related components in the Australian market, assistance to the 
automotive industry’s outputs will be lower than that implied by the MFN rate. Equally 
though, to the extent that the price of components is lower, the penalties (or negative 
assistance) on car assemblers’ inputs will also be lower than implied by the MFN rate. 
In these circumstances, use of the MFN rate could result in some overstatement of 
assistance to the components sector, and either some overstatement or 
understatement of assistance to assemblers, depending on trade patterns with the 
PTA partner countries and which automotive products have been subject to price 
reductions (and their relative magnitudes). 
On the other hand, to the extent that PTAs afford Australian automotive producers 
preferential market access in partner countries, effective assistance to the Australian 
industry could be increased. In effect, Australian producers would obtain the benefit of 
assistance provided by a partner country’s general automotive tariff regime for exports 
to that market. The actual assistance effects would depend on the extent of trade 
between partner countries and the margin of preference afforded by the PTA.  
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Box 2.3 (continued) 
Budgetary and other assistance 
As well as general tariff assistance, the estimates for the automotive industry cover 
support provided through ACIS, TRADEX, Export Market Development Grants, the 
R&D offset and tax concessions, the AutoCRC and some other, minor, items. The 
estimates omit assistance from several other sources, including State Government 
budgetary assistance and the potentially substantial assistance afforded by government 
purchasing preferences and the $12 000 duty on imported second-hand vehicles.  
Disaggregation procedure 
The assistance estimates for MVP were disaggregated as follows: 
• production, materials and value added estimates for cars and components were 
derived using material usage and value added shares from the modelling database 
• ACIS shares from the modelling database were used to disaggregate ACIS between 
cars and components  
• for non-ACIS budgetary assistance, given limited information about the industry 
incidence of these programs, production shares, as derived from the modelling 
database were used to allocate this assistance between cars and components 
• tariff assistance estimates, as published in Trade & Assistance Review, were 
disaggregated according to the average tariff levels on inputs and outputs that are 
faced by both cars and component producers.  
Assistance estimates for the combined automotive industry, 2006-07 
 Cars Components Automotive
Net Subsidy Equivalent $m $m $m
  Tariffs 148.0 373.3 521.3
  ACIS 357.0 180.0 537.0
  Other budgetary assistance 33.5 36.4 69.9
Total 538.5 589.7 1128.2
 
Effective Rate of Assistance % % %
  Tariffs 4.2 8.8 6.7
  ACIS 10.1 4.3 6.9
  Other budgetary assistance 0.9 0.9 0.9
Total 15.2 13.9 14.5
The estimated total net subsidy equivalent for the automotive industry of $1.13 billion is 
equivalent to $23 500 per worker, based on employment levels of 48 000 (based on 
employment data classified by ANZSIC codes drawn from ABS 2007a). 
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ACIS support is delivered through import duty credits funded by tariff revenue,4 
and has been designed in three stages. 
• Stage 1 (1 January 2001 to 31 December 2005). Funding included capped credits 
totalling $2 billion, as well as uncapped credits. 
• Stage 2 (1 January 2006 to 31 December 2010). Funding includes capped credits 
totalling $2 billion. Uncapped credits continue unchanged. 
• Stage 3 (scheduled to begin on 1 January 2011 and end on 31 December 2015). 
Total capped credits worth $1 billion, with annual funding to decline 
progressively over the period. Uncapped credits will continue unchanged. 
(AusIndustry 2008a) 
The nature of the scheme means that the level of capped ACIS funding falls as 
tariffs fall. 
ACIS credits are issued quarterly to registered motor vehicle assemblers, 
automotive component producers, automotive machine tool and tooling producers, 
and automotive service providers (figure 2.1; box 2.4).  
Figure 2.1 Allocation of ACIS funding, 2007 
0.3% Service providers1.5% Tool producers
39.2% Component 
producers
59% Vehicle 
producers
 
Data source: AusIndustry, unpublished data. 
Credits are tradeable and can be sold to any firm (in any industry) that has an 
interest in importing the eligible goods. Revenue from selling credits can be used 
                                                 
4 Credits are used to discharge customs duty paid on ‘eligible automotive products’ which include 
motor vehicles under Harmonised System (HS) subheadings 8702, 8703 and 8704 and any 
components or machinery that are used specifically in producing them (Customs Tariff Act 1995 
(Cwlth), Schedule 4, Item 41E). 
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for a range of purposes, including research and development (R&D), investment, 
export market development and training (PC 2002). In practice, credits are traded at 
a small discount. The Commission noted in its last automotive inquiry (PC 2002), 
for example, that many component producers sold their credits to vehicle importers 
at a price of around 95 to 98 cents in the dollar. 
 
Box 2.4 How ACIS credits are distributed 
Uncapped credits are distributed exclusively to car assemblers and are tied to 
production levels, according to the formula: PMVPMVuncapped tPACIS ××= 15.0 , where 
PPMV is the ex-factory value of car production and tPMV is the tariff rate on cars. 
Capped credits are shared by all producer classes. A multi-step modulation process is 
used to ensure expenditure does not exceed the allocation. The first step distributes 
55 per cent of credits to car assemblers and 45 per cent to the rest of the supply chain. 
Subsequent steps involve modulating the amounts within the two groups according to 
various rules (including that no individual assembler can receive credits exceeding 
5 per cent of its value of production). 
The capped entitlements of car assemblers are calculated as follows. 
1. Production credits are equal to 10 per cent of the value of production of motor 
vehicles multiplied by the car tariff rate plus 25 per cent of the value of production of 
engines and engine components multiplied by the car tariff rate. 
2. Investment credits are equal to:  
(a) 10 per cent of the value of investment in approved plant and equipment used to 
produce motor vehicles, engines or engine components 
(b) 25 per cent of the value of investment in approved plant and equipment in 
relation to the production of automotive components (other than engines and 
engine components), automotive machine tooling or automotive services 
(c) 45 per cent of the value of investment in R&D for third parties in relation to 
production of automotive components (other than engines and engine 
components), automotive machine tooling or automotive services. 
Automotive component producers, automotive machine tool and tooling producers and 
automotive service providers are entitled to: 
1. 25 per cent of the value of investment in approved plant and equipment 
2. 45 per cent of the value of investment in approved R&D. 
Sources: AusIndustry (2008a, b).  
 
Because some ACIS expenditure is allocated on an uncapped basis, it is possible for 
outlays to exceed tariff revenue. This could be the case if, for example, new PTAs, 
which reduced tariff revenue, were put in place while ACIS was still operating. If 
this occurred, the Government could either discontinue ACIS payments or distribute 
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the uncapped amounts as grants from budgetary funding sources other than tariff 
revenue. 
The Commission (PC 2008a) estimated the total level of ACIS funding to be 
$537 million in 2006-07. Assuming capped funding is distributed evenly over the 
five years of Stage 2, some $400 million of capped credits and $137 million in 
uncapped credits were allocated.  
In 2006-07, the effective rate of assistance due to ACIS alone is estimated to be 
10.1 per cent for car assemblers and 4.3 per cent for components manufacturers. 
(Combined with the assistance provided by tariffs, the estimated effective rate of 
assistance provided to the sectors was 14.1 and 13.1 per cent respectively.) 
The Green Car Innovation Fund 
The GCIF is due to start in 2011 and operate for five years. As proposed, it will 
involve the Australian Government investing one dollar for every three dollars 
invested by the industry, up to a value of $500 million, thereby aiming to generate 
$2 billion worth of R&D investment in green cars. In its 2008-09 Budget, the 
Australian Government allocated $100 million of expenditure to the Fund for the 
2011-12 financial year (Australian Government 2008b). 
The Government has indicated that funding will be open to various technologies, 
and will not be allocated entirely to one vehicle model, company or technology 
(Australian Government 2008b; Carr 2008a). Because the Bracks Review has been 
asked to make recommendations on the most effective way to deliver funding under 
the GCIF, more specific details about the Fund are unavailable.  
The Australian Government has also pledged to ‘purchase hybrid or other value-for-
money, environmentally-friendly vehicles’ if produced in Australia (Carr 2008a). 
The combined funding and purchasing commitments appear directed at achieving 
both environmental and industry-development objectives. According to the 
Australian Government, for example, the GCIF: 
… will encourage the development and manufacture of low-emission vehicles in 
Australia, promoting innovation and sustainability in the Australian automotive 
industry. (Australian Government 2008b, p. 22) 
2.3 Other policies 
As noted above (box 2.1), the automotive industry benefits from a range of 
industry-specific and general policies and initiatives, in addition to those outlined in 
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sections 2.1 and 2.2. Although the level of assistance that these policies provide 
cannot easily be quantified, some of them appear to afford substantial levels of 
additional assistance (box 2.5).  
 
Box 2.5 Levels of assistance provided by other policy measures 
It is not possible to quantify the assistance provided through some policies that affect 
the automotive industry, such as the prohibitive tariff on second-hand vehicles and 
government purchasing preferences. What follows is evidence of the value of 
assistance provided by some of the other measures outlined in box 2.1. 
Industry-specific measures 
• Funding of the AutoCRC includes $38.4 million from the Australian Government, 
$17.1 million from industry and $12.5 million from universities and State 
Governments over seven years. 
• The Australian Treasury (2007) estimated that about $1.5 billion worth of claims for 
fringe benefits tax concessions on company cars were made in 2006-07. Domestic 
car producers — which rely largely on fleet sales — could benefit from this 
concession to the extent that it encourages the purchase of company cars. 
• Over the years, substantial direct government expenditure has been allocated to 
ad hoc assistance measures. In May 2006, for example, the Australian Government 
announced that it would provide $52.5 million to fund the design, engineering and 
manufacture of the next generation Ford Falcon and Territory vehicles in Victoria, 
and the design and engineering of a Ford light commercial vehicle. In October that 
year, the Australian Government announced it would provide $6.7 million over four 
years (matched by the Victorian and South Australian Governments) to General 
Motors Holden, to introduce safety and fuel management improvements and to 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions on Commodores. 
General policies 
• In 2006-07, $1.6 million was provided to the industry through the Export Markets 
Development Grants Scheme, while TRADEX provided $46.9 million of assistance 
to exporting industries using motor vehicles and parts. 
• In 2006-07, $25.5 million worth of assistance was provided to the automotive 
industry through R&D grants and tax concessions. Of this, $15.5 million was under 
the 125 per cent concession, $7.5 million under the Premium 175 per cent tax 
concession, and $2.5 million under the R&D tax offset. (A ‘clawback’ mechanism is 
in place to ensure that R&D that attracts ACIS (or other government income) does 
not also attract a tax concession above 100 per cent.)  
Sources: Australian Treasury (2007); AutoCRC (2008); Howard (2006); Macfarlane (2006); PC (2002, 
2008a); Toyota (2008).  
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In other cases, such as with the luxury car tax,5 the effect on domestic producers is 
more ambiguous. However, given that this tax applies to vehicles with a GST-
inclusive value above $57 123, it is more likely to be imposed on imported than on 
domestically-produced vehicles. On balance, therefore, it is plausible that it 
provides some additional assistance to domestic producers. 
Some of the industry-specific and general policy measures potentially overlap or 
interact. For example, producers could seek to offset the effect of future reductions 
in ACIS by increasing their take-up of R&D concessions. The extent to which the 
R&D currently funded under ACIS would meet the narrower definition of R&D that 
applies under general concessions is unclear, however. 
Likewise, the national Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS), due to start in 2010, will 
provide a mechanism to achieve cost-effective abatement across all sources of 
emissions, including from cars. It will do this without governments needing to 
determine which industry or production activities provide scope for such abatement, 
or to specify the means of abatement. In terms of potential greenhouse outcomes, 
the ETS will override any potential benefits of a GCIF (and do so in a more 
effective and less costly way). As the Commission noted in its submission to the 
Garnaut Climate Change Review: 
… it is suggested that subsidies to assemble hybrid cars in Australia could reduce GHG 
[greenhouse gas] emissions as well as fostering domestic activity in the motor vehicle 
sector. While it is clearly appropriate to assess all costs and benefits of a policy 
initiative, with an effective ETS in place any climate change benefit of a subsidy for the 
production of hybrid cars would be illusory. The policy would therefore need to be 
justified on industry policy grounds. (PC 2008b, p. XIV) 
 
                                                 
5 The luxury car tax is imposed on cars with a GST-inclusive value above $57 123. A plan to 
increase the tax rate from 25 to 33 per cent was announced in the 2008-09 Australian 
Government Budget (Australian Government 2008). 
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3 Modelling the assistance scenarios 
In this chapter, the choice of model and how it is used are briefly outlined. The 
chapter begins with a discussion of how economic modelling informs policy 
decisions, and the relative advantages of the Monash Multi-Regional Forecasting 
(MMRF) model for this study (section 3.1). The structure, underlying assumptions 
and modifications to this model and its database are outlined (section 3.2). The 
simulation approach is then discussed, along with a description of how the 
necessary shocks have been designed and implemented. The chapter ends with an 
outline of key outputs of the model. Results from the simulations are given in 
chapter 4. 
3.1 The choice of a model 
Economic modelling enables the policy analyst to consider, in a systematic and 
transparent way, various ramifications of policy changes throughout the economy, 
to the extent that these can be specified in the model. In the absence of such a tool, 
judgement or guesses would be needed. That said, modelling is a selective 
abstraction of the real world, and its complex interactions, and cannot be expected 
to replicate reality except in simple exercises. It is therefore best used in 
conjunction with other analysis and, ultimately, a degree of judgement will still be 
called for.  
A good economic model should abstract from aspects that are not relevant to the 
issue under scrutiny, capturing to the extent possible only those that are likely to 
influence the outcome. This study focuses on estimating the economy-wide 
implications of changing some of the policies that affect the automotive industry. 
Therefore, an appropriate model for the task is one that can account for: 
• the economy-wide impacts of changes that affect primarily the automotive 
industry 
• the linkages between the automotive industry, the rest of the Australian economy 
and the outside world 
• the specific relationship between car assembly and component manufacturing in 
Australia. 
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Three main aspects of a model in turn influence the simulation results and how well 
the above aims can be achieved. 
1. Assumptions about the economic behaviour of automotive and other producers, 
investors, households and the foreign sector, reflected in equations and 
parameter values that determine the degree to which they respond to changes in 
relative prices and other market conditions.  
2. The database, which is a representation of input–output linkages and other 
features of the economy. 
3. The model ‘closure’, which describes the economic environment in which the 
simulations are conducted, incorporating factors that influence results but which 
are taken as given. 
The model used in this study 
The Commission chose to use the comparative-static version of the MMRF model 
for this study. The MMRF model is a multi-regional applied general equilibrium 
model developed by the Centre of Policy Studies (CoPS) at Monash University. 
This model is different from the recursive dynamic MONASH model of the 
Australian economy used in the Industry Commission’s 1997 report on The 
Automotive Industry (IC 1997) and the Commission’s 2002 Review of Automotive 
Assistance (PC 2002). Despite the differences between the MONASH and the 
MMRF models, long-term results from both versions can be compared (chapter 5).  
The MMRF model was chosen because, like the MONASH model, it is a 
well-documented model with a proven track record. It could also be relatively easily 
updated with recent information, and modified to reflect this study’s focus on the 
automotive industry. It was used by the Commission in its recent study for COAG, 
Potential Benefits of the National Reform Agenda (PC 2006).  
Two other key factors were considered in choosing the MMRF model — the time 
and spatial dimensions. 
The time dimension 
Using the comparative-static version of MMRF means that its simulation results do 
not relate to a particular year, and no adjustment paths can be inferred. Strictly, 
results must be interpreted as the difference between two situations: ‘with’ and 
‘without’ the policy change. 
These results are counterfactual projections of the effect of the specific change 
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modelled, not forecasts of what the economy will actually look like at a future point 
in time.  
The obvious disadvantage of a comparative-static approach is that it cannot be used 
to analyse the effects of the precise timing of policy changes, or the time-path of 
adjustment costs. While these temporal considerations may be important in some 
cases, a comparative-static model was seen as preferable in this study for two 
reasons: 
• the focus is on evaluating the long-term implications of changing industry policy 
— once firms and households have fully adapted to the changes — so that the 
spatial aspects of the model are more important 
• particularly given the time constraints in this study, a comparative-static model 
obviates the need to make forecasting assumptions about the future economy and 
automotive industry, which is fraught with difficulties and inevitably 
controversial. 
The spatial dimension 
Unlike other economic models, such as single-industry or sectoral models, the 
MMRF model is designed to capture the economy-wide impacts of policy changes. 
Yet by representing the Australian economy as a combination of the economies 
(and industries) of all jurisdictions, the MMRF model also allows an analysis of the 
effects of policy at the jurisdictional and industry levels. This is especially useful 
given the geographic concentration of the Australian automotive industry.  
The Commission has further developed the spatial and industry dimensions of the 
model to meet the specific needs of this study. How this was done is outlined in the 
following section.  
3.2 Key features of the MMRF model 
As noted, three main aspects of a model determine its simulation results — the 
behavioural assumptions as reflected in the equation structure and parameter 
settings, its database, and its closure. This section discusses how each of these is 
represented in the MMRF model, and the changes that were made for this study. 
Structure and parameters 
The MMRF model accounts for the links between different parts of the economy. It 
includes a representation of the behaviour of: 
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• domestic producers and investors, classified by industry and eight domestic 
regions (that is, the six States and two Territories, collectively referred to as 
‘jurisdictions’ in this report) 
• domestic consumers and suppliers of labour and capital, provided by eight 
region-specific household sectors 
• an aggregate foreign purchaser of Australia’s exports, seller of imports and 
supplier of foreign capital 
• the Australian Government and eight State and Territory Government accounts.  
The assumptions underlying the behaviour of these participants in the MMRF 
model include that: 
• producers are subject to constant returns to scale technology,1 which determines 
how they respond to changes in input and output prices by changing their output 
and their use of labour, produced capital, land and purchased inputs  
• households vary their consumption of commodities in response to changes in 
their income from labour and capital, and the relative prices of goods consumed 
• labour responds to regional employment opportunities as signalled by changes in 
relative wages (that is, labour moves to regions with relatively high wages) 
• domestic and foreign investors respond to changes in industry-specific rates of 
return 
• demand for Australian exports responds to changes in the world price of exports  
• demand for imports responds to changes in the import price of foreign products 
relative to the price of domestically-produced products.  
These assumptions are widely accepted as reasonable representations of observed 
behaviour in an economy and are used in most industry or sectoral, as well as 
economy-wide, models. (For example, most are present in Econtech’s 
MM 600+ model (Econtech 2002)). 
The model’s equations and parameters, outlined briefly below, reflect these 
assumptions. 
Equations 
The equations of the MMRF model define the determinants of demand and supply 
(documented in Adams et al. 2002). Two additional sets of equations were 
incorporated in the model for this study. Specifically: 
                                                 
1 See chapter 5 for a discussion of the influence of this assumption on model results. 
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• equations required to handle the inter-regional mobility of occupations (as in the 
version of MMRF used in PC (2006)) and the ‘single national labour market’ 
closure 
• an equation that ties uncapped ACIS credits to the value of production and the 
tariff rate (chapter 2). 
Parameter settings 
Numerous parameters — mostly elasticities, combined with database values — 
determine the degree to which changes in particular variables, such as prices, lead to 
changes in quantities demanded and supplied. 
Especially important in this study are: 
• export demand elasticities — that is, the responsiveness of demand for 
Australia’s exports to changes in world export prices; these have been set to 10 
(and at 5 in a sensitivity analysis) across all commodities (box 3.1) 
• substitution elasticities between domestically-produced and imported 
commodities, which determine the sensitivity of imports to changes in the 
duty-paid prices of imports; these vary between 0 and 10 across commodities,2 
and are set at 5.2 for cars and their components (appendix C)3 
• substitution elasticities between labour and capital — which determine the 
degree to which these factors can be substituted for each other in production; 
these are set at 0.5 for all industries.4  
                                                 
2 Zero for non-traded products. 
3 The substitution elasticities are the same across users in MMRF — that is, households (private 
and government consumption) and firms (intermediate inputs and investment goods). They are 
the values used in the MONASH model, and are consistent with those used in the GTAP model 
which suggests that domestic import substitution elasticities are about half the value of the 
elasticities of substitution among different foreign sources, the latter providing an upper bound 
on export demand elasticities (Hertel 1997; PC 2002; Shomos 2005). 
4 These are based on estimation work conducted in the context of the IMPACT project in the 
1970s (Caddy 1976). These magnitudes are commonly used in the context of models such as 
MMRF.  
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Box 3.1 Export demand elasticities and terms of trade effects 
Export demand elasticities indicate the responsiveness of exports to a change in the 
corresponding world prices — or vice versa. Similar elasticities operate on the import 
side. The values assigned to these elasticities depend on views about the share of an 
economy in international trade. In the context of this study, export demand elasticities 
are an important determinant of overall results.  
On the export side, large elasticity values imply that Australian producers are assumed 
to be ‘price takers’ — that is, Australian export levels are assumed not to affect world 
prices much. Alternatively, small elasticity values imply that a modelled increase in 
Australian exports will reduce the price received by exporters. This is referred to as a 
terms of trade loss, and is the inevitable result of combining low export demand 
elasticities with improvements in the international competitiveness of Australian 
exporters.  
Low values of export demand elasticities are often used in economic models to 
constrain the ability of the modelled economy to expand in response to an increase in 
factor inputs or competitiveness. Economic models do not account for many of the 
rigidities which actually limit the expansion of an economy. Export demand elasticities 
are one way of reducing the ability of a (constant returns to scale) economy to expand 
and, therefore, dealing with model ‘flip-flop’ (Dixon et al. 1997). 
Models of the Australian economy (such as the MONASH and MMRF models) often 
use the ‘almost small economy assumption’ (Tyers 2004), in which world prices of 
imports are assumed to be fixed, and world prices of exports are assumed to be 
somewhat sensitive to the volume of Australian exports.  
The standard value for export demand elasticities in MMRF is 5. This is based on 
values used in the MONASH model, which were informed by the results of econometric 
studies undertaken in the 1970s during the IMPACT Project (Parmenter 1982), as well 
as experience with the ORANI and MONASH models.  
The Commission has argued in the past that the standard MONASH values are too low 
and, for at least some products, should be doubled (PC 2000, 2002). This is because: 
• the basis on which the estimations were carried out in the econometric studies 
differs from that on which the parameters are defined in MMRF 
• although low values might be appropriate for short-run, year-to-year modelling 
purposes, they are likely to overstate the extent to which Australian firms can 
differentiate their products from those of foreign competitors in the longer term. 
The export demand elasticities for all goods in this study are set at 10. This is close to 
the values of 12 used in the MM 600+ model (PC 2002). A sensitivity analysis with a 
value of 5 was also conducted.  
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Updating and modifying the database 
The current economic and policy environment provides a starting point from which 
future policy options can be assessed. Thus, having laid out the structure of the 
model, the next step is to set up the database to reflect the latest-available 
information. The database is similar to that used for PC (2006), but it was modified 
in three ways, by: 
• updating the base year from 2001-02 to 2005-06 
• disaggregating the automotive industry 
• incorporating specifics of automotive assistance arrangements. 
Updating the base year 
The MMRF database was updated to 2005-06, using the latest-available consistent 
data from the ABS.5 Doing this was important, given the changes that have 
occurred in the Australian economy in recent years (for example, the increasing 
share of mining in economic activity and in exports). The updating was undertaken 
by CoPS. Appendix D provides an outline of the process used. 
Disaggregating the automotive industry 
For this study, the Commission contracted CoPS to separate the ‘motor vehicles and 
parts’ (MVP) industry from the broader ‘transport equipment’ industry that was 
included in the MMRF model used in PC (2006).  
The motor vehicle and parts industry is composed of distinct sub-sectors with their 
own characteristics. These sectors differ in terms of their: 
• location in the supply chain 
• geographical location (assemblers, for example, are concentrated in South 
Australia and Victoria, while component makers are spread across most 
jurisdictions) 
• levels of industry assistance, especially tariffs and ACIS funding, the focus of 
                                                 
5 The database was not updated with more recent information to 2008 to reflect, for example, the 
closure of Mitsubishi. There are three reasons for this. First, the direct effects of the changes 
over the past 18 months are uncertain, so including them would introduce more uncertainty in 
the modelling. Second, excluding this information is unlikely to affect results significantly, 
since the changes seem to have been small relative to the size of the automotive industry. Third, 
more recent automotive industry data would be inconsistent with the data describing the rest of 
the economy. 
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this study.  
Therefore, the motor vehicles and parts industry itself was disaggregated by the 
Commission to identify separately: 
• car assembly  
• car components 
• other motor vehicles and components (called ‘others’), which includes (but is not 
confined to) trucks, utilities, semi-trailers, motor cycles and engines.  
The criterion used for this disaggregation was to allocate those items not directly 
affected by the headline Most-Favoured-Nation (MFN) automotive tariff rate of 10 
per cent into the ‘others’ category.6 Appendix D outlines how this disaggregation 
was performed and the outcome for the database. 
The structure imposed on the MMRF database is consistent with that described in 
figure 3.1 — car assembly and components account for about three-quarters of 
automotive industry output in the database. Various checks were performed to 
ensure that the disaggregated database was robust (appendix D). Table 3.1 shows 
how sectoral value-added at the jurisdictional level in the MMRF database is 
consistent with the latest-available ABS data.  
                                                 
6 ACIS assistance applies more broadly than tariff assistance. Therefore, a small part of the 
‘others’ sector might be affected by modelled changes to ACIS funding.  
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Figure 3.1 Industry structure in MMRFa 
Shares of value-added 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
a
 Shares for assembly, components and others reflect those obtained when the Commission’s definitions of 
these sectors are applied directly to ABS 4-digit ANZSIC data on industry value-added. They are similar to the 
sector shares in the MMRF database after it is disaggregated. 
Data sources: Commission estimates; ABS (2007a). 
Table 3.1 State sectoral shares of value-added 
 ABS  MMRF 
 2001-02  2005-06 
 Cars Components Others  Cars Components Others
 % % %  % % %
New South Wales 3 19 15  0 21 16
Victoria 63 53 51  73 48 48
Queensland 4 6 14  0 11 16
South Australia 28 19 14  27 14 12
Western Australia 2 1 5  0 5 7
Tasmania 0 1 1  0 1 0
Northern Territory 0 0 0  0 0 0
ACT 0 0 0  0 0 0
Totala 100 100 100  100 100 100
a
  Columns may not add to total due to rounding.  
Data sources: Commission estimates; ABS (2005a-f, unpublished data). 
ComponentsAssembly Others
40% 36% 24%
Motor vehicles 
and parts
66%
Other transport
equipment
34%
Transport and 
equipment
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Incorporating assistance 
Automotive assistance is embedded in the standard MMRF model. However, 
changes to the database were needed to identify and account explicitly for ACIS and 
its interaction with the tariff. Further, as requested of the Commission (appendix A), 
the Green Car Innovation Fund (GCIF) was incorporated in the database.  
Tariffs 
The ABS input–output table on which the MMRF database is based contains tariff 
revenues and import values for each commodity. These can be used to derive a 
trade-weighted average tariff rate for each commodity. The rates obtained for the 
car assembly and car components sectors are 5.7 per cent and 4.2 per cent 
respectively. These figures are much lower than 10 per cent because they include 
the negative effect that ACIS import duty credits have on tariff revenue (table 3.2).  
When adjusted, the ACIS-exclusive tariff rates of around 8 per cent for cars and 
components reflect the average tariff rates that would be faced if the ACIS scheme 
did not exist. They are still lower than the headline MFN rate of 10 per cent for 
three reasons. 
1. As outlined in chapter 2, a range of preferential agreements with Australia’s 
trading partners reduces the average tariff rate. 
2. Concessional arrangements exempt some imports from duty.7 
3. Some imports subject to duties of less than 10 per cent were included in the car 
and components sectors, due to the complexity of aligning trade and input–
output classifications (table 3.3; appendix D). 
Table 3.2 Tariff rates implied in the MMRF database 
 Including ACISa Excluding ACISb
 % % 
Cars 5.7 8.4 
Components 4.2 7.6 
a Tariff rates implied by tariff revenues and value of imports in the MMRF database. b Tariff rates consistent 
with the value of duty that would have been paid, had ACIS not been in place.  
Source: Commission estimates based on MMRF database. 
                                                 
7 Customs Tariff Act 1995 (Cwlth), Schedule 4. 
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Table 3.3 Sectoral distribution of headline MFN tariff rates 
Share of value of imports  
 10 per cent 5 per cent 0 per cent
Cars 66 34 0
Components 60 31 8
Source: Commission estimates based on WITS (World Integrated Trade Solution). 
ACIS 
ACIS funding was only implicitly reflected in the original database — by the lower 
level of tariff revenue that arises from the use of ACIS credits to offset the duty 
payable on eligible automotive products. To model the policy scenarios for this 
study, ACIS funding needed to be accounted for explicitly. 
To do this, the total estimated ACIS funding of $537 million (chapter 2) was 
allocated across jurisdictions (table 3.4), using information: 
• from the MMRF database on the relative proportion of car and component 
manufacturers in each jurisdiction 
• on how credits are allocated nationally (chapter 2).8 
Table 3.4 ACIS funding by jurisdiction 
 Sharesa  ACIS fundingb 
 Of total costs 
(car assembly and 
components) Of ACIS 
 
 
Capped Uncapped
 % % $ m $ m
New South Wales 13 8 45 0
Victoria 56 63 235 102
Queensland 8 5 29 0
South Australia 18 21 76 35
Western Australia 4 2 13 0
Tasmania 1 0 2 0
Northern Territory 0 0 0 0
ACT 0 0 1 0
Total 100 100 400 137
a
  Columns may not add to 100 due to rounding. b  For 2006-07. 
Data sources: Commission estimates (appendix D); ABS (2005a-f, unpublished data). 
There were several options for including ACIS funding in the database (box 3.2).  
                                                 
8 Jurisdiction-based ACIS data are not otherwise available. 
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Box 3.2 Modelling ACIS — a subsidy for what? 
The nature of ACIS means that it could be seen as part research and development 
(R&D) subsidy, part subsidy on imported inputs, and/or part general production 
subsidy.  
An R&D subsidy? 
Although some ACIS funding is allocated on the basis of R&D expenditure, ACIS could 
only be seen as an R&D subsidy if it increased R&D expenditure (by lowering the cost 
to producers of R&D) at the margin. However, ACIS expenditure (which is lower than 
total R&D expenditure) appears to be ‘infra-marginal’ and, therefore, would not act as 
an R&D subsidy. Even if this were not the case, the broad definition of R&D under 
ACIS, and the nature of R&D in the industry (chapter 5), mean that it would be unlikely 
to generate spillovers associated with R&D. 
An import subsidy? 
Being delivered as import duty credits, ACIS lowers the prices of eligible automotive 
imports (as would an import subsidy). In this case, it could create a bias towards the 
use of imported rather than domestically-produced inputs (partly offsetting the initial 
distortionary effects of the tariff on input choice). This assumes that industry 
participants first use credits to offset duty payable on eligible imports, a reasonable 
assumption since they lose about 3–5 cents for every one dollar of credits traded. It is 
also consistent with evidence as to how credits seem to be used by eligible importers 
of eligible automotive products. However, ACIS may not act entirely as a subsidy on 
imports, because: 
• the value of tariffs on the imports of automotive products that are eligible for the use 
of ACIS credits exceeds the value of the relevant credits 
• the credits are tradeable. 
A production subsidy? 
Because most ACIS funding is allocated on the basis of production levels and credits 
are fully tradeable, it can be seen as equivalent to a pure cash payment and therefore 
acts, at least in part, as a production subsidy. Given this, ACIS may: 
• enable producers to sell their output below the cost of production — that is, drive a 
wedge between sales revenue and production costs of car and component 
producers, so that the price to users changes but resource costs are not lower 
• promote higher levels of production than otherwise 
• result in lower imports than would be the case if it were a pure import subsidy.  
Other effects of ACIS 
Compliance costs — record keeping, reporting and administration requirements — are 
incurred by businesses which register for ACIS. For example, employers need to report 
the amount of time spent by employees on automotive R&D and other activities. There 
are also costs for the Government associated with administration and monitoring.  
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ACIS was incorporated as follows: 
• uncapped funding was included as an import subsidy 
• capped funding was treated as a production subsidy. 
Although it is recognised that this is not precisely how the scheme operates, it is a 
reasonable approximation and provides insights into the interaction between the 
tariff and ACIS.9 More information on the treatment of ACIS is provided in 
appendices B and D.  
Moreover, in line with the task requested of the Commission, ACIS was also 
modelled as a pure production subsidy in one scenario.  
The Green Car Innovation Fund 
The Commission has not been asked to evaluate the effects of the GCIF, but has 
been asked to include it in the ‘base case’.10 As noted in chapter 2, however, most 
details of the Fund are yet to be determined.  
The design features of the GCIF are relevant to how it is incorporated in the 
database (box 3.3). Those features influence, for example, the effects on automotive 
production, and environmental and innovation spillovers (box 3.4). 
 
Box 3.3 Considerations in designing the GCIF 
Issues (highlighted by car producers) that will arise in designing the GCIF include: 
• how the funding is delivered — for example, whether through upfront cash grants, 
tax breaks or production credits 
• which firms are eligible to receive funding, for example: 
– whether there will be a cap on the amount individual companies can receive 
– whether funds are allocated to Australian operations or parent companies 
• whether funding will be additional to current programs 
• whether one technology or a range of technologies will be funded 
• the total amount of the funding. 
Source: Murphy and Porter (2008).  
 
                                                 
9 This facilitated the modelling; given the way uncapped funding depends on the value of 
production and on the tariff rate, the formula used to calculate its amount was incorporated into 
the model structure to allow any changes in output to affect ACIS endogenously.  
10 This was clarified at the workshop. As a result, the GCIF was included in the MMRF database, 
consistent with the workshop discussion. 
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Box 3.4 Possible effects of the Green Car Innovation Fund 
Likely impacts on automotive production  
The GCIF essentially is a subsidy for the development and production of hybrid or 
other ‘green’-type vehicles in Australia. Subsidies reduce unit costs to producers of the 
activity to which the funding applies, but not the real resource costs to the Australian 
economy. The GCIF will expand development and production of green cars (over and 
above the level that producers would have undertaken without the additional support) 
to the extent it compensates producers for the additional costs they incur in excess of 
potential market returns.  
The extent to which the GCIF encourages a net increase in industry output will depend 
on the rate of subsidy — if producers are just compensated for higher costs of 
producing green cars (including forgone profits from producing other models), there will 
be a change in the mix but not the overall level of production. If the subsidy is more 
generous, there could be a change in the vehicle mix as well as a net expansion in 
production and investment.  
To the extent that the GCIF subsidises production of a model that would otherwise 
have been uncommercial, it would have negative effects on productivity in the industry, 
and impose an economic loss on the economy overall.  
Potential environmental spillover effects  
The GCIF appears geared to encouraging the production of environmentally-friendly 
cars, rather than supporting environmentally-friendly production methods. Thus, any 
environmental benefits of the GCIF relate to increased purchases of green vehicles. 
However, with the local retail price still determined by the tariff-inclusive price, it is 
unlikely that overall sales of green vehicles would increase markedly, although there 
would be a switch towards those produced locally. Moreover, the Government has 
announced the introduction of an Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS). This scheme, by 
setting a price for carbon emissions, will induce cost-effective responses to emissions 
abatement across the economy. In this context, policies that target use of particular 
abatement technologies become redundant, and will only impose additional, 
unnecessary costs.  
Potential innovation spillover effects  
The GCIF may encourage some development of green car technology in Australia. 
However, it is likely that this technology would be ‘owned’ and patented by vehicle 
makers who could then sell it incorporated in their vehicles, or directly to other 
manufacturers. It can be argued that in the absence of a price for carbon emissions, 
there is little incentive for firms to develop abatement technologies because the market 
undervalues abatement. Again, however, unlike the GCIF, an ETS will provide this 
signal in a way that does not attempt to pick technology ‘winners’.  
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In the absence of more information, the following assumptions about the Fund were 
made when incorporating it in the MMRF database: 
• it is allocated evenly over the five years — $100 million per year (which is in 
line with the Government’s Budget allocations for 2011-12 (chapter 2)) 
• it is delivered as a cash payment and therefore represented in the database as a 
production subsidy, with no account for any other possible effects (box 3.4)  
• it is allocated to car assemblers only, according to the shares of car production in 
Victoria and South Australia. 
The model’s closure 
The following ‘central’ model closure was adopted for the main simulations. 
In the aggregate economy:  
• labour supply by occupation is fixed nationally (being determined independently 
of the policies under investigation), so all adjustments in the national labour 
market translate into changes in real wages for each occupation 
• the after tax rate of return on capital is fixed, and the capital stock adjusts to 
keep that rate constant 
• investment moves in proportion with changes in the capital stock, and is funded 
by Australian savings and foreign inflows of capital 
• private savings and consumption change in line with household disposable 
income 
• the trade balance is endogenous, and adjusts to keep additional investment fully 
funded 
• the level of real public current expenditure moves in proportion with the level of 
real aggregate private consumption expenditure 
• the Australian Government surplus is a fixed proportion of GDP — consistent 
with the assumption that budgetary policy should not be influenced by changes 
in automotive industry policy — and a tax on factor incomes adjusts to maintain 
this ratio. 
At the jurisdiction level:  
• labour is mobile across jurisdictions, responding to ‘short-term’ changes in 
relative wages, and changes in occupational wages equate across jurisdictions 
• in a similar way, capital is reallocated across jurisdictions in response to 
‘short-term’ changes in its after tax  returns. 
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At the industry level:  
• policy changes do not alter the technology available to producers, however 
producers may change the capital–labour ratio of their production processes in 
response to changes in relative factor prices 
• capital and labour are reallocated across industries, in response to changes in 
their respective returns. 
These closure settings are broadly consistent with those used in PC (2007) and 
many other Monash and MMRF trade simulations (for example, IC (1997) and 
PC (2002, 2003)). 
The settings for labour and capital reflect what is often referred to as a long-run 
closure. Although there is no time dimension in a comparative-static model, this 
‘long run’ is generally interpreted to be about seven to ten years (enough time for 
adjustments to policy changes to be completed). A result of these settings for labour 
and capital is that the relative size of the State/Territory economies is likely to 
change in response to changes in assistance, as resources are reallocated from the 
automotive industry to other industries, and from automotive-intensive jurisdictions 
to other jurisdictions. Further, if the capital stock increases, then both the size of the 
economy and its capital intensity will increase. 
Three alternative closure settings were used to analyse the sensitivity of results to 
the assumptions of flexibility in movements of labour and capital outlined above. 
Alternative closures 
As the flexibility of the economy to respond to policy changes is constrained, the 
size of gains can be reduced or sometimes turn negative. Three sensitivity 
simulations were run with the following alternative closures to illustrate this point. 
• The ‘decomposition closure’ fixes the national stock of capital, and the rate of 
return of capital adjusts. This closure is designed to isolate the reallocation 
effects of movements in labour and capital across industries and jurisdictions in 
response to a policy shock, as well as their associated terms of trade effects.  
• The ‘variable rate of return’ closure allows some flexibility in the supply of 
capital from abroad, but less than in the central closure. This closure assumes 
that, as Australia increases its borrowings from abroad, lenders require a risk 
premium, which leads to a rise in the required rate of return and reduces the 
amount of additional capital.  
• The ‘short-run’ closure fixes capital at the national, jurisdictional and industry 
levels, and restricts labour movements to within jurisdictions. This closure 
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represents a very short-run economic environment, represented by restricted 
factor movements.  
3.3 Implementing shocks to the model 
With the structure and database of the MMRF model modified to suit the needs of 
this study, the model was ready to simulate the alternative policy scenarios. These 
scenarios involve changes in the combination and level of assistance requested 
through tariffs and ACIS, under different assumptions. The simulations were 
grouped into three categories (table 3.5): 
• reference scenarios (labelled R1 through R4) designed to provide a detailed 
analysis of the effects of tariffs and of ACIS — these scenarios include some of 
the options described in the task requested of the Commission (appendix A) 
• options scenarios (labelled O1 through O8), which cover the options described in 
the task requested of the Commission 
• sensitivity scenarios (labelled S1 through S5). 
Table 3.5 List of scenarios for modelling automotive assistancea 
Scenario Description 
 Reference scenarios 
R1 Tariff reduced from 10% to 5% and ACIS discontinued (=R2+R3) (current plan) 
R2 Tariff reduced from 10% to 5% and ACIS maintained at Stage 2 (equivalent to O2) 
R3 Tariff maintained at 10% and ACIS discontinued (equivalent to O6) 
R4 Scenario R1 with ‘decomposition’ closure  
 Options outlined in appendix Ab 
O1 Tariff reduced from 10% to 5% and ACIS reduced to Stage 3 
O3 Tariff reduced from 10% to 5% and ACIS maintained at Stage 2 delivered as grants 
O4 Tariff maintained at 10% and ACIS reduced to Stage 3 
O5c Tariff maintained at 10% and ACIS maintained at Stage 2 (equivalent to database) 
O7 Tariff reduced from 10% to 0% and ACIS discontinued 
O8 Scenario O1, with 10% increase in mining commodity prices  
 Sensitivity analysesd 
S1  Scenario O7 with general tariff to 0% 
S2 Scenario R1 with export demand elasticity of 5 
S3 Scenario R1 with endogenous budget surplus 
S4 Scenario R1 with ‘variable rate of return’ closure 
S5 Scenario R1 with ‘short-run’ closure 
a All non-sensitivity analysis simulations assume a fixed Australian Government budget to GDP ratio, and an 
export elasticity of 10. b In translating these options into simulated scenarios, the Commission has interpreted 
an increase in ACIS as retaining Stage 2, because current arrangements’ in those options are referred to as 
Stage 3. c Scenario O5 (interpreting an increase in ACIS as retaining Stage 2) is reflected in the database and 
all scenarios are compared with this situation. d Scenarios S2 to S5 model alternative assumptions about the 
model settings and parameters. 
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Table C.3 in appendix C outlines the initial budgetary impacts of a range of these 
scenarios. The remainder of this section outlines how the shocks to the tariff rate, 
ACIS and the exchange rate were implemented across the three scenario categories. 
Modelling tariff changes 
The tariff shocks outlined above included changes to the automotive tariff rate and 
the general tariff rate. 
Automotive tariffs 
Tariff shocks are implemented by reducing the tariff rates in the MMRF model 
(table 3.2) by a percentage amount consistent with a reduction in the headline MFN 
rate from 10 to 5 per cent.11 This amount is obtained using detailed HS 8-digit level 
data, with the percentage changes given in table 3.6. In performing this calculation, 
it is assumed that the MFN rates give the closest approximation to the price wedge 
created by tariffs and, therefore, preferential tariff rates are abstracted from in this 
calculation (chapter 2).  
Table 3.6 Percentage change in trade-weighted average tariff rate 
Associated with a change in the headline MFN rate from 10 to 5 per cent 
Cars 38
Components 43
Source: Commission estimates, using WITS (World Integrated Trade Solution).  
General tariff 
One of the options (labelled scenario O7) was to model an elimination of the 
automotive tariff (as well as all ACIS funding). An alternative way of simulating 
this is to model it in conjunction with an elimination of the general tariff rate 
(scenario S1). This alternative avoids the allocative distortions associated with 
uneven tariff rates across sectors.  
Modelling ACIS 
The ACIS options were modelled as follows. 
• The scheduled reduction in ACIS from Stage 2 to Stage 3 was modelled as a 
                                                 
11 Eliminating the automotive tariff rate is modelled as a 100 per cent reduction. 
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reduction in capped credits only — from $2 billion to $1 billion. This is because 
formulas for calculating uncapped credits are set to remain unchanged in Stage 3 
(chapter 2).  
• However, given the way uncapped credits are allocated, the value of uncapped 
credits was modelled to change in line with any change to production levels or 
the modelled tariff rate. 
• Winding up ACIS was modelled as the elimination of both capped and uncapped 
credits. 
Modelling $A appreciation as a commodity price shock 
The MMRF model does not include nominal bilateral exchange rates, affecting how 
the Commission could address the request to simulate the effects of a further 
appreciation of the Australian dollar to achieve parity with the US dollar. (It 
contains just one exchange rate — that is, a real exchange rate between Australia 
and the ‘rest of the world’.) The scenario requested would have to be modelled 
indirectly in the model — that is, by implementing a change in the real economy 
that would lead to a change in the real exchange rate.  
The nominal exchange rate is the price of a foreign currency in terms of the 
Australian dollar. It is determined by the demand and supply of two currencies for 
international and domestic transactions and is affected by the stock of currency and, 
therefore, inflation in both economies. The real exchange rate is adjusted for 
inflation. In MMRF, it is the ratio of the domestic price of imports and domestic 
producer prices (as measured by the GDP deflator). 
While exchange rate changes can be caused by a wide range of circumstances, the 
key driver of the real and nominal appreciation over recent years has been the rising 
terms of trade, driven by strong increases in foreign demand for, and therefore 
export prices of, base metals and minerals (figure 3.2). It is this cause of the 
exchange rate appreciation that has been modelled, in line with comments of 
referees and participants at the Commission’s technical workshop (appendix B). 
Demand for Australia’s exports of base metals and mineral commodities was 
increased sufficiently to produce a 10 per cent rise in the export price of these 
goods, which causes an appreciation in the exchange rate.  
An approximation of the effect of the exchange rate appreciation on the automotive 
industry can be obtained by scaling the simulation results. For example, to analyse 
the effect of an appreciation to parity with the US dollar, the change in automotive 
output would be multiplied by a ratio of the change in the exchange rate required to 
reach parity to the change in the exchange rate given by the modelling results. 
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Figure 3.2 Australia’s terms of trade and the nominal exchange rate 
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3.4 Key outputs 
The results of MMRF simulations are interpreted as long-run effects — that is, 
changes in the economy once all adjustments in goods and factor markets have 
occurred.12 These effects are described by the following key outcome variables 
generated by the model: 
• national and jurisdiction outputs (measured by GDP and gross state products) 
• sectoral output, value-added and employment by jurisdiction 
• employment by occupational group, in each jurisdiction, and by industry 
• exports and imports by commodity, nationally and by jurisdiction 
• revenues and expenditures for the State/Territory and Australian Governments. 
The change in real gross national expenditure (GNE), adjusted for the share of 
additional investment funded by foreign sources, has been used as the key measure 
of economic ‘welfare’ changes in this study (box 3.5). 
                                                 
12 Some of the sensitivity or decomposition closures are defined as short run, and adaptation is 
limited, as discussed earlier in this chapter.  
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Box 3.5 Measuring changes in economic welfare in the MMRF model 
A measure of economic welfare is an attempt at capturing the effect of a policy change 
on the well being of Australians derived through additional consumption. This study 
uses changes in real gross national expenditure (GNE) adjusted for foreign investment 
as the principal indicator of changes in aggregate welfare resulting from changes in 
automotive policy settings. GNE is defined as the sum of private and public 
consumption and investment. In interpreting GNE as a measure of welfare, investment 
is interpreted as the present value of the future consumption that it generates. To the 
extent that part of that investment is financed by foreigners, they have claims on a 
proportionate amount of future income, which is excluded.  
The following provides an outline of the rationale for this approach.  
Private and public consumption expenditure 
Traditionally, economists use combined changes in consumer and producer surplus, 
together with changes in taxes, as the indicator of economic welfare. In the case of 
private consumption, ‘equivalent variation’ is often used to estimate consumer surplus. 
This is a measure of the amount of income that would offset the benefits to the 
consumer that arise from the changes modelled (for example, a reduction in the price 
of cars). This measure is related to the change in consumption expenditure deflated by 
the change in prices — that is, real consumption. A similar logic is applied to changes 
in spending on government services, which form part of the wellbeing of households.  
In the MMRF model, households receive the incomes from all factors (so a separate 
calculation is not required for producer surplus) and taxes adjust households’ 
disposable income. Real consumption provides, therefore, a good proxy for the 
traditional measures of welfare for this part of GNE.  
Private and public investment 
In a dynamic model that accounts properly for the implications of changes in foreign 
debt, changes in real private and public consumption are measured accurately. In a 
comparative-static model, it is difficult to account for the implications of changes in the 
capital stock that underlie the results. In this study, investment is interpreted as claims 
against future consumption. The additional capital requires an increase in investment. 
To the extent that some of this investment is financed by foreigners, only the part of 
investment relevant to Australian investors should be included in calculating the part of 
GNE that is relevant to measuring a change in the welfare of Australian residents. In 
the MMRF database, 80 per cent of capital is assumed to be Australian owned. 
Australian-owned investment is funded by domestic savings while foreign-owned 
investment is funded by the trade deficit and foreign income flows (the current account 
deficit).  
 
 
   
 THE MODELLING 45
 
4 The modelling 
Given the relatively small share of the Australian economy accounted for by the 
automotive industry and the relatively small reductions in tariff rates, one would 
expect the modelled changes to have relatively small economy-wide effects. The 
distributional and intersectoral effects could be expected to be more significant, as 
could effects on the automotive industry itself.  
The interactions between the tariff and Automotive Competitiveness and Investment 
Scheme (ACIS) are complex. As a result, the strategy in this chapter is first to 
provide a framework which describes the main mechanisms at work in the model 
(section 4.1). Four ‘reference simulations’ were designed to illustrate the 
interactions between the tariff and ACIS (section 4.2). Results for options and 
sensitivity simulations are discussed in sections 4.3 and 4.4 respectively.  
4.1 Main mechanisms at work 
Lowering automotive tariffs will generally reduce the selling prices of imported 
cars and components. This can benefit private buyers of cars and business users of 
cars and automotive inputs. It can particularly benefit those industries that are 
exposed to international trade. Automotive producers can benefit from tariff 
reductions through lower prices on their imported automotive inputs. 
Lower import prices also encourage a switch in demand away from domestic 
production towards imports, putting pressure on the profits and outputs of local 
assemblers and component manufacturers. This, in turn, puts pressure on these 
sectors to reduce their costs, which they can do in part by switching their input mix 
towards the now less costly imported inputs, and by pursuing productivity and 
technological improvements.  
Reducing budgetary assistance will generally reduce the price of domestically-
produced automotive products. Hence, like a reduction in tariffs, a reduction in 
budgetary assistance imposes pressures on assemblers and component makers to 
find cost savings. However, unlike a tariff reduction, it does not bring about the 
extra benefits of reducing prices to consumers and business. This is because, 
compared with a tariff, a producer subsidy does not increase, and may even 
decrease, consumer prices. Thus, subject to being able to source government 
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revenues in a way that minimises deadweight losses from raising taxes — an 
important proviso — reducing budgetary assistance can be expected to be less 
beneficial than reducing tariffs which assist the industry to a similar degree, all 
other things being equal (box 4.1).  
 
Box 4.1 The differing effect of tariffs and subsidies 
Differences exist in how import tariffs and production subsidies influence relative 
prices, and the behaviour of firms and consumers. These differences need to be taken 
into account in evaluating policy options. 
A tariff increases the domestic price (Pd in diagram below) of a good relative to the 
foreign price (Pf). This higher domestic price raises domestic production above the 
efficient level (from Qs to Qs1), but reduces consumption from Qd to Qd1. Part of the loss 
in consumer surplus from higher prices is transferred to producers (producer surplus) 
and to the Government (tariff revenue). However, a deadweight loss is also incurred, 
given by the area in the shaded triangles in the diagram below.  
If instead, in the presence of trade, the industry were assisted by a production subsidy, 
represented by a shift in the supply curve from S to S+sub, the same expansion of the 
industry would occur as with the tariff, generating the same shaded triangle of 
deadweight loss on the left in the diagram. However, unlike the tariff, the consumer 
price would remain at the world price (Pf) and the triangle on the right would not 
appear.  
To the extent that they avoid the deadweight loss on the consumption side (right-hand 
triangle in the diagram), production subsidies are less distortionary than import tariffs. 
In this sense, assuming that the government funds the subsidy through an efficient tax, 
subsidies are preferable to import tariffs as they are a less costly means of promoting 
activity in an industry.  
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The economy-wide effects of policy changes are conditioned by the many settings 
in the model as discussed in chapter 3. Reducing tariffs affects real consumption (an 
indicator of welfare) through three main mechanisms in the model.  
1. Allocative efficiency effects. Tariffs distort the decisions of consumers and 
downstream industries in favour of domestic over lower-cost imported products. 
Reducing tariffs improves allocative efficiency across the economy, as resources 
exit the automotive industry and are reallocated to more efficient industries. 
2. Terms of trade effects. In the MMRF model, as in many other economic models, 
it is assumed that Australian firms can only sell greater volumes on world 
markets by accepting a lower price (the ‘almost-small economy’ assumption 
described in chapter 3). To the extent that policy changes raise the share of 
resources allocated to export-intensive industries, Australians face a reduction in 
the prices of their exports relative to the prices of imports. Therefore, although 
tariff reductions are likely to generate cost reductions and encourage increased 
exports in the model, this is at the cost of a decline in Australia’s terms of trade, 
and therefore in income that can be allocated to consumption.  
3.  Resource expansion effects.1 Aggregate employment in the model is fixed by 
assumption. In the central closure, Australia’s capital stock can be financed by 
domestic and foreigner investors, giving the economy the capacity to expand. 
Although foreigners receive the returns on the capital they financed, Australians 
can still gain from greater foreign capital because of domestic taxes on 
repatriated profits. In addition, an increase in the capital stock increases the 
productivity of labour and, thus, real wages. Therefore, tariff reductions would 
cause a fall in the cost of purchasing capital goods in Australia, encouraging 
capital accumulation.  
The allocative efficiency and resource expansion effects are referred to collectively 
in this study as resource effects. These effects contribute toward an increase in 
economic activity.  
How the expansion in the resource base operates is analysed by comparing 
scenarios R1 and R4, as discussed below. In this latter simulation, the expansion 
effect is constrained to isolate the reallocation effects and their associated terms of 
trade effects.2  
                                                 
1 The assumption about how capital is financed determines whether this mechanism operates or 
not. 
2 As noted earlier, however, there is evidence that a reduction in assistance can drive efficiency 
improvements in the assisted industry (PC 2002). For illustrative purposes, the Commission has 
modelled a productivity improvement in the car industries. These results are discussed at the 
end of the chapter. 
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As illustrated in box 4.1, tariff reductions are likely to generate greater 
economy-wide gains in the model than equivalent reductions in budgetary 
assistance in terms of resource effects. But, in doing so, they are also likely to 
generate greater terms of trade losses. The net outcome depends on the strength of 
these opposing effects.  
As discussed in chapter 3, terms of trade effects have often been criticised as being 
inconsistent with the idea that Australia is a small country by world standards (that 
is, unable to influence world prices). It is, however, consistent with the notion that, 
in at least some international markets, Australian products account for a large 
proportion of the volume traded, so that greater sales may require a lower price even 
if all other overseas prices are unaffected.3 
The size of the terms of trade effects in the MMRF model is sensitive to the size of 
the export demand elasticities. These elasticities govern the extent to which greater 
export volumes come at the expense of price declines — the greater the elasticities, 
the smaller the price declines required. The central results in this paper assume a 
value of 10 for all export demand elasticities. As discussed in chapter 3, there is 
much uncertainty and little agreement among modellers about appropriate values 
for the export demand elasticities in a model such as MMRF. The practice at the 
Centre of Policy Studies is to use a value of 5 in year-to-year simulations. In view 
of the discussion in chapter 3 (see especially box 3.1) — a value of 10 is considered 
appropriate for long-run projections of the kind used in this study. 
4.2 Reference case results 
The reference case simulations are used to illustrate and analyse the effects of 
maintaining the current assistance reductions, introduced following the 
Commission’s 2002 inquiry of automotive assistance (PC 2002). In scenario R1, the 
automotive tariff is reduced to 5 per cent and the transitional arrangements of the 
ACIS scheme are completed. The scenario can be decomposed into the effect of 
reducing the tariff (scenario R2) and the effect of removing ACIS (scenario R3).4 
The pure reallocation effects are isolated in scenario R4, where national supplies of 
both capital and labour are fixed.  
Economy-wide, industry and jurisdictional results are presented in tables 4.1 to 4.3. 
All results represent percentage changes in reported variables compared with the 
policy status quo as represented in the database (which is equivalent to scenario O5 
                                                 
3 This setting is sometimes referred to as the ‘almost-small economy’ assumption (chapter 3). 
4 There are small interaction effects, but these are typically not detected until the fifth decimal 
place. 
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in table 3.5 (chapter 3)). As anticipated, the modelled net effects of changes in 
assistance on the economy as a whole are small, reflecting the relatively small size 
of the automotive industry and relatively small changes in assistance rates that 
scenario R1 entails.  
Economy-wide effects from the model 
Reducing the tariff from 10 to 5 per cent and winding up ACIS results in an 
increase in real GDP, the indicator of economic activity, by up to 0.06 per cent 
(table 4.1). The slight economic expansion of, and the reallocation of resources 
across, the economy involves an increase in exports and the attendant reduction in 
the terms of trade. This reduction in the terms of trade reduces the gains to 
consumers from the expansion and reallocation effects. The indicator of welfare, 
real adjusted Gross National Expenditure (GNE), increases by about 0.06 per cent. 
The following discussion isolates the effect of reducing the tariff and eliminating 
ACIS.  
Table 4.1 Reference case results — economy-wide 
Percentage changes relative to the database 
Scenario  R1   R2   R3  R4 
Tariffa to 5%  to 5%  10%  to 5%
ACIS to 0  Stage 2  to 0  to 0
Other settings     Decomposition 
closure
National aggregates     
Real adjusted GNEb 0.057  0.054  0.002  0.003
Real GDP 0.063  0.059  0.003  0.004
Real private and public consumption 0.002  0.019  -0.018  -0.008
Real investment 0.136  0.130  0.006  -0.006
Export volumes 0.405  0.325  0.082  0.285
Import volumes 0.268  0.256  0.012  0.218
Terms of trade -0.046  -0.035  -0.011  -0.033
Real exchange ratec 0.124  0.103  0.021  0.085
Sectoral aggregates 
       
Agriculture 0.067  0.046  0.021  0.047
Mining 0.360  0.258  0.103  0.157
Food processing 0.095  0.068  0.027  0.087
Manufacturing -0.122  -0.075  -0.047  -0.173
Services 0.046  0.049  -0.003  -0.005
a ‘to 5%’ means reducing automotive tariffs from 10% to 5%. b Real gross national expenditure adjusted for 
foreign ownership of capital. c In the MMRF model, a change in the real exchange rate is interpreted as a 
change in the nominal exchange rate; a negative sign is interpreted as an appreciation of the $A. 
Source: Commission estimates based on MMRF simulation results. 
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Effects of the tariff reduction 
Reducing the tariff from 10 per cent to 5 per cent leads to an increase in economic 
activity of 0.06 per cent (or almost all of the total increase from the policy package). 
By reducing the cost of cars to business users, the lower tariff encourages an 
expansion of production in non-automotive sectors. As labour is assumed to be 
fixed nationally, this results in a ‘short-term’ increase in returns to capital, which 
attracts an inflow of foreign capital to keep the rate of return constant. This is 
reflected in an increase in investment of 0.13 per cent. 
The lower tariff also increases trade. Reduced production costs lower the cost of 
exports, and export volumes increase by 0.32 per cent. At the same time, users 
switch from domestically-produced cars and components to cheaper imports and, as 
the economy expands, import volumes rise by 0.26 per cent. 
Increased export volumes lead to a fall in export prices, and the terms of trade fall 
by 0.04 per cent. This partly offsets the rise in consumption from the positive 
income effects of cheaper cars, so that real consumption growth is limited to 
0.02 per cent. Net benefits as measured by real adjusted GNE increase by 
0.05 per cent.  
Effects of reducing or removing ACIS  
As discussed in box 4.1, the distortionary effects of ACIS are likely to be smaller 
than those of an equivalent tariff as long as it is possible to raise taxes to fund the 
subsidy without imposing a distortion greater than that associated with the tariff. 
This is borne out in the results, with a significantly smaller increase in real GDP 
resulting from the removal of ACIS. Because the economic effects of ACIS are akin 
to that of a subsidy on imported inputs and of a production subsidy,5 in contrast to 
reducing tariffs, removing ACIS increases the cost of domestically-produced 
automotive products to consumers and other users. The benefits of removing ACIS 
are restricted to those resulting from the reallocation of factors of production, and 
translate into a smaller increase in GDP relative to reducing tariffs. This again 
drives an increase in the volume of exports (0.08 per cent), with a corresponding 
fall in the terms of trade (0.01 per cent). This leads to a small decline in real 
consumption of 0.02 per cent. Net benefits as measured by real adjusted GNE 
increase fractionally (by 0.002 per cent).  
 
                                                 
5 This is true as long as there is enough tariff revenue from duty paid on automotive imports to 
cover the ACIS credits. 
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As anticipated, the aggregate net effect of a production subsidy is smaller than that 
of a tariff. There are several reasons why the impacts of reducing tariffs are larger 
than the effects of reducing or removing ACIS.  
First, the assistance provided to the industry by the 10 per cent tariff is greater than 
the assistance provided by ACIS — broadly speaking, the tariff allows automotive 
producers to raise their (ex-factory) prices by up to 10 per cent, whereas ACIS 
reduces their production costs by less than 2 per cent. Hence, for the industry, 
reducing the tariff to 5 per cent has more than double the impact of removing ACIS.  
Second, the tariff imposes a tax on buyers of cars (box 4.1). A reduction in the tariff 
to 5 per cent is estimated to reduce retail car prices by almost 3 per cent, whereas 
removing ACIS results in a small increase in the price of domestically-produced 
cars but virtually no reduction in the price of imported ones. Removing ACIS frees 
up tax revenue, which all else equal allows lower taxes in the economy (whereas 
reducing the tariff reduces government revenue). However, the beneficial effect of 
this is less than the economy-wide benefits from reducing the ‘consumer tax’ effect 
of the tariff. In other words, as modelled, the distortions imposed by the import tax 
on households and businesses, which use automotive products as intermediate 
inputs, exceed the distortions imposed by the broader-based taxes used to pay for 
the subsidy.  
In this model, ACIS is assumed to be funded through a tax on factor incomes. This 
broad-based tax is highly neutral, in that it does not change the relative prices of 
labour and capital, and therefore generates small deadweight losses. It is, therefore, 
likely that the model does not fully capture the distorting impacts of the tax system 
as it actually operates. For this reason, the benefits of reducing or removing ACIS 
are likely to be underestimated.6 
Reallocation effects 
The allocative effects of the current plan, and their associated terms of trade effects, 
can be isolated by comparing the results for scenarios R1 and R4. With the capital 
supply fixed nationally in R4, the size of the resource base remains unchanged. The 
small increase in real GDP measures the allocative gains in terms of a change in 
productivity — that is, the increase in output made possible by reallocating the 
fixed amount of labour and capital available.  
                                                 
6 Some estimates put the deadweight costs of taxation at between 20 and 50 cents in the dollar 
(PC 2008a). 
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Sectoral effects 
As modelled, reducing assistance to the automotive industry leads resources to 
move out of the automotive industry into other industries. This reallocation is a 
function of the industries’ trade exposure and of the responsiveness of demand in 
their output markets. More exported-oriented industries face elastic demand for 
their products and are more able to expand. Conversely, industries which produce 
mainly for the domestic market are more constrained in their ability to expand 
output.  
As a result, resource gains from reduced automotive assistance are concentrated in 
the mining sector and some manufacturing industries. The services sector grows 
almost at the same rate as the economy as a whole to support the expansion of other 
sectors. Growth of the agricultural sector is contained by the availability of land, 
and that of the food processing sector is limited by the growth of its main input, 
agricultural products.  
Fixing capital in scenario R4 illustrates how this constraint affects the different 
sectors — the gains from reducing the cost of automotive products to industries that 
use them as part of their investment are concentrated in the mining industry. 
Although removing ACIS increases the cost of automotive products to buyers, it 
still frees up resources that are available for expanding output — again, mainly in 
the mining sector.  
Effects on the automotive industry 
The effects of reducing the tariff and eliminating ACIS on the automotive industry 
are complicated by: 
• the opposing effects of each type of assistance on the price of outputs 
• the different effects on assembly and component manufacturing. 
Most of the combined assistance is directed to the assembly sector. As a result, this 
sector bears larger impacts from reduced assistance. Note that constraining capital 
growth has little impact on the automotive industry, confirming that the closure in 
scenario R4 is particularly useful for analysing resource reallocation across the 
economy. In the following, the effects of tariff reduction (scenario R2) and of ACIS 
(scenario R3) are analysed separately, based on table 4.2.  
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Table 4.2 Reference case results — automotive industry 
Percentage changes relative to the database 
Scenario  R1   R2   R3  R4 
Tariffa to 5%  to 5%  10% to 5%
ACIS to 0  Stage 2  to 0  to 0
Other settings    Decomposition
closure
Automotive assembly    
Output -4.600  -2.929  -1.680  -4.558
Employment -5.468  -3.501  -1.985  -5.378
Domestic sales from 
domestic production -5.028
 
-3.931
 
-1.117
 
-4.998
Domestic sales — total 0.029  0.038  -0.009  -0.019
Export volume -2.860  1.141  -3.970  -2.770
Import volume 3.726  3.151  0.574  3.649
Component manufacturing 
   
Output -1.375  -1.159  -0.215  -1.380
Employment -1.777  -1.532  -0.244  -1.721
Domestic sales from 
domestic production -1.613
 
-1.401
 
-0.212
 
-1.622
Domestic sales — total 0.029  0.038  -0.009  -0.019
Export volume 4.117  4.427  -0.298  4.203
Import volume 1.141  1.589  -0.455  1.129
a ‘to 5%’ means reducing automotive tariffs from 10% to 5%.  
Source: Commission estimates based on MMRF simulation results. 
Effects of the tariff reduction 
Reducing the tariff (scenario R2) reduces the price of imported cars and 
components, and encourages users of cars to substitute toward imports. Reducing 
the tariff rate also reduces uncapped ACIS payments and increases the cost of 
automotive inputs to the assembly sector. Domestic sales of cars fall by nearly 
4 per cent and imports increase by about 3 per cent, in response to a reduction of 
almost 3 per cent in the price of imports. The assembly sector benefits from the 
effect of the reduced tariff on the price of imported components. Reduced costs 
mean that the assembly sector can increase its exports by about 1 per cent.  
Component producers use a large amount of imported components as intermediate 
inputs. As the tariff reduction reduces the cost of one of their main inputs, this 
reduces the cost of producing components in Australia, relative to the world price. 
Australian component manufacturers become more competitive and increase their 
exports by nearly 4.5 per cent.  
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The combination of effects results in a reduction in output of the assembly sector in 
the order of 3 per cent, but a much smaller decrease in component output 
(1.2 per cent). An increase in the capital–labour ratio in the automotive sectors (as is 
the case in the rest of the economy) means that the decrease in employment exceeds 
the decrease in output in the automotive industry.  
The effect of reducing ACIS 
Reducing ACIS (scenario R3) increases the price of assembled automotive 
products, and the price of components by a negligible amount. As a result, 
consumers and businesses switch toward imports and exports fall. These effects are 
larger in the assembly sector than in the component sector because the bulk (67 per 
cent as modelled) of ACIS assistance is directed to the assembly sector. Imports of 
components fall as a result of the contraction of the assembly sector and of the 
domestic components sector itself.  
Jurisdictional results 
The mechanisms at work at the jurisdictional level are similar when reducing both 
tariff and ACIS assistance and they are discussed together here, concentrating on 
scenario R1 (table 4.3). As assistance is reduced, the more automotive-intensive 
jurisdictions — Victoria and South Australia, and to a lesser extent, New South 
Wales — lose a small proportion of their labour and capital to other jurisdictions, 
especially to those that depend on resources and exports for a large part of their 
activity (Western Australia, Queensland and the Northern Territory). 
This movement of population out of the automotive-intensive jurisdictions, reduces 
demand for local services, in turn reducing aggregate activity (gross state product 
(GSP)) in these jurisdictions.7  
In all jurisdictions, however, GSP per person increases. This effect is most 
prominent in the automotive-intensive jurisdictions, as workers leave the 
automotive industry for more capital-intensive industries.8  
                                                 
7 To the extent that labour moves on a temporary basis, this effect would be even smaller than 
projected here. There is anecdotal evidence that some workers are choosing to travel to high 
growth areas to work for certain periods, without moving their households. If increased 
participation were the main source of additional labour in the expanding jurisdictions, the 
reduction in GSP effect would also be dampened. 
8 The share of capital in value-added is 0.4 in the automotive industry, and between 0.7 and 0.9 in 
mining. 
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Table 4.3 Reference case results — by jurisdiction 
Percentage changes relative to the database 
Scenario  R1   R2   R3  R4 
Tariffa to 5%  to 5%  10% to 5%
ACIS to 0  Stage 2  to 0  to 0
Other settings    Decomposition
closure
Real GSP    
New South Wales  0.111  0.084  0.028  0.079
Victoria -0.257  -0.145  -0.114  -0.252
Queensland 0.214  0.144  0.071  0.107
South Australia -0.195  -0.047  -0.148  -0.187
Western Australia 0.446  0.306  0.142  0.230
Tasmania 0.208  0.177  0.031  0.156
Northern Territory 0.302  0.211  0.092  0.200
ACT -0.037  -0.007  -0.031  -0.085
GSP per person 
     
New South Wales 0.039  0.044  -0.005  -0.011
Victoria 0.059  0.057  0.002  0.008
Queensland 0.056  0.057  ..  -0.006
South Australia 0.072  0.060  0.012  0.021
Western Australia 0.073  0.069  0.004  -0.002
Tasmania 0.058  0.060  -0.002  0.005
Northern Territory 0.062  0.062  ..  0.011
ACT 0.023  0.029  -0.006  -0.027
a ‘to 5%’ means reducing automotive tariffs from 10% to 5%.  
.. greater than 0 and less than 0.0005 
Source: Commission estimates based on MMRF simulation results. 
Further results are available for the automotive industries by jurisdiction in 
appendix E. All the mechanisms discussed in this section are also relevant to 
interpreting the effects in those tables.  
4.3 Results for option scenarios and sensitivity tests 
Results for the options listed in the task requested of the Commission are outlined 
and discussed in the following sections. Results for the sensitivity scenarios are 
briefly summarised in the last section.   
As mentioned in chapter 3, some of the options are covered in the analysis of the 
reference case. The remaining options include: 
• three combinations of tariffs and ACIS funding at different levels (scenarios O1, 
O4 and O7) 
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• an option in which ACIS is delivered exclusively as grants (scenario O3) 
• a scenario in which the Australian dollar appreciates relative to the US dollar 
(scenario O8).  
National and sectoral aggregate results are shown in table 4.4.9  
Scenarios O1 and O4 illustrate that, in reducing tariffs from 10 to 5 per cent and 
moving to Stage 3 of ACIS, the latter component of the policy change has a 
negligible effect on results (recalling that reducing the tariff reduces uncapped 
ACIS payments).  
Table 4.4 Option scenario results — economy-wide 
Percentage changes relative to the database 
Scenario  O1   O3   O4   O7  O8 
Tariffa to 5% to 5%  10%  to 0%  to 5%
ACIS Stage 3  Stage 2  Stage 3  to 0  Stage 3 
Other settings  ACIS as
grants
    Commodity 
price increase 
National aggregates       
Real adjusted GNEb 0.055  0.053  0.001  0.159  1.276
Real GDP 0.061  0.058  0.001  0.176  1.437
Real private and public consumption 0.015  0.031  -0.004  0.048  2.159
Real investment 0.132  0.126  0.002  0.396  3.246
Export volumes 0.346  0.298  0.022  0.974  -2.939
Import volumes 0.259  0.273  0.003  0.750  2.265
Terms of trade -0.038  -0.031  -0.003  -0.106  3.447
Real exchange ratec 0.109  0.092  0.006  0.300  -3.341
Sectoral aggregates 
         
Agriculture 0.052  0.035  0.006  0.145  -1.559
Mining 0.288  0.198  0.030  0.806  14.466
Food processing 0.075  0.054  0.008  0.214  -3.009
Manufacturing -0.089  -0.058  -0.014  -0.218  -3.991
Services 0.048  0.052  -0.001  0.149  0.817
a ‘to 5%’ means reducing automotive tariffs from 10% to 5%. b Real gross national expenditure adjusted for 
foreign ownership of capital. c In the MMRF model, a change in the real exchange rate is interpreted as a 
change in the nominal exchange rate; a negative sign is interpreted as an appreciation of the $A. 
Source: Commission estimates based on MMRF simulation results. 
Scenario O3 illustrates that delivering ACIS as a grant converts it from a relatively 
complex assistance program, which insulates those that receive the uncapped 
portion from the effects of the tariff, into a simple production subsidy.  
                                                 
9 Other results for these scenarios are found in appendix E (tables E.4 to E.8). 
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Scenario O8 helps to put into perspective the changes in scenario O1. 
Results for these scenarios are discussed next.  
Combinations of assistance (O1, O4 and O7) 
Scenarios O1, O4 and O7 are different combinations of tariff and ACIS changes. 
The mechanisms and effects relevant to scenarios O1, O4 and O7 are closely related 
to those found in the reference scenarios, which are reported in table 4.1.  
When moving from Stage 2 to Stage 3, capped ACIS funding is halved, and the 
economy-wide effects of this change are proportionate to the size of the automotive 
tariff. For example, if automotive tariffs remain unchanged (scenario O4), halving 
capped ACIS funding is expected to have a much smaller impact on the economy 
than in scenario R3, in which ACIS funding is removed completely.  
On the other hand, if automotive tariffs are reduced to 5 per cent (scenario O1), the 
effects of halving capped ACIS funding will be greater than they are in scenario O3, 
but smaller than they are in scenario R1, in which ACIS is removed completely. It 
should be noted that the differences between scenarios O1 and O3 are much greater 
than between scenarios O1 and R1. This is because a tariff reduction has a greater 
impact on the economy than does reducing an industry subsidy. As illustrated in 
table 4.1 for the reference scenarios, the economy-wide effects in scenario O1 are 
almost entirely attributable to the tariff reduction. 
The effects of a further tariff reduction can be seen clearly in scenario O7, in which 
automotive tariffs are reduced to zero (and all other tariffs remain unchanged).10 
This case can be compared with scenario R1, in which automotive tariffs are 
reduced to 5 per cent. In scenario O7, the removal of all automotive tariffs involves 
more resources leaving from the automotive sectors to other activities. In particular, 
the export-oriented industries, notably mining, are projected to attract more 
resources than in scenario R1. These expanding industries have a higher capital–
labour ratio than the automotive industry. As resources move into these 
capital-intensive industries, the demand for capital increases and the size of the 
economy expands. Specifically, real GDP increases by 0.18 per cent, compared with 
0.06 per cent in scenario R1. As household incomes increase, domestic 
consumption and expenditure rise — real adjusted GNE increases 0.16 per cent, 
compared with 0.06 per cent in scenario R1.  
                                                 
10 Scenario S1 models the elimination of all tariffs. 
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ACIS delivered as grants (O3) 
In scenario O3, all ACIS funding (both capped and uncapped) is treated as a 
production subsidy and delivered as grants to the automotive sectors. The effects are 
reported in column 2 of table 4.4. 
The effects of scenario O3 can be compared with those of scenario R2 (table 4.1). In 
scenario R2, capped ACIS is already treated as a production subsidy. However, 
uncapped ACIS funding is treated as a credit to offset the duty paid by the assembly 
sector on its imports of car components. This implies that the assembly sector 
effectively benefits from duty-free imports of car components. A reduction in tariffs 
on components does not, therefore, increase the assembly sector’s demand for these 
components.  
In scenario O3, on the other hand, ACIS funding is used to pay for any inputs, not 
just to offset the industry’s tariff bill. When tariffs are reduced, the demand for 
components by the assembly sector is projected to shift from domestic products to 
imports. As a result, the output of the components industry will fall more in 
scenario O3 (appendix E) than in scenario R2. The output of the assembly sector 
will be higher in scenario R2 than in scenario O3 because the duty-free imports 
allow the assembly industry to lower its costs, and therefore the price of cars, which 
stimulates the sales of domestic cars. From an economy-wide perspective, however, 
delivering ACIS as a pure industry subsidy or partly as an input subsidy makes little 
difference.  
An appreciation of the Australian dollar (O8) 
Scenario O8 repeats the experiment in scenario O1 in a setting in which the world 
prices of Australian mining exports increase by 10 per cent. This scenario is 
designed to capture the likely effects of a commodity boom in the world market 
(chapter 3). The exports include coal, oil, gas, iron ore and other mining products. 
The results are reported in the fifth column of table 4.4.  
As expected, an increase in the price of Australia’s mining exports has a significant 
impact on the economy: nearly all the effects reported under scenario O8 are 
attributable to this. With import prices constant in the model, a rise in the world 
prices of major exports leads to a projected improvement in the terms of trade of 
3.5 per cent. As the purchasing power of domestic income rises, the demand for 
domestic and imported products increase. This results in a rise in domestic prices 
and the costs of primary factors, especially labour and land. The Australian dollar is 
projected to appreciate about 3.3 per cent as a result of combining scenario O1 with 
the modelled 10 per cent increase in the price of mining exports.   
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The rising costs of production affect non-mining industries, particularly 
manufacturing, including automotive sectors. Although real GDP and GNE 
increase, the outputs of other non-mining industries decline, except services which 
increases marginally. Despite the expansion in mining exports, exports as a whole 
decline because the decline in non-mining exports outweighs the increase in mining 
exports.  
Sensitivity scenarios 
Various simulations were run by changing settings in scenario R1.11 The first 
(scenario S1) is a rerun of scenario O7 in an environment in which the tariffs which 
apply to all other imports (except TCF products) are reduced to zero. Although the 
general tariff on the imports of most other products is already low (5 per cent or 
lower), the removal of these tariffs is still projected to generate gains to the 
economy. As shown in table 4.5, real GDP and GNE increase by 0.3 and 
0.27 per cent, respectively. 
All other simulations, from scenario S2 to S5 in table 4.5, are based on scenario R1 
to test the sensitivity of results in the reference case. 
Export demand elasticities set to 5 (scenario S2) 
In scenario S2, the elasticities of foreign demand for Australian exports are reduced 
from 10 (in scenario R1) to 5. As might be anticipated from the discussion in 
chapter 3, this results in larger terms of trade effects and smaller increases in 
exports than in scenario R1. For any given rise in exports, world prices are 
projected to fall further in scenario S2 than in scenario R1. As anticipated, this leads 
to a slight worsening in the terms of trade, which dampens real adjusted GNE. The 
differences between the results of scenarios S2 and R1 are small, indicating that 
outcomes do not change much with reasonable settings of the export demand 
elasticities. 
Endogenous government budget (scenario S3) 
In this simulation, the Australian Government budget balance is set as endogenous 
and all tax rates are fixed. The changes in tariff and ACIS policies lead to a decline 
in government revenue. Compared with scenario R1, household disposable income 
increases because income taxes remain unchanged. This results in a rise in real 
                                                 
11 National and sectoral aggregate results for the sensitivity scenarios are shown in table 4.5; all 
other results can be found in appendix E. 
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household consumption and savings. However, as government revenue declines, 
total domestic savings are reduced. To meet the demand for investment determined 
by the growth in the capital stock, foreign capital inflow needs to increase. As a 
result, the trade deficit has to increase — exports increase less in scenario S3 than in 
scenario R1. Overall, there is a small difference in the increases in real GDP and in 
real adjusted GNE between scenarios S3 and R1. This is due to a decrease in 
domestic (government) savings (which increases real aggregate consumption) and 
the attendant increase in foreign capital, as evidenced by an increase in the trade 
deficit (exports are lower and imports higher in scenario S3 than in scenario R1).  
Table 4.5 Sensitivity simulation results — economy-wide 
Percentage changes relative to the database 
Scenario S1  S2  S3  S4  S5 
Tariffa to 0%  to 5%  to 5%  to 5%  to 5% 
ACIS to 0  to 0  to 0  to 0  to 0 
Other settings General 
tariff 
 to 0% 
 Export
elasticity 
of 5
 Endogenous
budget
 Rate of 
return 
closure 
 Short 
run 
closure 
National aggregates        
Real adjusted GNEb 0.268  0.051  0.063  0.011  .. 
Real GDP 0.297  0.054  0.067  0.014  .. 
Real private and public 
consumption 0.100 
 
-0.011
 
0.093
 
-0.066
 
-0.062 
Real investment 0.675  0.118  0.141  0.023  0.000d
Export volumes 1.511  0.411  0.116  0.505  0.415 
Import volumes 1.206  0.240  0.299  0.208  0.169 
Terms of trade -0.159  -0.084  -0.011  -0.059  -0.051 
Real exchange ratec 0.381  0.172  0.029  0.157  0.203 
Sectoral aggregates 
     
Agriculture 0.176  0.081  0.031  0.075  0.061 
Mining 1.352  0.325  0.222  0.293  0.021 
Food processing 0.194  0.085  0.055  0.115  0.100 
Manufacturing -0.183  -0.115  -0.184  -0.120  -0.091 
Services 0.257  0.038  0.064  -0.005  .. 
a ‘to 5%’ means reducing automotive tariffs from 10% to 5%.  b Real gross national expenditure adjusted for 
foreign ownership of capital. c In the MMRF model, a change in the real exchange rate is interpreted as a 
change in the nominal exchange rate; a negative sign is interpreted as an appreciation of the $A. d Exactly 
zero.  
.. greater than 0 and less than 0.0005 
Source: Commission estimates based on MMRF simulation results. 
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Increasing rate of return of capital (scenario S4) 
This simulation is designed to test the assumption that capital can readily be 
obtained from foreign capital markets at a fixed rate of return. As might be 
expected, if the cost of borrowing capital rises as the demand for capital increases, 
the expansion of economic activities slows relative to scenario R1. Real GDP is 
projected to rise only 0.01 per cent in S4 (table 4.5), compared with 0.06 per cent in 
scenario R1 (table 4.1). When the cost of borrowing from abroad increases, the 
expansion of capital is curtailed, as evidenced by a smaller increase in investment.  
‘Short-run’ closure (scenario S5) 
The last simulation is used to check the performance of the model when labour 
mobility is constrained between industries within each jurisdiction and capital is 
fixed at the industry level. This closure can be interpreted as representing short-run 
effects, before most adjustments can occur. As capital is immobile, labour is the 
only factor that can be reallocated, but only within each jurisdiction. This restricted 
mobility of labour still produces a small efficiency gain when tariffs are reduced 
from 10 per cent to 5 per cent and ACIS is wound up. However, household real 
consumption declines as the increase in income tax required to balance the 
government budget, outweighs the small rise in labour income.  
Both scenario S4 and scenario S5 show that the simulation results are determined, 
to a large extent, by the expansion effect of the modelled reductions in assistance, 
which are associated with the increase in capital stock required to match the 
reallocation of labour across the economy.  
A 1 per cent improvement in productivity in the automotive sectors 
The Commission conducted a simple illustrative productivity simulation to compare 
results with other scenarios. In this simulation, the automotive industry was 
assumed to achieve a 1 per cent improvement in the productivity of its labour and 
capital. Economy-wide results are found in table 4.6 and industry results in 
table 4.7. 
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Table 4.6 Productivity simulation results – economy-wide 
Percentage changes relative to the database 
   Changes
Real adjusted GNEa   0.008
Real GDP   0.007
Real private and public 
consumption 
  0.012
a Real gross national expenditure adjusted for foreign ownership of capital. 
Source: Commission estimates based on MMRF simulation results. 
Table 4.7 Productivity simulation results — automotive industry 
Percentage changes relative to the database 
  Car
assembly 
Component 
manufacturing
Output  0.597 0.387
Employment  -0.486 -0.661
Domestic sales from 
domestic production  0.395 0.326
Domestic sales — total  0.011 0.011
Export volume  1.422 1.804
Import volume  -0.197 -0.097
Source: Commission estimates based on MMRF simulation results. 
The improvement in productivity in the automotive industry increases income (real 
GDP) and disposable income, as evidenced by an increase in consumption.  
The productivity improvement reduces the price of domestic products and improves 
their competitiveness. This is evidenced by increases in output and exports of cars 
and components. This occurs to the detriment of imports as buyers and industries, 
which use cars and components substitute away from imports and toward local 
products. As might be anticipated, notwithstanding the increase in output, the 
productivity improvement also reduces employment in the automotive industry, 
which makes this labour available to other industries. 
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5 The modelling in perspective 
The economic model used in this study broadly indicates the impacts of changes in 
assistance on resource allocation within the economy, as well as highlighting 
potential impacts on particular industries, including the assisted industry. 
However, as noted at the outset, modelling is not without limitations. Simulation 
outcomes can be sensitive to parameter choices or specific features of the model 
used. And some matters that influence the economy-wide effects of assistance 
policies — for example, drivers of innovation and technological change, and 
adjustment costs — are exogenous to general equilibrium (GE) models, and must be 
integrated with modelling assessments. This is particularly so when assessing the 
merits of incremental changes to assistance from a relatively low base, as is the case 
in the current exercise.  
In this chapter, the Commission first distils some ‘high level’ messages from the 
simulations reported earlier in this study (section 5.1), and then examines how 
accounting for certain features of the model, and a range of exogenous influences, 
could affect these findings (sections 5.2 and 5.3). It then draws some implications 
from the study for the assessment of options for future assistance to the automotive 
industry (section 5.4). 
5.1 What do the model simulations indicate? 
The simulation results reported in chapter 4 consistently indicate that, in relation to 
the various resource effects captured in the modelling, further reductions in 
automotive assistance could be expected to yield economy-wide benefits, with 
larger reductions bringing larger gains. The largest gains through changes to 
automotive assistance arrangements, as measured by real adjusted gross national 
expenditure (GNE) (chapter 4), arise under scenario O7, in which all assistance to 
the automotive industry is removed. Scenario R1, which models the current plan to 
reduce automotive tariffs to 5 per cent in 2010 and to remove ACIS by 2015, also 
yields net benefits, and these are greater than in those simulations that involve lesser 
reductions in assistance, particularly for tariffs. 
A feature of the simulation results is that, as expected, the projected net effects of all 
the automotive assistance options simulated are small in economy-wide terms. For 
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example, the increase in both real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and real adjusted 
GNE in scenario R1 is just 0.06 per cent. The limited size of these net results 
reflects the small size of the automotive industry (0.5 per cent of GDP) and of the 
reductions in assistance being modelled. Nevertheless, the small percentage gains in 
these economic measures equate to around $600 million and $500 million a year, 
respectively. As the gains would accrue each year in perpetuity, they are sizeable in 
present value terms. 
The net benefits modelled mask the much more substantial gains to Australian 
buyers of cars and taxpayers from reductions in tariffs and subsidies. The current 
programs redistribute more than $1 billion each year in income from these groups 
toward owners of capital (including foreign-owned companies) and workers in the 
automotive industry. As noted in chapter 2, on a per worker basis, the transfer was 
equivalent to around $23 500 in 2006-07 (for the assistance measures covered in the 
Commission’s estimates). 
The net benefit projections also mask differences in the impact of the modelled 
policy options at the industry level. The current plan (scenario R1) results in a 
contraction of automotive output and employment of around 3.5 per cent, although 
with a relatively greater contraction in vehicle assembly than in component 
manufacturing. The contraction in the automotive industry is the corollary of the 
effects of the present automotive assistance arrangements, in which consumers, 
taxpayers and people in other industries effectively support activity in the 
automotive industry. Indeed, once the economy is fully adjusted to the policy 
change, the contraction in the automotive industry is more than offset by expansions 
in the output and employment of other industries, including other manufacturing 
industries. 
Reflecting such changes, there are also differences in the effects of the policy 
options between jurisdictions. Scenario R1 entails small long-run contractions in 
economic activity in Victoria and South Australia, with small increases in other 
States. Again, this is an upshot of the effects of the present automotive assistance 
arrangements, in which consumers, businesses and taxpayers in all jurisdictions 
effectively support activity in Victoria and South Australia. That said, in the long 
run, average incomes in all jurisdictions (as given by Gross State Product per 
person) are higher under all simulations involving a reduction in the tariff. 
However, the modelling also shows that the impacts of changes in automotive 
assistance on the industry, and indeed the economy, would potentially be small 
relative to other influences that affect the industry’s viability. This is reflected in 
scenario O8, where a further appreciation of the Australian dollar, induced by a 
commodity boom, is projected to lead to a significant contraction in the automotive 
industry — far greater than from reducing tariffs — as well as a contraction in 
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several other industries. Equally, a future reduction in the exchange rate of similar 
magnitude — resulting, for example, from a decline in commodity prices or other 
factors — would see an expansion that would more than offset the modelled effects 
of reductions in assistance. 
The simulations also illustrate that, in terms of various resource effects captured in 
the modelling, subsidies remain preferable to tariffs for delivering industry 
assistance. For example, scenario R2 entails a reduction in assistance via tariff cuts; 
scenario R3 entails a reduction in ACIS subsidies. Scenario R2 results in much 
higher net benefits for Australia (even after scaling the results to make the quantum 
of assistance in each scenario comparable). 
The modelled impacts of reducing tariffs are larger than those of removing ACIS (or 
reducing it, as in scenario O4) for two main reasons.  
First, the assistance provided to the industry by the 10 per cent tariff is greater than 
assistance provided by ACIS — broadly speaking, the tariff allows automotive 
producers to raise their (ex factory) prices by up to 10 per cent, while ACIS reduces 
their production costs by less than 2 per cent. Hence, for the industry, reducing the 
tariff to 5 per cent has more than double the impact of removing ACIS.  
Second, the tariff imposes a tax on buyers of cars. A reduction in the tariff to 5 per 
cent is estimated to reduce retail car prices by almost 3 per cent, whereas removing 
ACIS results in a small increase in the price of domestically-produced cars but 
virtually no reduction in the price of imported cars. While removing ACIS allows 
lower taxes in the economy, the beneficial impact of this as modelled is less than the 
economy-wide benefits from reducing the ‘consumer tax’ effect of the tariff. (In 
other words, the distortions imposed by the import tax on households and 
particularly businesses, which use automotive products as intermediate inputs, 
exceed the distortions imposed by the broader-based taxes used to pay for the 
subsidy.) It is likely, however, that the model does not fully capture the distorting 
impacts of the actual tax system and, for this reason, the benefits of reducing or 
removing ACIS are likely to be underestimated. That means, for example, that the 
benefits in scenario R1 are understated relative to R2. 
5.2 How robust are the model specifications and key 
parameters? 
While the simulation results suggest that reductions in automotive assistance would 
generate net benefits for the Australian community, and that the current plan 
(scenario R1) offers greater net benefits than options entailing lesser reductions in 
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assistance, it is important to investigate how robust such results are to changes in the 
model. The results from model-based simulations can only be as sound as the model 
itself. While the Monash Multi-Regional Forecasting (MMRF) model is widely seen 
as suitable for the exercise undertaken by the Commission, three aspects of the 
model that may affect the simulation results, and warrant explicit consideration, are 
its treatment of:  
• scale economies 
• export demand elasticities  
• tariff preferences under bilateral trade agreements. 
Scale economies 
As noted in chapter 3, the model incorporates production functions embodying 
‘constant returns to scale’. In effect, the cost of producing each additional unit — a 
car or a component — is modelled as being the same as the cost of producing each 
previous unit. In reality, some production activities show increasing or decreasing 
returns to scale over ranges of output.  
The production of particular vehicle models is recognised as involving ‘increasing 
returns to scale’ up to a certain level of production. These economies of scale arise 
due to the large fixed costs associated with developing a product, and tooling and 
commissioning a plant. At the time of the Commission’s 2002 inquiry, industry 
sources indicated that 180 000 units was the minimum economic production volume 
for the sort of large vehicles produced in Australia, with 80 000 to 100 000 units 
seen as the minimum necessary for ‘niche’ car assembly (Spurling Report 2001, 
cited in PC 2002).1 The Bracks Review indicated that ‘a minimum plant capacity of 
300 000 to 400 000 units per annum is [generally accepted as] necessary to help 
ensure profitability, especially for small and medium car production, where margins 
are low’ (Bracks 2008a). By contrast, the production levels of (current) Australian 
assemblers in 2006 ranged from 81 000 units (Ford) to 126 000 units (Holden) 
(table 5.1), suggesting significant untapped scale economies. 
                                                 
1 In its 2002 report, the Commission also noted that economies of scale in the industry are 
increasingly important due to higher product development costs requiring higher throughput for 
firm profitability, and at the same time are decreasing in importance at the individual model 
level due to developments in computer-driven machine technology and the advent of ‘platform 
engineering’ (PC 2002).  
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Table 5.1 Australian PMV production and exportsa, by producer, 2006 
Motor vehicle 
producer 
 
Models 
Engine size 
(cylinders)
Production level
(units)
Exports
(units)
Toyota Camry/Aurion 4-6 111 610 79 648
Holden Commodore/Statesman 6-8 125 855 46 027
Ford Falcon/Territory 6-8 81 470 7 012
a Excludes Mitsubishi. 
Source: DIISR (2007). 
Economies of scale may also be important in components production. The 
international trend in component sourcing is for producers to purchase globally, 
resulting in consolidation amongst components suppliers to increase scale and a 
reduced number of suppliers worldwide (Victorian Government 2008). In the past, 
the Australian components sector has been characterised by relatively low scales of 
operation (PC 2002).  
In these circumstances, a reduction in assistance (or any other factor that could lead 
to a decline in production) would be more likely to trigger the closure of one or 
more plants because unit costs rise as production and sales fall. Essentially, this 
means that adjustment may be ‘lumpy’ rather than incremental.  
However, where selected closure occurs, scale economies can also help remaining 
firms to reduce their unit costs of production and improve their viability, as they 
capture some of the sales from plants that close. In relation to the car assembly 
sector, there are clear possibilities for substitution by domestic consumers between 
the current, locally produced models (although this is probably less so with respect 
to the Ford Territory).2 This suggests that, were one of the local assemblers to cease 
operations at some point, the volumes achieved by the remaining assemblers would 
increase. From this perspective, reduced assistance may drive efficient integration 
and achieve scale economies. Similarly, in its 2002 report, the Commission 
considered that further rationalisation in the components sector could improve the 
industry’s competitiveness through scale economies. Further, where rationalisation 
within the automotive industry releases resources for use in other industries, this 
may allow the achievement of greater scale economies in those other industries. In 
sum, in such cases, the net benefits from reductions in assistance would be higher, 
possibly considerably so, than those projected in the simulations (box 5.1).  
                                                 
2 The Commission’s 2002 report considered it unlikely that the export business of an exiting 
producer would flow to remaining Australian producers, though exports to New Zealand were a 
possible exception, given the high degree of substitution between Commodores and Falcons that 
competed in the market at that time (PC 2002). 
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Box 5.1 Modelling some possible effects of economies of scale 
Modelling has been utilised in previous Commission inquiries to help illustrate some of 
the possible effects of reductions in assistance in the presence of economies of scale. 
In the 2002 inquiry, the MONASH model was used to explore the potential impacts of 
the possible closure of Mitsubishi, under a variety of assumptions regarding demand 
leakage to imports and the effects of closure on the realisation of economies of scale 
by remaining vehicle producers and component producers.  
Under one scenario, most of Mitsubishi’s sales were assumed to be lost to foreign 
suppliers, and there was a resultant reduction in local component activity with an 
associated loss of economies of scale. As would be expected, the costs to the industry 
under this scenario were greater than in a second scenario in which the bulk of 
Mitsubishi’s domestic fleet business flowed to the remaining vehicle assemblers, and 
the flow-on effects on component production were rescaled accordingly.  
Under a third scenario, which also assumed that the bulk of Mitsubishi’s domestic fleet 
business flowed to the remaining vehicle assemblers, allowance was made for 
economies of scale in assembly activity. The negative projected impacts for industry 
activity and employment resulting from the closure were greatly diminished, and the 
initial adverse short-run economy-wide impacts effectively neutralised, although 
regional labour reallocation impacts remained. 
In the Industry Commission’s 1997 automotive inquiry, simulations were run to explore 
the impacts, in economy-wide terms, of costs reductions that could be generated by 
exploiting greater economies of scale in the automotive sector. The simulation involved 
a reduction in tariffs from 15 per cent to 5 per cent. Among other things, the simulation 
assumed that the marginal producer exited the industry and the remaining producers 
increased their production sufficiently to meet the domestic production projected in the 
constant returns to scale scenario. The modelled cost reduction of 3.9 per cent increased 
the effects of the simulated tariff reduction on real GDP growth to four times that under 
the constant returns to scale scenario.  
Source: IC (1997); PC (2002).  
 
Alternatively, it may be that a future fall in output would not result in the exit of the 
marginal vehicle producer, or sufficient marginal components producers, but would 
be shared among all existing car producers and most existing component producers. 
If this were to occur, the unit costs for each would increase to the extent that their 
level of production would be less than required to minimise unit costs. As such, the 
net benefits from reductions in assistance would be lower than those projected in the 
modelling simulations. 
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Export demand elasticities 
As noted in chapter 3, in the MMRF model it is assumed that Australian firms can 
sell greater volumes on world markets only by accepting a lower price. Accordingly, 
to the extent that policy changes raise the share of resources allocated to export-
intensive industries, Australians face a reduction in the prices of their exports relative 
to the prices of their imports. These ‘terms of trade’ effects are reflected in the 
simulation results reported in chapter 4, and reduce the net benefits associated with 
reductions in assistance, relative to what they would be in the absence of such 
effects.  
The simulated terms of trade effects were based on export demand elasticities — 
which measure the responsiveness of world prices to increases in Australia’s exports 
— set equal to 10 for all commodities.  
Sensitivity analysis (scenario S2) shows that reducing this parameter to 5 (at the 
lower end of the range typically applied in GE models) has limited effect on 
outcomes generated by the model. As would be expected, the reductions in 
automotive assistance simulated in scenario S2 result in greater terms of trade 
losses. (While further reducing the export demand elasticity would increase terms of 
trade losses further, it is unlikely that Australia would have such a degree of market 
power.) However, the simulation still results in an increase in GDP, due to resource 
reallocation and expansion gains, and net benefits (as measured by real adjusted 
GNE) remains virtually unchanged. That said, real public and private consumption 
decline by 0.01 per cent. 
Scenario S2 mirrors the main simulation reported in the Commission’s 2002 report (which 
also used export demand elasticities of 5, among other values), although in that case the 
reported result of a net consumption loss reflected the limited timeframe provided for 
adjustment in the simulation. Had that simulation’s time frame been extended to allow 
fuller adjustment, the change in net consumption would have become positive (box 5.2). 
Even so, it is clear that with sufficiently low export elasticity parameters, it would 
be possible to obtain estimates of net costs from reductions in assistance, due to 
terms of trade effects. (In turn, this provides the theoretical basis for deriving a set 
of ‘optimal’ tariffs that exceed zero (box 5.3).) However, for the reasons set out in 
chapter 3, the Commission considers that the export demand elasticities used in its 
reference case simulations are a more reasonable representation of the price-quantity 
trade-off that Australian exporters face in the longer run.  
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Box 5.2 Comparison with previous modelling results 
In its 2002 inquiry, the Commission used the MONASH ‘dynamic’ model to model 
several scenarios, with an array of export demand elasticities. The main scenario was 
the Commission’s ‘preferred post-2005 option’, which involved:  
• retention of PMV tariffs at 10 per cent from 2005, with a step reduction to 5 per cent 
in 2010 and no further reduction until at least 2015; and 
• retention of overall ACIS funding at (then) current levels from 2005 to 2010, and 
retention of the uncapped production credits from 2010 to 2015. 
In the 2002 inquiry report, this scenario produced the results listed in the last two 
columns in the table below. The comparable scenario in the present study is O1. To 
illustrate the effects of changing export demand elasticities, scenarios R1 and S2 are 
also shown.  
Scenario O1a R1a S2a PC 2002b PC 2002b
Export demand elasticity 10 10 5 4 10 
Real GDP 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.00 0.01 
Terms of trade -0.04 -0.05 -0.08 -0.08 -0.02 
Real consumption 0.02 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 
Real adjusted GNE 0.05 0.06 0.05 n.a n.a 
a MMRF simulations; percentage deviation from base, once all long-term adjustments have occurred.  
b MONASH simulations; percentage deviation from baseline scenario in 2016.  
Sources: Commission estimates from MMRF simulations; PC (2002). 
As the table shows: 
• in this study, real GDP increases about 0.06 per cent, whereas in the MONASH 
simulations, it increases by 0.01 per cent or less 
• when comparing scenario O1 with the 2002 scenario in which export demand 
elasticities are set to 10 (shown in the last column), terms of trade effects in this 
study are larger than those in the MONASH simulations 
• changes in real consumption are small in both sets of results. 
The smaller increase in real GDP recorded in the 2002 MONASH simulations indicates 
that the capital stock had not grown as much in those simulations as in the current 
study’s MMRF simulations. This is due in large measure to the fact that MONASH 
results were reported for the year 2016, only 6 years after the modelled reduction in 
tariffs and in ACIS. In running the MONASH simulation further, the Commission found 
that capital was projected to continue to be accumulated past 2016. The MONASH 
model took about 13 years to exhaust the adjustments required in response to the 
modelled policy change. In doing so, results from the MONASH simulation converged 
to those of the MMRF simulations in this study.    
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Box 5.3 Some issues in seeking to devise an ‘optimal’ tariff       
Being a relatively small part of the world economy, Australia is generally considered to 
be a ‘price taker’ in world markets. However, our share of world trade in certain 
commodities, and in some instances the possibility of taking advantage of seasonal 
and/or regional variations in demand and supply, may in theory be sufficient to allow 
the exploitation of ‘market power’ in those markets by manipulating trade flows.  
Were this the case, there would in theory be a set of ‘optimal’ import tariffs and/or 
export taxes that exceed zero. These trade taxes would be optimal in the sense that 
they would facilitate the extraction of ‘rents’ from foreign suppliers and buyers by 
restricting flows of imports and exports. Although these taxes would leave Australia’s 
trading partners worse off and generate net costs globally, they could in theory 
generate net benefits for Australia, outweighing the efficiency costs of the tariff 
protection. 
To exploit any market power Australia might have in commodities markets, the ‘first 
best’ policy approach would typically be to tax exports of the relevant commodities, 
such as iron ore, wheat and wool, taking into account developments in international 
markets.  
It has been suggested that tariff protection for the automotive industry could also allow 
Australia to benefit in this way, as holding resources in the automotive industry would 
indirectly restrict the expansion of export industries, thereby limiting the terms of trade 
losses that would entail. In this context, if Australia were assumed to exert sufficient 
influence over prices received in foreign markets and an economic model was 
specified accordingly, it should be possible to derive the result that an increase in 
automotive tariffs (holding all other tariffs constant) would generate a net benefit for 
Australia.  
However, it should also be possible to obtain the same result for an increase in tariffs 
on any randomly selected imported item. Individual tariffs devised on this basis, 
whether for cars or other products, are unlikely to be ‘optimal’. In practice, seeking to 
devise optimal tariffs to generate terms of trade gains would be a complex and fraught 
task. To seek to capitalise on any gains Australia might be able to derive from market 
power in certain commodity markets through a specific tariff on automotive imports 
would likely be far from optimal in an economy-wide sense.  
 
Preferential tariffs 
As noted in chapter 3, the tariff scenarios are modelled as changes in the headline 
Most-Favoured-Nation (MFN) automotive tariff. The change in MFN rates is 
interpreted to be a measure of the change in the ‘price wedge’ created by tariffs. 
Therefore, the calculation abstracts from the effect of preferential tariff rates, 
including the effect of those relating to the recent preferential trade agreements 
(PTAs) with Thailand and the United States. These agreements provide for tariff 
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concessions on imports from these countries: most imports of motor vehicles and 
parts meeting ‘rules of origin’ requirements from Thailand and the United States 
currently enter duty free, with the exception of cars from the United States, duties 
on which are being phased down to zero over the period to 2010.3 Imports from 
these countries currently represent around 14 and 10 per cent of total motor vehicles 
and parts imports, respectively (Bracks 2008a), although it is understood that many 
of these are in the ‘other’ vehicles and components category that is outside the focus 
of this study. 
The effects of such agreements on import competition in Australia, and thus on the 
most appropriate tariff price wedge for use in modelling, would depend on the 
extent to which the partner country’s automotive industry is able to undercut the 
(tariff-inflated) price of rival imports. To the extent that they do not undercut the 
tariff-inflated price of goods from competing domestic and foreign suppliers, the 
duty concessions embodied in these PTAs would effectively transfer tariff revenue 
from the Australian Government to automotive producers with facilities located in 
the partner countries (for example, Thailand and the United States), and not 
significantly benefit Australian consumers through price reductions in the local 
market. This would imply that these agreements have little effect on assistance to 
the domestic automotive industry and, in turn, that little or no adjustment is needed 
to the modelled net benefits of reducing or removing such assistance (although there 
could be government revenue implications not picked up in the modeling).  
To the extent, however, that the prices of imported cars and related components in 
Australia have fallen as a result of these tariff concessions, there would be a case for 
adjusting the modelling results to reflect these effects. But determining the 
appropriate adjustment to make would not be straight-forward. On the one hand, to 
the extent that the price of imported cars and related components in Australia has 
fallen as a result of these tariff concessions, the ‘true’ tariff price wedge on the 
automotive industry’s outputs would be lower than represented in the modelling. On 
the other hand, lower priced components would reduce the penalty assemblers pay 
on their inputs as a result of automotive tariffs. In these circumstances, the use of the 
MFN tariff rate (rather that the MFN rate deflated to reflect the concessions) to 
derive price wedges in the modelling could have caused some overstatement of 
assistance to the components sector, but either some overstatement or 
understatement of assistance to assemblers, depending on trade patterns with the 
PTA partner countries and which automotive products have borne the price declines. 
While an empirical matter, it is feasible that the net effect of these PTAs could be to 
reduce the net price raising effect of assistance to the domestic automotive industry 
                                                 
3 With the exception of the $12 000 duty on second-hand vehicles. 
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provided by the tariff. In this case, the net benefits of further reducing automotive 
assistance would be smaller than suggested in the modelling simulations. Equally, 
the contraction in the automotive industry consequent upon further reductions in 
assistance would also be less than modelled. 
 
Box 5.4 Some possible effects of prospective PTAs 
In addition to the existing bilateral PTAs with the United States, Thailand, Singapore, 
New Zealand, the Australian Government is currently negotiating or considering 
agreements with Japan, Chile, China, Korea, Malaysia, India, Indonesia, the 
Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) (with New Zealand), and the Gulf 
Cooperation Council. 
The extent to which reductions in automotive assistance in particular foreign markets, 
that might be delivered through prospective PTAs, could benefit Australian producers 
would depend among other things on the nature of demand in those markets. Given 
that most Australian production centres around larger cars, they are likely to be of more 
benefit in markets where demand for such vehicles is significant. But in our key export 
markets for cars: 
• automotive tariffs are only 5 per cent in the Gulf States 
• Australia is already party to PTAs with the United States and New Zealand. 
For Australian component producers, however, there may be more scope to capitalise 
on expanded market access, as they are not dependent to the same extent on sales in 
particular markets. 
As noted, the effects of such agreements on import competition in Australia would 
depend on whether the partner country’s automotive industry is able to undercut the 
(tariff-inflated) price of rival imports. If they do not, a PTA will simply divert trade from 
other sources to the partner country, with little significant impact on prices in the 
domestic market.  
However, a PTA that provided preferential treatment for imports from Japan would 
have major ramifications — it would be expected to be largely trade creating, given the 
competitiveness of Japanese production and the multiple manufacturers located in that 
market. It would, therefore, effectively render remaining tariffs on imports from other 
countries largely ineffectual. (The prospect of such an agreement would reinforce the 
case for lowering all automotive tariffs, and providing whatever assistance is deemed 
appropriate for the automotive industry in forms such as production subsidies. More 
generally, as the coverage of PTAs increases, reductions in the general rate would 
reduce trade diversion effects.)  
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5.3 Accounting for ‘exogenous’ considerations 
As noted above, the simulation results indicate that the net resource effects of 
further reductions in automotive assistance are likely to be small in economy-wide 
terms. This mirrors a finding of the Commission’s 2002 inquiry. As noted in chapter 1, 
that inquiry indicated that, given small net resource effects, other considerations not 
incorporated directly in the modelling exercise assumed greater relative importance 
for the determination of future policy. 
Some key exogenous considerations that could influence the net economy-wide 
outcomes from changes in automotive assistance include:  
• induced productivity growth 
• R&D and skills spillovers 
• labour adjustment costs. 
Further reform-induced productivity improvements? 
As noted in chapter 1, there have been substantial improvements in the productivity 
performance of the automotive industry over the last two decades, induced in large 
measure by reforms to its assistance arrangements that increased competitive 
pressures on the industry. Historically, the automotive industry in Australia had 
been protected from ‘the usual consequences of poor management, unsustainable 
wage outcomes and conditions and excessive disputation’ (PC 2002, p. 49). 
Reductions in assistance provided an imperative for employers and employees alike 
to improve work practices. 
However, changes in industry productivity, whether tariff-induced or not, are not 
modelled as an integral part of the MMRF framework. (It is possible, however, to 
apply exogenous ‘shocks’ to the model to simulate the effects of productivity 
improvements, as the Commission has done for this study.)  
The Commission’s 2002 automotive inquiry observed that assistance reductions 
would add pressure for further improvements. While acknowledging that much of 
the ‘low hanging fruit’ may have already been picked, it identified a number of 
potential sources of further productivity improvements, including through the 
reaping of further economies of scale and, importantly, more cooperative workplace 
relations. As the industry itself acknowledged, reductions in assistance — although 
not welcomed — can spur productivity improvement. In turn, this can help firms 
cope with the additional competitive pressures associated with lower assistance, and 
enhance the industry’s longer-term capacity to attract capital, and boost its 
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competitiveness more generally. (Indeed, such productivity improvements are one 
reason that previous reductions in automotive assistance typically have been 
followed by smaller contractions in the automotive industry than had been projected 
in earlier modelling exercises.) 
Currently, domestic producers together with their employees face heightened 
incentives to maximise productivity. Among other things, as well as the 
5 percentage point reduction in tariffs that occurred in 2005, the Australian dollar 
(as measured by the trade-weighted index) has appreciated by around one-third 
since 2002. Over the same period, many consumers’ preferences have shifted 
against the larger cars that are the current focus of Australian production. These 
heightened pressures suggest that the additional impact of future assistance 
reductions on productivity in the current climate might be less than it was in the past. 
However, given the history of the industry and particularly its tenuous industrial 
relations environment, the signal provided by any government decision to reverse 
pre-announced assistance reductions could result in greater resistance by worker 
representatives to change. This could be reflected in a slowing in the uptake of 
future opportunities for productivity gains, particularly via workplace efficiencies, 
or even the delay or reversal of previously agreed reforms.  
As reflected in the relevant simulation in chapter 4, any productivity gain 
consequent upon further reform would add to the net benefits from such reforms. 
The simulation entails a 1 per cent improvement in the use of labour and capital. 
The results confirm the importance of productivity, with this shock leading to an 
increase in economy-wide net benefits of 0.01 per cent, or some $70 million per 
year in real adjusted GNE. The automotive industry’s output expands slightly (by 
around 0.5 per cent), while employment in the industry declines by around the same 
amount. In practice, the effects within the automotive industry itself would depend 
on the exact nature of the productivity gain. For instance, improved labour 
productivity would be expected to be reflected in higher output but could either 
increase or reduce employment in the industry, at least in the short term. 
Technological spillovers? 
Through their activities, firms often generate spillovers for rival firms in their 
industry. In its 2002 inquiry, the Commission supported the view that spillovers 
generated by firms in the automotive industry are significant and, importantly, that 
some of the spillovers flow through to other industries (PC 2002). The Terms of 
Reference for the Bracks Review state that ‘innovation in the automotive industry 
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results in significant spillover effects across the economy, and particularly the 
manufacturing sector’ (Bracks 2008b).4 
Such spillovers are typically associated with the performance of R&D — such as the 
development of knowledge-intensive inputs, for example advanced software tools, 
with applications for other industries — although they are also said to arise from 
non-R&D factors, such as demonstration effects from vehicle exports enhancing 
Australia’s reputation as a producer of complex manufactured products.  
The automotive industry receives significant government support for R&D, 
including via ACIS (chapter 2). ACIS funding is included in the modelling exercise, 
principally as a production subsidy for the relevant segment of the industry. R&D 
undertaken by the industry is also reflected in the database.  
However, the model does not account for any beyond-the-industry spillover benefits 
generated by the performance of R&D. Accordingly, to the extent that such 
spillovers are induced by assistance to the automotive industry, the simulation 
results will tend to overstate the net benefits of reducing such assistance. 
Recent analysis suggests, however, that the extent of beyond-the-industry R&D 
spillovers generated by assistance to the automotive industry may in fact be 
relatively minor. In its 2007 Science and Innovation study, the Commission 
reaffirmed that the strongest case for public support of science and innovation based 
on spillovers occurs: 
• for basic research in science 
• where businesses are engaged in support-induced novel R&D activities that 
either spill over cheaply to others or that trigger cycles of innovation by rivals. 
The spillover benefits will be greatest when there are many potential 
beneficiaries (generic technologies, or many potential users of that technology 
because of industry structures) (PC 2007b). 
In contrast, the type of automotive R&D that has been supported by ACIS generally 
involves ‘modification of existing products, processes and production systems’ 
(PC 2007b, p. 439). At the firm level, this may involve activities such as the design 
                                                 
4 Spillovers are sometimes confused with inter-industry ‘linkages’. All industries have such 
linkages — for example, the automotive industry has linkages with (among others) steel, metal 
fabrication, transport and wholesaling; and the food processing industry has linkages with 
agriculture, transport and wholesaling. Such linkages are captured in the model and the flow-on 
effects of changes in assistance to the automotive industry on other industries are likewise 
reflected in the simulation results. Importantly, the fact that industries have linkages with many 
other industries, even particularly ‘deep’ linkages, does not of itself imply any case for 
government assistance. 
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of parts for specific applications, or the retooling of production equipment. More 
broadly, the industry has been characterised as one that invests in product 
development rather than the development of new technology (Bracks 2008a). 
Further, the Science and Innovation study found that: 
… the type of automotive ‘R&D’ activity that has been supported by public funding … 
is likely to have been undertaken without public support as the majority of benefits 
from this kind of development work are captured by either individual automotive firms 
or the wider automotive industry. (PC 2007b, pp. 439–40) 
Thus, the Commission considers that the extent of R&D spillovers supported by 
automotive assistance would be unlikely to warrant any significant adjustment to the 
simulation results.  
Skill development spillovers? 
The Commission’s 2002 inquiry noted that ‘other industries and activities have 
benefited from the skills development that has taken place in the automotive sector’ 
(PC 2002, p. 71). Similarly, a 2006 inquiry into employment in the automotive 
component manufacturing industry considered that the industry is ‘a major 
contributor to the wider skilled workforce through its contribution to on-the-job 
training.’ (HoR 2006, p. 35).  
As with R&D spillovers, any spillovers in skills development associated with the 
operation of the automotive industry are not captured in the model. Nor are any 
spillovers to the automotive industry that result from the relocation of skilled 
workers from other industries. 
Importantly though, while skills acquired in one job are often of value in another, 
this does not necessarily mean that they represent ‘spillovers’ in an economic sense. 
Where recognised and of value, skills acquired by workers are typically reflected in 
the incomes paid to workers (including, when they transfer to other firms or 
industries). Further, the opportunity for gaining marketable skills in a particular job 
is one factor that may influence workers’ willingness to take on a position, and the 
wage rate necessary to attract them to a position. Thus, the broader value of skills 
gained on a job will, to some extent, be ‘internalised’ between the employer and 
employee.  
That said, there may be difficulties in having competencies recognised, and labour 
market or wage rigidities may prevent the appropriation by employers of the full 
value of training they provide. This is likely to cause some underinvestment by the 
firms in such training and by some workers in the uptake of training. (This is one 
reason that government assistance is provided via general programs for skills 
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development, which may be accessed by eligible automotive businesses and 
employees.) 
In its 2002 report, while the Commission noted several skills and training issues for 
the automotive industry, it did not identify a significant market failure in the area 
specific to the industry. Thus, the fact that the automotive industry is a generator of 
skilled labour does not provide a rationale for industry-specific assistance (or 
continuation of current automotive industry assistance), in addition to currently 
available broad-based assistance for industry training. Nor is there a clear basis for 
adjusting the simulation results significantly to reflect the automotive industry’s 
generation (and use) of skilled labour. 
Labour market adjustment costs? 
While potentially bringing benefits over the longer term, structural adjustment 
inevitably entails costs for the producers and workers affected. For instance, in some 
cases retrenched workers may be unable to find new work, or may need to retrain 
and/or relocate to take up new positions. Equally, while reforms to automotive 
assistance, by improving the competitiveness and output of other industries, may 
increase the demand for labour in Australia in the long run, they are likely to cause a 
short-term reduction in employment, as the process of structural adjustment 
proceeds. 
Jurisdiction-level employment effects are estimated in the model, but various 
adjustment-related costs are not. Welfare payments including those related to 
structural adjustment are captured in the model’s database, but changes in the level 
of payments have not been modelled. The same applies to the costs of labour 
adjustment programs typically provided by the Australian and State/Territory 
Governments to assist with adjustment to major and rapid workforce changes, and 
which provide a range of assistance including with the costs of retraining or 
relocation. Finally, the model does not include job search costs for affected 
individuals (some of which may be partly subsidised under labour adjustment 
programs), nor their earnings loss while unemployed. 
In its 2002 report, the Commission addressed the extent to which adjustment issues 
might arise as a consequence of further reductions in automotive assistance. Among 
other things, it took into account: 
• the industry’s demonstrated capacity to adjust successfully to significant 
reductions in assistance 
• the significant improvements in the skills of the workforce and their effect on 
improving alternative employment prospects 
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• the reduced regional dependence on the industry 
• certain factors limiting firm and regional adjustment capacity, including: 
–  higher unemployment rates than the average for the relevant State (in some 
cases) 
– a significant proportion of workers without post-school qualifications 
– a relatively high-proportion of employees from non-English speaking 
backgrounds 
– the potentially limited value of excess plant and equipment to other industries 
or other automotive producers 
– reduced labour turnover rates at the time, reducing the scope to manage 
adjustment pressures in this way (PC 2002). 
The inquiry’s projections suggested a concentration of labour market adjustment 
costs in 2011 of 96 person-years, following step reduction in assistance in 2010,5 
with the Commission of the view that potentially disruptive firm or regional-level 
adjustments in the industry could not be ruled out. In such an eventuality, 
governments may need to consider providing specific adjustment support 
(PC 2002).  
Since 2002, the most significant development for future adjustment prospects is the 
substantially stronger employment market. In this environment, workers losing their 
jobs because of reduced industry assistance are likely to be more rapidly re-
employed in areas of demand. This is particularly the case for skilled workers, as 
illustrated by events following the recent closure of the Mitsubishi assembly plant at 
Tonsley Park, Adelaide — at the time of the closure in March 2008, over 700 ‘full-
time, long-term positions’ were offered to highly trained personnel affected by the 
closure (Hassall 2008). Moreover, the automotive industry itself is already 
experiencing skills shortages due to competing demands in the national economy 
(Bracks 2008a), a point emphasised by the Victorian Government: 
Australia’s resource boom primarily in Western Australia and Queensland has 
dramatically increased demand for skilled workers and is contributing to a high attrition 
rate of skilled workers from the Victorian automotive industry by offering higher 
wages. (Victorian Government 2008, p. 21) 
This suggests that while the model’s estimate of net benefits of the various options 
to reduce assistance would be lessened by inclusion of adjustment costs, these costs 
are unlikely to be significant given the current strength of the labour market. 
                                                 
5 This cost was calculated using the MONASH model’s Labour Input Loss Index. The Index 
accounts for the effects (both positive and negative) of changes in the structure of the economy 
on labour market adjustments (PC 2002).  
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Moreover, such costs are likely to be significantly lower than anticipated at the time 
of the 2002 inquiry, when the current assistance package for the industry was 
framed. 
At the same time, the direct cost to the community of retaining jobs in the industry 
is clearly significant. Based on the estimates of automotive assistance and employment 
in chapter 2, and simulation O7 in which the removal of tariffs and ACIS is 
projected to induce a contraction in automotive industry employment of 7 per cent, 
the value of support from the community for each job retained in the industry could 
be around $300 000 per year. 
5.4 Summing up the economy-wide effects 
The modelling in this study suggests that further reductions in assistance to the 
automotive industry would generate net benefits for the Australian community 
through improved usage of resources. The associated contraction in automotive 
activity would be more than offset in the long run by gains to other industries. The 
modelling also suggests that the current plan to reduce automotive tariffs to 
5 per cent in 2010, and to terminate ACIS in 2015, offers greater net benefits than 
alternative options that entail lesser (or more prolonged) reductions in assistance. 
This is particularly so when allowance is made for the likely deadweight costs of 
raising tax revenue to make up the revenue loss associated with ACIS subsidies. 
In the Commission’s view, these conclusions remain intact when account is taken of 
the various ‘exogenous’ factors that influence the economy-wide effects of the 
options modelled. These include the potential for spillover benefits associated with 
the development and use of skilled labour in the automotive industry, as well as 
those that had been presumed to flow from automotive R&D. In the current climate, 
adjustment costs would be far lower than when the current assistance arrangements 
were framed in 2002. And the scope to achieve additional productivity gains, and to 
embed those already achieved, are further likely benefits from the current plan. 
Nor are these conclusions materially affected by recent market developments that 
have increased import penetration, including currency movements, changing 
consumer preferences, and the effects of recently concluded PTAs. In particular, the 
recent exchange rate appreciation is frequently cited as a reason for providing higher 
levels of support to the automotive industry. Such appreciation inevitably puts 
pressure on the profitability and even the viability of firms in a range of trade-
exposed industries, not just the automotive industry. However, this is integral to the 
process by which scarce resources in an economy, including skilled workers, are 
induced to move from lower value to higher value activities, in response to changing 
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economic circumstances and emerging opportunities — in this case, the higher 
returns available in the commodities sector. Suggestions that assistance to an 
industry should be maintained or increased to offset the higher dollar typically 
overlook this key point, and in general would prevent resources from flowing to 
their highest value uses, at the community’s expense.  
In sum, based on the Commission’s economy-wide modelling and related analysis, 
reducing tariffs to 5 per cent by 2010 and removing ACIS by 2015 can be expected 
to have a positive payoff. By comparison, the options that would prolong higher 
assistance for this industry, or introduce new forms of assistance, would be likely to 
impose costs on the community as a whole. 
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A Study request 
The request for this study came in the form of a letter to the Productivity 
Commission’s Chairman from the Assistant Treasurer, the Hon. Chris Bowen MP, 
agreeing to a request from the Hon. Steve Bracks that the Commission undertake 
modelling of specific future assistance options for the automotive industry. 
This appendix includes both the letter from the Assistant Treasurer and that from 
Mr Bracks, which accompanied it, outlining the policy options to be modelled.  
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B Referee comments — summary 
Results presented in this report have benefited from suggestions made by three 
independent referees — Philip Adams, Director at the Centre of Policy Studies 
(CoPS) at Monash University; Chris Murphy, Director at Econtech; and David 
Pearce, Director and Principal Policy Analyst at the Centre for International 
Economics.  
On 28 April 2008, the Commission held a technical workshop to present some 
preliminary results and review the modelling undertaken for this study. Participants 
included the three referees, as well as representatives of the Automotive Review 
Secretariat, the Australian Government Treasury, and the Department of Innovation, 
Industry, Science and Research. Dr Larry Cook, Lecturer in the Department of 
Economics at Monash University, also provided insightful comments. 
A summary of the feedback received and the Commission’s responses to points 
raised is provided in this appendix. The summary is presented according to the 
broad topics addressed in the workshop discussion and the referee reports: 
• the model chosen (section B.1) 
• specific features of the model as applied in this study, including its structure and 
parameters, and updates to the model’s database (section B.2) 
• how shocks are implemented (section B.3). 
The complete referee reports are available on the Commission’s website 
(http://www.pc.gov.au).  
B.1 The model  
The Commission’s choice of the Monash Multi-Regional Forecasting (MMRF) 
model for this exercise was seen as appropriate. The main issue discussed was the 
merit of using it in comparative-static rather than dynamic mode. 
It was suggested that, especially in light of the time constraints for this study, the 
comparative-static framework was a reasonable one. It was also seen to provide 
‘defensible assessments’ of the effects of assistance options. However, potential 
weaknesses of the comparative-static approach — stemming from the fact that time 
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• it does not explicitly allow for the precise timing of exogenous shocks or 
endogenous outcomes — this can make it difficult to interpret and present 
results, especially when timing of policy changes is a key issue 
• it does not incorporate a ‘satisfactory’ theory of investment 
• it requires particular care to be taken in constructing the reference database 
against which simulations are compared. 
Response 
Temporal considerations — such as whether a change occurs in 2011 or 2015 — 
may be important in some cases. However, the focus in this study is on evaluating 
the long-term implications of policy changes — that is, once firms and households 
have fully adapted to the changes. 
Moreover, incorporating a temporal adjustment path in a model such as MMRF 
involves many restrictive assumptions. These relate to the estimated effects of the 
policy changes being modelled, as well as projections of all economic variables. A 
comparative-static model removes the need to make forecasting assumptions about 
the future economy and automotive industry, thereby avoiding issues that would 
arise from these assumptions. 
Therefore, it is the spatial and industry dimensions of the model that are most 
germane, rather than the time dimension.  
B.2 Features of the model 
Structure and parameters 
The two most discussed issues relating to the structure and parameters of the model 
involved the assumption of constant returns to scale and the elasticity measures 
used. 
Constant returns to scale 
One referee suggested that a brief summary of the evidence for and against the 
assumption of constant returns to scale be presented, with a conclusion on the 
reason for the final assumption simply stated. 
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Response 
Although some evidence suggests that the automotive industry exhibits increasing 
returns to scale, there is some uncertainty about how much this matters to the 
economy-wide effects of the policy options examined in this study. For example, 
Horridge (1987) has found that the overall effects from changing assumptions about 
scale economies in modelling the economic impact of tariff reductions are unclear. 
If import-competing industries are assumed to exhibit external economies of scale, 
simulation of tariff cuts yield marginally smaller gains in welfare than under 
constant returns to scale. On the other hand, Harris (1984) and Dixon (1978) found 
that, when modelling internal economies of scale, tariff cuts can lead to markedly 
larger increases in GDP compared with assuming constant returns to scale. In 
contrast, Snape (1977) found that tariff reductions could reduce rather than increase 
national welfare, given increasing returns to scale. 
A second issue that must be considered with respect to modelling scale economies 
is which other industries, apart from the automotive industry, are also subject to 
increasing returns to scale. The existence of scale economies in other industries 
implies that, although tariff reductions may have a stronger negative effect on the 
automotive industry, the aggregate result for all industries is largely unchanged, 
since tariff reductions allow other industries experiencing scale economies to lower 
their marginal costs of production. For example, Abayasiri-Silva and Horridge 
(1996) have found that, assuming scale economies operate across all industries, the 
effects of unilateral trade liberalisation on key aggregate variables are only slightly 
different from assuming constant returns to scale.  
In summary, accounting explicitly for increasing returns to scale in a model such as 
MMRF is complex, its effects on results depend crucially on how it is modelled, 
and it was not possible to do it within the timeframe of this study.  
Elasticity assumptions 
Mention was made of the need to: 
• discuss and justify parameter choices for the disaggregated automotive sectors, 
such as consumer demand elasticities, import substitution elasticities and 
capital–labour substitution elasticities 
• test the effect of varying these elasticities through sensitivity analysis. 
Response 
Issues in estimating export demand elasticities are summarised in chapter 3. A 
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sensitivity analysis using a lower export demand elasticity was performed and 
reported in chapter 4.  
Updating the database 
The procedure the Commission and CoPS adopted to update the database for this 
study was seen as broadly appropriate. Discussion focused on specific aspects such 
as the base year used, checks on the industry disaggregation, and the modelling of 
the Automotive Competitiveness and Investment Scheme (ACIS) and the Green Car 
Innovation Fund (GCIF).  
Updating the base year 
The database was updated to 2005-06 and incorporates the latest consistent data 
available. It was, however, suggested that: 
• this still may not be the best reference point for the simulations, given the 
changes in the automotive industry since then  
• these more recent changes could be reflected in the database by using other data 
sources. 
Also highlighted was the importance of comparing the automotive industry detail in 
the model with independent, industry-based data. 
Response 
The database was not updated with post-2005-06 information to reflect, for 
example, the closure of Mitsubishi. The direct effects of these changes over the past 
18 months are uncertain but seem to have been small relative to the size of the 
automotive industry. Including uncertain information would introduce more 
uncertainty in the modelling. Excluding this information is unlikely to affect 
comparative-static results significantly. 
Checks on the industry disaggregation 
Although the definitions and sales splits were deemed ‘sensible’, one referee 
expressed reservations about the cost splits for intermediate inputs. It was suggested 
that extraneous information be used to inform the sales and costs splits and to check 
how well the MMRF values reflected the cost structures of the automotive sectors.  
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Response 
The representation of the industry’s cost structure in the database was compared 
with 2005-06 ABS data on the automotive industry (table 3.1, chapter 3). The 
comparison indicated that the updated MMRF database is consistent with these 
data. Further, the distribution of automotive industry activity across jurisdictions in 
the updated MMRF database is consistent with 2001-02 ABS data (table 3.2, 
chapter 3). The manner in which total sales were distributed across intermediate and 
final demand was also checked (but not reported due to space constraints).   
Modelling ACIS 
After some discussion, it was generally agreed that an appropriate (and the simplest) 
way to model ACIS was as a production subsidy, rather than as an import subsidy. 
This view was based on the facts that: 
• the credits are tradeable (notwithstanding the discount at which they are traded) 
and that the supply of credits does not outstrip demand 
• in practice, research and development (R&D) is defined so broadly in ACIS that 
any funds allocated for this purpose could be seen as a more general production 
subsidy. 
Response 
ACIS was modelled partly as a subsidy on imports and partly as an 
industry/production subsidy. This facilitated the modelling and allowed it to account 
for the possible bias that ACIS might introduce in favour of imports. This treatment 
assumes that firms first use credits to offset duty payable on eligible imports 
because of the discount incurred on trading the credits. This is consistent with 
evidence as to how credits seem to be used by eligible importers of eligible 
automotive products. To the extent that this bias does not exist, the projected impact 
of removing ACIS on imports could be overstated. However, whether ACIS is 
represented as an import or production subsidy in the database or through shocks 
does not affect the way in which it influences the total costs of the automotive 
industry, and therefore it has little effect on economy-wide results.  
Given that uncapped funding depends both on the value of production and on the 
tariff rate, the formula used to calculate it was incorporated into the model structure 
to allow any changes in output to affect ACIS endogenously.  
Capped funding was treated as a pure production subsidy. In line with the options 
outlined in the request to the Commission, total ACIS funding has also been 
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modelled as a pure production subsidy (in simulation O3). 
Modelling the GCIF 
It was observed that the lack of detailed information about how the GCIF will 
operate makes it difficult to simulate. Modelling it as a simple production subsidy 
was seen to be ‘very approximate’. Some of the difficulties raised included that it:  
• requires a particular form of production 
• appears designed to produce a new kind of product, which would be difficult to 
account for in the model. 
It was also noted, however, that the assigned task did not appear to require an 
independent evaluation of the GCIF. It was suggested, therefore, that the GCIF not 
be ‘modelled in the simulations, but included in all simulations as part of the base 
case’. 
Response 
There are many potential ways to model the effect of the GCIF on the Australian 
economy, as discussed in chapter 3. In light of the uncertainty surrounding its 
nature, it was deemed most straightforward to incorporate the GCIF as a pure 
production subsidy in the database. As noted at the workshop, this option gives the 
benefit of the doubt to the GCIF, in terms of the treatment of its overall effects on 
costs. To the extent that the GCIF subsidises production of a model that would 
otherwise have been uncommercial or inefficient, it would have negative effects on 
productivity in the industry, and impose an economic loss on the economy overall. 
This effect was not considered. 
The reference case 
It was suggested that the report needed to explain any difference between the 
reference case used in the study and the ‘base case’ outlined in the request.  
Response 
The reference case was designed to clarify the exposition of the different impacts of 
tariffs and budgetary assistance. The links between the reference case and the base 
case are explained in chapter 4.  
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Closure 
It was suggested that an appropriate closure would be to fix government 
consumption, allowing private consumption to vary to ensure the trade balance 
remained unchanged following a shock. It was suggested that this closure would be 
both justifiable and allow real consumption to be a better indicator of welfare.  
Response 
After experimenting with the proposed closure, further discussion with referees and 
eventual agreement, the initial closure was maintained as the central closure.  
Eventually, changes in real gross national expenditure, adjusted for foreign 
ownership of capital and foreign investment were chosen as the measure of welfare. 
See discussion in chapter 3.  
B.3 Implementing shocks 
The main discussion surrounded modelling the appreciation of the Australian dollar 
to parity with the US dollar (as specified in the task requested of the Commission).  
It was noted that the MMRF model cannot be used to simulate the effects of 
changes in the bilateral nominal exchange rate, as the model accounts only for 
changes in relative prices and there is no representation of money in MMRF.  
It was argued that the factors that lead to a real appreciation would need to be 
modelled instead — for example, commodity price increases resulting from an 
exogenous outward shift in the export demand for minerals.  
Response 
The key driver of the appreciation of the exchange rate over recent years has been a 
rise in Australia’s terms of trade, which has reflected strong increases in foreign 
demand for, and therefore export prices of, base metals and minerals (chapter 3). 
This cause of the appreciation in the exchange rate has been modelled.  
An approximation of the effect of the exchange rate appreciation on the automotive 
industry can be obtained by scaling the simulation results. For example, to analyse 
the effect of an appreciation to parity with the US dollar, the change in automotive 
output would be multiplied by a ratio of the change in the exchange rate required to 
reach parity to the change in the exchange rate given by the modelling results. 
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C Supporting tables 
In this appendix, tables that support the material in chapters 2 and 3 are provided.  
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Table C.1 Preferential tariff rates by HS8 code subtitle 
MVP HS8 CAa MFN NZ PNG SG TH USA
CARS 87032119 2.5 10 0 0 0 0 8
CARS 87032120 0 5 0 0 0 0 0
CARS 87032190 0 5 0 0 0 0 0
CARS 87032219 2.5 10 0 0 0 0 8
CARS 87032220 0 5 0 0 0 0 0
CARS 87032290 0 5 0 0 0 0 0
CARS 87032319 2.5 10 0 0 0 0 8
CARS 87032320 0 5 0 0 0 0 0
CARS 87032390 0 5 0 0 0 0 0
CARS 87032419 2.5 10 0 0 0 0 8
CARS 87032420 0 5 0 0 0 0 0
CARS 87032490 0 5 0 0 0 0 0
CARS 87033119 2.5 10 0 0 0 0 8
CARS 87033120 0 5 0 0 0 0 0
CARS 87033190 0 5 0 0 0 0 0
CARS 87033219 2.5 10 0 0 0 0 8
CARS 87033220 0 5 0 0 0 0 0
CARS 87033290 0 5 0 0 0 0 0
CARS 87033319 2.5 10 0 0 0 0 8
CARS 87033320 0 5 0 0 0 0 0
CARS 87033390 0 5 0 0 0 0 0
CARS 87039019 2.5 10 0 0 0 0 8
CARS 87039020 0 5 0 0 0 0 0
CARS 87039090 0 5 0 0 0 0 0
PARTS 84099110 10 10 0 0 0 5 0
PARTS 84099190 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
PARTS 84099910 10 10 0 0 0 5 0
PARTS 84099990 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
PARTS 84133010 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
PARTS 84133090 10 10 0 0 0 5 0
PARTS 84152000 10 10 0 0 0 5 0
PARTS 84831010 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
PARTS 84831091 2.5 10 0 0 0 5 0
PARTS 84831099 0 5 0 0 0 0 0
PARTS 84832000 10 10 0 0 0 5 0
PARTS 84833010 2.5 10 0 0 0 5 0
PARTS 84833090 5 5 0 0 0 0 0
PARTS 84834011 2.5 10 0 0 0 5 0
PARTS 84834019 0 5 0 0 0 0 0
PARTS 84834090 10 10 0 0 0 5 0
PARTS 84835011 2.5 10 0 0 0 5 0
PARTS 84835019 0 5 0 0 0 0 0
PARTS 84835090 10 10 0 0 0 5 0
(Continued next page)
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Table C.1        (continued) 
MVP HS8 CAa MFN NZ PNG SG TH USA
PARTS 84836010 10 10 0 0 0 5 0
PARTS 84836090 5 5 0 0 0 0 0
PARTS 84839000 10 10 0 0 0 5 0
PARTS 84841010 10 10 0 0 0 5 0
PARTS 84849010 10 10 0 0 0 5 0
PARTS 85111000 10 10 0 0 0 5 0
PARTS 85112000 5 5 0 0 0 0 0
PARTS 85113000 10 10 0 0 0 5 0
PARTS 85114010 2.5 10 0 0 0 5 0
PARTS 85114090 0 5 0 0 0 0 0
PARTS 85115010 2.5 10 0 0 0 5 0
PARTS 85115090 0 5 0 0 0 0 0
PARTS 85118000 10 10 0 0 0 5 0
PARTS 85119000 10 10 0 0 0 5 0
PARTS 85122000 10 10 0 0 0 5 0
PARTS 85123000 10 10 0 0 0 5 0
PARTS 85124000 10 10 0 0 0 5 0
PARTS 85129010 2.5 10 0 0 0 5 0
PARTS 85129090 0 5 0 0 0 0 0
PARTS 85443000 10 10 0 0 0 5 0
PARTS 87081010 2.5 10 0 0 0 5 0
PARTS 87082110 2.5 10 0 0 0 5 0
PARTS 87082930 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
PARTS 87082991 2.5 10 0 0 0 5 0
PARTS 87083130 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
PARTS 87083191 2.5 10 0 0 0 5 0
PARTS 87083199 0 5 0 0 0 0 0
PARTS 87083910 5 5 0 0 0 0 0
PARTS 87083920 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
PARTS 87083991 2.5 10 0 0 0 5 0
PARTS 87083999 0 5 0 0 0 0 0
PARTS 87084020 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
PARTS 87084030 2.5 10 0 0 0 5 0
PARTS 87084091 2.5 10 0 0 0 5 0
PARTS 87084099 0 5 0 0 0 0 0
PARTS 87085020 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
PARTS 87085030 2.5 10 0 0 0 5 0
PARTS 87085091 2.5 10 0 0 0 5 0
PARTS 87085099 0 5 0 0 0 0 0
PARTS 87086030 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
PARTS 87086091 2.5 10 0 0 0 5 0
PARTS 87086099 0 5 0 0 0 0 0
PARTS 87087030 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(Continued next page)
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Table C.1        (continued) 
MVP HS8 CAa MFN NZ PNG SG TH USA
PARTS 87087091 2.5 10 0 0 0 5 0
PARTS 87087099 0 5 0 0 0 0 0
PARTS 87088030 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
PARTS 87088091 2.5 10 0 0 0 5 0
PARTS 87088099 0 5 0 0 0 0 0
PARTS 87089110 5 5 0 0 0 0 0
PARTS 87089120 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
PARTS 87089191 2.5 10 0 0 0 5 0
PARTS 87089199 0 5 0 0 0 0 0
PARTS 87089230 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
PARTS 87089291 2.5 10 0 0 0 5 0
PARTS 87089299 0 5 0 0 0 0 0
PARTS 87089320 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
PARTS 87089330 2.5 10 0 0 0 5 0
PARTS 87089391 2.5 10 0 0 0 5 0
PARTS 87089399 0 5 0 0 0 0 0
PARTS 87089430 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
PARTS 87089491 2.5 10 0 0 0 5 0
PARTS 87089499 0 5 0 0 0 0 0
PARTS 87089920 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
PARTS 87089991 2.5 10 0 0 0 5 0
PARTS 87089999 0 5 0 0 0 0 0
OTHER 84073100 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
OTHER 84073200 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
OTHER 84073310 2.5 10 0 0 0 5 0
OTHER 84073390 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
OTHER 84073410 2.5 10 0 0 0 5 0
OTHER 84073420 5 5 0 0 0 0 0
OTHER 84073490 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
OTHER 84079010 2.5 10 0 0 0 5 0
OTHER 84079020 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
OTHER 84079030 5 5 0 0 0 0 0
OTHER 84079090 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
OTHER 84082010 2.5 10 0 0 0 5 0
OTHER 84082020 5 5 0 0 0 0 0
OTHER 84082090 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
OTHER 84841090 5 5 0 0 0 0 0
OTHER 84842000 5 5 0 0 0 0 0
OTHER 84849090 5 5 0 0 0 0 0
OTHER 85361000 0 5 0 0 0 0 0
OTHER 85362000 0 5 0 0 0 0 0
OTHER 85363000 0 5 0 0 0 0 0
OTHER 85391010 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(Continued next page)
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Table C.1        (continued) 
MVP HS8 CAa MFN NZ PNG SG TH USA
OTHER 85392200 5 5 0 0 0 0 0
OTHER 85392900 5 5 0 0 0 0 0
OTHER 87021010 0 5 0 0 0 0 0
OTHER 87021090 0 5 0 0 0 0 0
OTHER 87029010 0 5 0 0 0 0 0
OTHER 87029090 0 5 0 0 0 0 0
OTHER 87031000 0 5 0 0 0 0 0
OTHER 87032111 10.2 10.2 0 0 0 0 8
OTHER 87032211 10.2 10.2 0 0 0 0 8
OTHER 87032311 10.2 10.2 0 0 0 0 8
OTHER 87032411 10.2 10.2 0 0 0 0 8
OTHER 87033111 10.2 10.2 0 0 0 0 8
OTHER 87033211 10.2 10.2 0 0 0 0 8
OTHER 87033311 10.2 10.2 0 0 0 0 8
OTHER 87039011 10.2 10.2 0 0 0 0 8
OTHER 87042110 0 5 0 0 0 0 0
OTHER 87042200 0 5 0 0 0 0 0
OTHER 87042300 0 5 0 0 0 0 0
OTHER 87043110 0 5 0 0 0 0 0
OTHER 87043200 0 5 0 0 0 0 0
OTHER 87049010 0 5 0 0 0 0 0
OTHER 87051000 5 5 0 0 0 0 0
OTHER 87052000 5 5 0 0 0 0 0
OTHER 87053000 5 5 0 0 0 0 0
OTHER 87054000 5 5 0 0 0 0 0
OTHER 87059000 5 5 0 0 0 0 0
OTHER 87071010 2.5 10 0 0 0 0 0
OTHER 87071091 2.5 10 0 0 0 0 0
OTHER 87071099 0 5 0 0 0 0 0
OTHER 87079010 2.5 10 0 0 0 5 0
OTHER 87079090 0 5 0 0 0 0 0
OTHER 87081090 0 5 0 0 0 0 0
OTHER 87082190 0 5 0 0 0 0 0
OTHER 87082999 0 5 0 0 0 0 0
OTHER 87089930 2.5 10 0 0 0 5 0
OTHER 87111000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
OTHER 87112000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
OTHER 87113000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
OTHER 87114000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
OTHER 87115000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
OTHER 87119000 5 5 0 0 0 0 0
OTHER 87120000 5 5 0 0 0 0 0
OTHER 87131000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(Continued next page)
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Table C.1        (continued) 
MVP HS8 CAa MFN NZ PNG SG TH USA
OTHER 87139000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
OTHER 87141100 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
OTHER 87141910 5 5 0 0 0 0 0
OTHER 87141990 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
OTHER 87142000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
OTHER 87149100 5 5 0 0 0 0 0
OTHER 87149200 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
OTHER 87149300 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
OTHER 87149400 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
OTHER 87149500 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
OTHER 87149600 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
OTHER 87149900 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
OTHER 87150000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
OTHER 87162000 5 5 0 0 0 0 0
OTHER 87163100 5 5 0 0 0 0 0
OTHER 87163900 5 5 0 0 0 0 0
OTHER 87164000 5 5 0 0 0 0 0
OTHER 87168000 5 5 0 0 0 0 0
OTHER 87169000 0 5 0 0 0 0 0
OTHER 90251900 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
OTHER 90261020 10 10 0 0 0 0 0
OTHER 90261080 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
OTHER 90262020 10 10 0 0 0 0 0
OTHER 90262080 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
OTHER 90268020 10 10 0 0 0 0 0
OTHER 90268080 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
OTHER 90291020 10 10 0 0 0 5 0
OTHER 90291080 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
OTHER 90292010 10 10 0 0 0 5 0
OTHER 90292090 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
OTHER 90303900 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
OTHER 90321000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
OTHER 90328100 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
OTHER 90328911 10 10 0 0 0 5 0
OTHER 90328919 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
OTHER 90328980 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
a
 CA=Canada, HK=Hong Kong, MFN=Most Favoured Nation, MY=Malaysia, NZ=New Zealand, PNG=Papua 
New Guinea, SG=Singapore, TH=Thailand, USA=United States 
Source: WITS (World Integrated Trade Solution). 
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Table C.2 Domestic-Import substitution elasticities in MMRF 
Commodity Elasticity Share of imports in domestic use
 %
Sheep cattle 0.9 0.0
Dairy 2.0 0.0
Other animal 2.0 0.1
Grains 1.8 0.5
Bio fuel 1.5 0.0
Other agriculture 2.0 4.3
Fishing and services to agriculture 0.3 1.0
Forestry 2.0 4.0
Coal 0.5 0.3
Oil 10.0 79.2
Gas 10.0 0.0
Iron ore 0.5 23.5
Non iron ore 0.6 19.8
Other mining 2.0 2.7
Meat products 0.5 1.1
Other food 1.4 4.4
Textile, clothing and footwear 2.9 28.9
Wood products 2.0 11.1
Paper products 1.1 27.7
Printing 2.0 7.0
Gasoline 0.4 24.7
Diesel 0.4 23.7
Liquefied petroleum gas 0.4 31.0
Air fuel 0.4 38.1
Other fuel 0.4 39.7
Chemicals 1.9 30.8
Rubber and plastic 1.5 29.5
Non-metallic minerals 1.2 16.5
Cement 0.3 0.6
Steel 0.8 11.9
Alumina 1.0 2.1
Aluminium 1.0 15.7
Other metals 1.0 66.2
Metal products 1.7 19.2
Cars 5.2 47.0
Car parts 5.2 29.0
Other motor vehicles and parts 5.2 62.9
Other manufacturing 1.2 52.7
Electricity — coal 0.0 0.0
Electricity — gas 0.0 0.0
Electricity — oil 0.0 0.0
Electricity — nuclear 0.0 0.0
Electricity — hydro 0.0 0.0
(Continued next page) 
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Commodity Elasticity Share of imports in domestic use
Electricity — other 0.0 0.0
Electricity — supply 0.0 0.2
Gas supply 0.0 0.0
Water supply 0.0 1.6
Construction 0.0 0.2
Trade 0.0 0.2
Accommodation hotels 0.0 3.8
Road transport 0.0 4.7
Road freight 0.0 0.4
Rail transport 0.0 0.0
Rail freight 0.0 0.0
Water transport 1.9 3.4
Air transport 2.0 24.0
Communication 0.0 3.8
Financial services 0.0 2.0
Business services 0.0 2.9
Dwelling 0.0 2.2
Public services 0.0 0.7
Other services 0.0 4.0
Private transport 0.0 0.0
Private electricity 0.0 0.0
Private heating 0.0 0.0
Source: MMRF database. 
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Table C.3 Estimated first-round budgetary impacts of policy optionsa 
Scenario 
           ACIS   
    uncappedb 
ACIS
capped 
Tariff 
revenue 
Net
revenue 
 $m $m $m $m 
Option 1 
Tariff to 5%, ACIS to Stage 3 -69 -200 776 507 
Option 2 
Tariff to 5%, ACIS at Stage 2 -69 -400 776 307 
Option 3 
Tariff to 5%, ACIS at Stage 2, 
delivered as grants  0 -469 776 307 
Option 4 
Tariff at 10%, ACIS to Stage 3, 
delivered as duty credits -137 -200 1286 949 
Option 5 
Tariff at 10%, ACIS at Stage 2 -137 -400 1286 749 
Option 6 
Tariff at 10%, ACIS discontinued 0 0 1286 1286 
Option 7 
Tariff to 0%, ACIS discontinued 0 0 0 0 
Other scenarios 
Tariff to 5%, ACIS discontinued 
(combining options 2 and 6) 0 0 776 776 
Tariff to 5%, ACIS discontinued 
(combining options 2 and 6), with 
additional PTAs 0 0 264 264c
Tariff to 5%, ACIS at Stage 3 
(option 1), with additional PTAs -69 -200 264 0c
a Options as defined in the letter from the Assistant Treasurer (appendix A). b Car production values are held 
constant in this calculation. c Includes all preferential trade agreements (PTAs) already agreed and currently 
being considered or negotiated. Under this scenario, the cost of ACIS exceeds tariff revenue. 
Sources: Commission estimates; WITS (World Integrated Trade Solution). 
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D Database modifications 
In this appendix, the processes involved in updating the base year of the database, 
disaggregating the motor vehicle and parts industry, and incorporating ACIS in the 
model are described. 
D.1 Updating the base year 
The database was updated from 2001-02 to 2005-06 in four steps, to suit the MMRF 
model (figure D.1). 
1. The 2001-02 ABS national input–output table for 109 industries was converted 
to a 172-sector database to be consistent with a simple general equilibrium (GE) 
model of the Australian economy (ORANI). This produced a national database 
with a structure that is broadly consistent with that of the regional database used 
in the MMRF model. 
2. Industry value-added and trade flows were updated to 2005-06 using ABS 
national accounts and trade data. 
3. The updated national database was disaggregated to 59 statistical-divisions, to 
form what is known as TERM. This was done using: 
– 2006 Census data on employment by industry, to define the size of the 172 
industries in each statistical division 
– population size, to estimate household consumption per statistical division 
– ABS 2002 Household Expenditure Survey data on regional consumption 
levels 
– trade data from 49 ports to estimate international trade flows in and out of 
each statistical division. 
4. The number of regions and industries in the TERM database was then 
aggregated to the State/Territory level to generate the eight-region MMRF 
database, with 58 industries (further details are found in Horridge et al. (2005)). 
The resultant concordance of input–output and MMRF industries is shown in 
table D.1. 
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Figure D.1 Stages in updating an MMRF database to 2005-06  
  
Stage Regions Industries 
ABS 2001 1 109 
  manufacturing, agriculture and 
service industries disaggregated 
ORANI G 1 172 
  no change 
2005-2006 1 172 
 statistical division mining and services aggregated 
TERM 59 144 
 State and Territories sectors aggregated 
MMRF 8 58 
  
Data source: Glyn Wittwer, Centre of Policy Studies, Monash University, pers. comm., 8 May 2008. 
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Table D.1 Concordance — 2001-02 ABS national input–output and MMRF 
industries 
Input–Output  Description MMRF industry 
0101 Sheep Sheep cattle 
0102 Grains Grains 
0103 Beef cattle Sheep cattle 
0104 Dairy cattle Dairy 
0105 Pigs Other animals 
0106 Poultry Other animals 
0107 Other agriculture Other agriculture 
0200 Services to agriculture, hunting and trapping Fishing and services to agriculture
0300 Forestry and logging Forestry 
0400 Commercial fishing Fishing and services to agriculture
1101 Coal Coal 
1201 Oil and gas Oil, gas 
1301 Iron ores Iron ore 
1302 Non-ferrous metal ores Non iron ore 
1400 Other mining Other mining 
1500 Services to mining Other mining 
2101 Meat and meat products Meat products 
2102 Dairy products Other food 
2103 Fruit and vegetable products Other food 
2104 Oils and fats Other food 
2105 Flour mill products and cereal foods Other food 
2106 Bakery products Other food 
2107 Confectionery Other food 
2108 Other food products Other food 
2109 Soft drinks, cordials and syrups Other food 
2110 Beer and malt Other food 
2113 Wine, spirits and tobacco products Other food 
2201 Textile fibres, yarns and woven fabrics Textile, clothing and footwear 
2202 Textile products Textile, clothing and footwear 
2203 Knitting mill products Textile, clothing and footwear 
2204 Clothing Textile, clothing and footwear 
2205 Footwear Textile, clothing and footwear 
2206 Leather and leather products Textile, clothing and footwear 
2301 Sawmill products Wood products 
2302 Other wood products Wood products 
2303 Pulp, paper and paperboard Paper products 
2304 Paper containers and products Paper products 
2401 Printing and services to printing Printing 
2402 Publishing, recorded media, etc. Printing 
2501 Petroleum and coal products Gasoline, diesel, LPG, air fuel, 
other fuel 
2502 Basic chemicals Chemicals 
2503 Paints Chemicals 
(Continued next page) 
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Table D.1 (continued) 
Input–Output  Description MMRF industry 
2504 Medicinal and pharmaceutical products, 
pesticides 
Chemicals 
2505 Soap and detergents Chemicals 
2506 Cosmetics and toiletry preparations Chemicals 
2507 Other chemical products Chemicals 
2508 Rubber products Rubber and plastic 
2509 Plastic products Rubber and plastic 
2601 Glass and glass products Non-metallic minerals 
2602 Ceramic products Non-metallic minerals 
2603 Cement, lime and concrete slurry Cement 
2604 Plaster and other concrete products Non-metallic minerals 
2605 Other non-metallic mineral products Non-metallic minerals 
2701 Iron and steel Steel 
2702 Basic non-ferrous metal and products Alumina, aluminium, other metals 
2703 Structural metal products Metal products 
2704 Sheet metal products Metal products 
2705 Fabricated metal products Metal products 
2801 Motor vehicles and parts, other transport 
equipment 
Motor vehicles and parts 
2802 Ships and boats Other manufacturing 
2803 Railway equipment Other manufacturing 
2804 Aircraft Other manufacturing 
2805 Photographic and scientific equipment Other manufacturing 
2806 Electronic equipment Other manufacturing 
2807 Household appliances Other manufacturing 
2808 Other electrical equipment Other manufacturing 
2809 Agricultural, mining, etc. machinery Other manufacturing 
2810 Other machinery and equipment Other manufacturing 
2901 Prefabricated buildings Other manufacturing 
2902 Furniture Other manufacturing 
2903 Other manufacturing Other manufacturing 
3601 Electricity supply  
3602 Gas supply Gas supply 
3701 Water supply, sewerage and drainage services Water supply 
4101 Residential building Construction 
4102 Other construction Construction 
4201 Construction trade services Construction 
4501 Wholesale trade Trade 
4502 Wholesale mechanical repairs Trade 
4503 Other wholesale repairs Trade 
5101 Retail trade Trade 
5102 Retail mechanical repairs Trade 
5103 Other retail repairs Trade 
5701 Accommodation, cafes and restaurants Accommodation hotels 
6101 Road transport Road transport 
(Continued next page) 
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Table D.1 (continued) 
Input–Output  Description MMRF industry 
6201 Rail, pipeline and other transport Road freight 
6301 Water transport Water transport 
6401 Air and space transport Air transport 
6401 Air and space transport Air transport 
6601 Services to transport, storage Water transport 
7101 Communication services Communication 
7301 Banking Financial services 
7302 Non-bank finance Financial services 
7401 Insurance Financial services 
7501 Services to finance, investment and insurance Financial services 
7701 Ownership of dwellings Dwelling 
7702 Other property services Business services 
7801 Scientific research, technical and computer 
services 
Business services 
7802 Legal, accounting, marketing and business 
management services 
Business services 
7803 Other business services Business services 
8101 Government administration Public services 
8201 Defence Public services 
8401 Education Public services 
8601 Health services Public services 
8701 Community services Public services 
9101 Motion picture, radio and television services Other services 
9201 Libraries, museums and the arts Other services 
9301 Sport, gambling and recreational services Other services 
9501 Personal services Other services 
9601 Other services Other services 
Source: MMRF database. 
D.2 Disaggregating the automotive industry 
The ABS categorises all industries into Input–Output Industry Groups (IOIGs) 
which can be linked (via the IOIG-ANZSIC (Australian and New Zealand Standard 
Industrial Classification) concordance) to a corresponding list of the products 
primarily produced by these industries, referred to as Input–Output Product 
Classification (IOPC) codes. These IOPCs form the basis for disaggregating the 
motor vehicle and parts industry in the MMRF database. ABS release 
5215.0.55.001 (ABS 2006) provides detailed input-output information on the 
allocation of the supply of all IOPCs across all industry and final users in the 
economy.  
The first step in the disaggregation was to examine the tariff rate imposed on each 
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IOPC relevant to the motor vehicle and parts industry. This was done via a 
concordance between the IOPCs, and the Harmonized System (HS) codes used by 
the Australian Customs Service in assigning tariffs to commodities. The car 
assembly and car components industry was defined to be all commodities that are 
subject to the 10 per cent Most-Favoured Nation (MFN) automotive tariff rate. All 
those commodities not subject to a 10 per cent tariff were defined as ‘other’.  
Because the IOPC-HS concordance links a single IOPC to several HS commodities, 
in some cases a number of different tariff rates were connected to a single IOPC. In 
these cases, additional trade volume data were used to discern whether most of a 
commodity’s trade was subject to a 10 per cent tariff. If this was the case, the 
commodity was defined to be part of the car assembly and car component sector. 
Car assembly and car components were then separated from each other, with ‘car 
assembly’ taken to be represented by the IOPC 28110010 (‘Finished motor vehicles 
with less than 10 persons capacity’), and the remainder defined as ‘components’. 
Table D.2 sets out the resulting disaggregation of motor vehicle and parts-related 
IOPCs into ‘assembly’, ‘components’ and ‘other’, and their concordance with HS 
commodities. 
This sectoral split was then used to disaggregate demand in the MMRF database by 
intermediate industry users and final users (represented by the rows in the MMRF 
input–output tables) into the demand for ‘others’ and for ‘car assembly and 
components’. Except for trade variables, this was done using the national shares of 
supply of the relevant groups of IOPCs to each user from the ABS input–output 
product details, applied uniformly across all jurisdictions.1 Having specified shares 
for each component of the row in the MMRF database, the total sales split was then 
calculated as the weighted average share across all users. 
                                                 
1 For export and import shares, trade data by jurisdiction and commodity, at a HS 6-digit level, 
were obtained from the ABS (unpublished data), and concorded with IOPCs. For other elements 
in the row for which no ABS shares were available, for example. inventories, the national total 
supply shares were used. 
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Table D.2 Concordance — IOPC–HSa 
Sectorb IOPCs IOPC description HS6 codes 
Cars 28110010 Finished motor vehicles with less than 10 
persons capacity 
870321, 870322, 870323, 870324, 
870331, 870332, 870333, 870390 
Components 28110071 Cranks, crank & cam shafts, gears and 
flywheels 
848310, 848320, 848330, 848340, 
848350, 848390 
 28130012 Motor vehicle and truck air conditioners 841520 
 
28130014 Motor vehicle or motor cycle wiring 
harnesses 
854430 
 
28130015 Motor vehicle starting, heaters, demisters, 
windscreen wipers; lighting/signalling 
equipment 
851110, 851120, 851130, 851140, 
851150, 851180, 851190, 851220, 
851230, 851240, 851290 
 
28190010 Motor vehicle transmission assemblies 
(excl associated with the manufacture of 
complete vehicles/engines) 
870829, 870840, 870850, 870860, 
870880, 870891, 870892, 870893, 
870894, 870895, 870899 
 
28190021 Cylinder blocks, pistons, connecting rods, 
valves (excl associated with the 
manufacture of complete vehicles/engines) 
840991, 840999, 870829, 870840, 
870850, 870880, 870891, 870892, 
870894, 870895, 870899 
 
28190022 Fuel, lubricating or cooling medium pumps 
(excl associated with the manufacture of 
complete vehicles or engines) 
841330, 870829, 870840, 870850, 
870880, 870891, 870892, 870894, 
870895, 870899 
 
28190023 Cranks, cam shafts, gears and flywheels 
(excl associated with the manufacture of 
complete vehicles/engines) 
848310, 848320, 848330, 848340, 
848350, 848360, 848390, 870829, 
870840, 870850, 870880, 870891, 
870892, 870894, 870895, 870899 
 
28190024 Motor vehicle, tractor and truck gaskets 
(excl associated with the manufacture of 
complete vehicles or engines) 
848410, 848490 
 
28190025 Motor vehicle parts and equipment nec 
(excl associated with motor vehicle 
manufacturing) 
840991, 840999, 848420, 870810, 
870821, 870829, 870830, 870831, 
870839, 870840, 870850, 870870, 
870880, 870891, 870892, 870894, 
870895, 870899 
 28190026 Motor vehicle body panels 870829 
 28299998 Unassembled motor vehicles nec na 
Others  28110020 Finished motor vehicles with 10 or more 
person capacity 
870210, 870290 
 
28110030 Finished trucks, truck type vehicles, 
utilities and panel vans 
870421, 870422, 870423, 870431, 
870432, 870490, 870510, 870520, 
870530, 870540, 870590 
 
28110060 Engines nec, for motor vehicles or tractors 840731, 840732, 840733, 840734, 
840790, 840820 
 
28110072 Motor vehicle, tractor and truck gaskets 
(associated with the manufacture of 
complete vehicles or engines) 
848410, 848490  
 
28110073 
 
Motor vehicle, tractor & cycle parts nec 
(associated with the manufacture of 
complete vehicles & engines) 
848420, 870810, 870821, 870899  
 
(Continued next page) 
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Table D.2 (continued) 
Sectorb IOPCs IOPC description HS6 codes 
Others 
 
 
28119010 Second hand motor vehicles 870321, 870322, 870323, 870324, 
870331, 870332, 870333, 870390, 
870431 
 28120011 Motor vehicle and truck bodies (coachwork) 870710, 870790 
 
28120031 Agricultural self loading and unloading semi-
trailers (incl tippers) 
871620 
 
28120032 Other semi-trailers for the transport of goods 
& materials (incl tankers, vans, transporters, 
stock crates & jinkers) 
870432, 871620, 871631, 871639  
 
28120041 Trailers for the transport of goods and 
materials (incl box trailers, boat trailers and 
horse floats) 
871631, 871639  
 
28120042 Other trailers & semi-trailers nec (excl for 
the transport of goods & materials, & 
domestic type camper trailers) 
871640 
 28120050 Body panels for trucks and buses 870829 
 
28120060 Parts nec, for motor vehicle trailers and 
semi-trailers 
871690 
 
28130013 Motor vehicle apparatus for making, 
breaking, protecting & making connections 
to/in electrical circuits (excl wiring) 
853610, 853620, 853630  
 
28130016 Motor vehicle, tractor and motor cycle 
filament lamps and sealed beam lamps 
853910, 853922, 853929  
 
28130017 Motor vehicle & tractor gauges, revolution & 
production counters, speed indicators, 
thermostats & similar instruments 
902519, 902610, 902620, 902680, 
902910, 902920, 903033, 903039, 
903210, 903281, 903289 
 
28290010 Transport equipment, parts and accessories 
nec 
870310, 871200, 871310, 871390, 
871411, 871419, 871420, 871491, 
871492, 871493, 871494, 871495, 
871496, 871499, 871500, 871680 
 
28298000 Motor scooters and motor cycles 871110, 871120, 871130, 871140, 
871150, 871190 
 
28291810 Royalties income and licence fees (2811-
2819, 2829) 
na 
 28291900 Repairing and servicing (2811-2819, 2829) na 
 28291920 Other income (2811-2819, 2829) na 
 
28291950 Increase in stocks - work-in-progress (2811-
2819, 2829) 
na 
a IOPC refers to Input–Output Product Classification codes. HS refers to the Harmonised System of product 
classification, presented here at the 6-digit-level of disaggregation. b These refer to the sectors as defined by 
the Commission for the purposes of disaggregating the MMRF database. nec not elsewhere classified. na not 
applicable. 
To disaggregate the industry cost data (the columns of the MMRF database): 
• the shares of total sales were imposed on total production costs (because total 
costs must equal total sales for the database to be balanced) 
• capital and labour cost shares were estimated from ABS data on each industry’s 
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value-added and wage costs in each jurisdiction (ABS 2005a-f, unpublished 
data). 
• value-added was subtracted from total production costs for each industry in each 
jurisdiction, to obtain cost shares for the remaining inputs. As was suggested by 
the workshop referees (appendix B), the calculated cost structures were then 
compared to ABS data to check how well these corresponded (ABS 2005a-f, 
unpublished data). 
The same procedure for splitting the rows and columns of the database was used to 
separate ‘car assembly’ from ‘car components’. This stage also involved:  
• imposing a value of zero on the costs and sales of car assembly in all 
jurisdictions except Victoria and South Australia, as shown in Table 3.2 
• setting the share of car assembly and components for both Victoria and South 
Australia equal to that calculated from ABS data on state production shares 
(ABS 2005b, ABS 2005d). 
Four checks were performed to ensure the database was structurally sound before 
the modelling was undertaken.  
• A basic accounting requirement is that total sales (the sum of the row elements) 
is equal to total production (the sum of the column elements). 
– These figures for each sector were compared to ensure total sales equalled 
total costs. 
• The diagonal element in intermediate demand — which refers to the respective 
value of cars and of components used in the production of cars and of 
components — was examined. 
– As expected, the value of cars used in components was zero, with the value 
of components used in cars being the highest value.  
• The tariff rates implicit in the tariff revenue matrix conformed to the trade-
weighted average tariff rates which have been adjusted to take into account the 
impact of ACIS import duty credits on tariff revenue collected.  
• The results of the disaggregation of the MMRF database were also compared 
with the 2001-02 ABS input–output product details (ABS 2006) as well as more 
recent data (2005-06) on production (ABS 2007). 
D.3 Incorporating ACIS 
The process for allocating ACIS capped and uncapped credits across jurisdictions 
and for incorporating these in the database is described below. 
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Allocating capped credits 
In this study, it has been assumed that the total capped credits for Stage 2 are spread 
evenly across its five years — that is, $400 million in credits are distributed 
annually. The allocation has been undertaken in the following way. 
• Consistent with the modulation process outlined in chapter 2, and because car 
assembly only occurs in Victoria and South Australia, the 55 per cent allocated 
to vehicle assemblers has been split across these two States, based on the 
estimates of total costs derived from the MMRF database. 
• The remaining 45 per cent of capped funding was split according to each 
jurisdiction’s share of component production costs. 
This process is consistent with the idea that the majority of capped ACIS funding is 
allocated according to production values. This process produces an average rate of 
subsidy for each sector, without recognising any disparities that might exist among 
firms within the sector. 
Allocating uncapped credits 
Given the total estimated ACIS funding of $537 million (chapter 2), after 
accounting for the $400 million in capped credits, $137 million in uncapped credits 
remain. These credits were allocated between Victoria and South Australia 
according to the estimates of production costs derived from the MMRF database. 
The estimated shares of capped and uncapped ACIS funding allocated to car 
assembly and component manufacturing are consistent with the actual average 
distribution between 2005 and 2007, as reported by AusIndustry (table D.3). 
Table D.3 Share of total ACIS funding by sector  
 PC Distributiona  AusIndustryb 
 Uncapped Capped Total  Total 
 % % %  % 
Car assembly 25 41 67  62 
Components 0 34 33  36 
a Although tool producers and service providers are entitled to receive ACIS, the proportion they are allocated 
is very small. Therefore, for modelling purposes, their allocation was assumed to be zero. Also, due to the 
nature of the MMRF industry split between cars and components, several component producers which are 
currently captured in ‘others’ have had their ACIS entitlements allocated to ‘components’ in the modelling. 
b This is the average split across car assembly and component manufacturers over the three years from 2005 
to 2007. The shares do not sum to 100, as they exclude the proportion allocated to tool producers and service 
providers.  
Sources: AusIndustry (unpublished data); Commission estimates. 
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How ACIS was included in the database 
ACIS-inclusive tariff rates (chapter 3) were used to derive the implicit import duties 
that should have been paid by the car assembly and components sectors under the 
normal tariff system. Since neither sector imports cars as intermediate inputs, the 
imputed import duties are paid exclusively on imported car parts.  
• The uncapped ACIS value ($137 million) for the car assembly industry was 
modelled as a negative federal indirect tax on imports, and allocated according 
to the regional cost of car production. These subsidies are used to offset directly 
the import duties paid by the car industries in Victoria and South Australia. 
• Capped ACIS funding was treated as a production subsidy (allocated across 
jurisdictions as outlined above), and included in the database as negative federal 
taxes on Other Cost Tickets (OCTS). 
As the federal tax (OTXF) is included in OCTS in the database, the values of OCTS 
for car assembly and components industries had to be adjusted to maintain the 
original total cost values for the industries.  
The total imputed import duties that should have been paid by the car assembly and 
components sectors are estimated to be $240 million, compared with actual industry 
receipts of $537 million. The surplus was assumed to have been sold by the 
industries to other importers of cars and components for capital investment (BAS2) 
and for final consumption (BAS3). Therefore, the corresponding import values in 
BAS2 and BAS3 needed to be adjusted to reflect the purchases of $297 million of 
ACIS credits from the assembly and components sectors.  
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E Additional simulation results 
Reference cases 
Table E.1 Simulation results — automotive industry, Victoria 
Percentage changes relative to the database 
Scenario R1  R2  R3  R4 
Tariffa to 5%  to 5%  10% to 5%
ACIS to 0  Stage 2  to 0  to 0
Other settings    Open economy
Automotive assembly    
Output -4.74  -3.19  -1.56  -4.70
Employment -5.64  -3.83  -1.84  -5.55
Domestic sales from 
domestic production -5.03
 
-3.89
 
-1.16
 
-5.00
Domestic sales — total -0.29  -0.17  -0.12  -0.28
Export volume -2.86  1.26  -4.08  -2.77
Import volume 4.36  3.72  0.63  4.33
Component manufacturing    
Output -1.73  -1.52  -0.21  -1.69
Employment -2.08  -1.85  -0.22  -1.99
Domestic sales from 
domestic production -2.23
 
-2.03
 
-0.21
 
-2.20
Domestic sales — total -0.29  -0.17  -0.12  -0.28
Export volume 4.25  4.48  -0.22  4.37
Import volume -1.31  -0.57  -0.75  -1.30
a ‘to 5%’ means reducing automotive tariffs from 10% to 5%.  
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Table E.2 Simulation results — automotive industry, South Australia 
Percentage changes relative to the database 
Scenario R1  R2  R3  R4 
Tariffa to 5%  to 5%  10% to 5%
ACIS to 0  Stage 2  to 0  to 0
Other settings    Open economy
Automotive assembly    
Output -4.21  -2.19  -2.02  -4.16
Employment -5.01  -2.64  -2.38  -4.91
Domestic sales from 
domestic production -5.01
 
-4.08
 
-0.94
 
-4.98
Domestic sales — total -0.24  -0.07  -0.16  -0.23
Export volume -2.86  1.02  -3.85  -2.77
Import volume 4.39  3.83  0.55  4.36
Component manufacturing    
Output -1.66  -1.40  -0.26  -1.63
Employment -2.03  -1.75  -0.28  -1.95
Domestic sales from  
domestic production -1.90
 
-1.63
 
-0.26
 
-1.87
Domestic sales — total -0.24  -0.07  -0.16  -0.23
Export volume 4.82  4.84  -0.02  4.93
Import volume -1.27  -0.20  -1.08  -1.25
a ‘to 5%’ means reducing automotive tariffs from 10% to 5%. 
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Table E.3 Simulation results — component manufacturing industry 
Percentage changes relative to the database 
Scenario R1  R2  R3  R4 
Tariffa to 5%  to 5%  10% to 5%
ACIS to 0  Stage 2  to 0  to 0
Other settings    Open economy
New South Wales    
Output -1.09  -0.87  -0.22  -1.09
Employment -1.37  -1.11  -0.26  -1.32
Domestic sales from 
domestic production -1.16
 
-0.95
 
-0.21
 
-1.16
Domestic sales — total 0.10  0.08  0.02  0.07
Export volume 3.07  3.88  -0.78  3.08
Import volume 4.98  4.85  0.12  4.97
Queensland    
Output -0.96  -0.76  -0.20  -1.03
Employment -1.23  -0.99  -0.25  -1.25
Domestic sales from  
domestic production -1.04
 
-0.84
 
-0.19
 
-1.10
Domestic sales — total 0.19  0.13  0.06  0.09
Export volume 3.24  4.05  -0.78  3.15
Import volume 4.88  4.72  0.16  4.81
a ‘to 5%’ means reducing automotive tariffs from 10% to 5%. 
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Review options 
Table E.4 Simulation results — automotive industry 
Percentage changes relative to the database 
Scenario O1  O3  O4  O7  O8 
Tariffa to 5%  to 5%  10%  to 0  to 5%
ACIS Stage 3  Stage 2  Stage 3  to 0  Stage 3
Other settings  ACIS as
grants
    Commodity
price increase
Automotive assembly       
Output -3.44  -1.58  -0.51  -8.52  -11.18
Employment -4.11  -1.91  -0.61  -10.14  -13.07
Domestic sales from 
domestic production -4.27
 
-3.06
 
-0.34
 
-10.85
 
-6.86
Domestic sales — total 0.04  0.04  0.00  0.11  1.06
Export volume -0.10  4.44  -1.23  0.97  -28.74
Import volume 3.33  2.69  0.18  8.74  9.01
Component manufacturing       
Output -1.20  -1.65  -0.05  -3.12  -3.72
Employment -1.59  -2.22  -0.06  -4.13  -6.57
Domestic sales from 
domestic production -1.45
 
-1.93
 
-0.05
 
-3.76
 
-2.76
Domestic sales — total 0.04  0.04  0.00  0.11  1.06
Export volume 4.43  4.86  0.00  11.77  -25.68
Import volume 1.43  3.21  -0.16  3.76  2.88
a ‘to 5%’ means reducing automotive tariffs from 10% to 5%.  
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Table E.5 Simulation results — by jurisdiction 
Percentage changes relative to the database 
Scenario O1  O3  O4  O7  O8 
Tariffa to 5%  to 5%  10%  to 0  to 5%
ACIS Stage 3  Stage 2  Stage 3  to 0  Stage 3
Other settings  ACIS as
grants
    Commodity
price increase
Real GSP      
New South Wales 0.09  0.07  0.01  0.25  -1.75
Victoria -0.18  -0.08  -0.04  -0.45  -4.87
Queensland 0.17  0.10  0.02  0.44  4.85
South Australia -0.09  0.06  -0.05  -0.20  -3.57
Western Australia 0.35  0.22  0.04  0.95  19.29
Tasmania 0.19  0.16  0.01  0.53  -0.14
Northern Territory 0.24  0.16  0.03  0.67  14.75
ACT -0.02  0.02  -0.01  -0.03  1.01
GSP/worker      
New South Wales 0.04  0.05  0.00  0.13  0.92
Victoria 0.06  0.06  0.00  0.17  0.76
Queensland 0.06  0.06  0.00  0.17  1.26
South Australia 0.06  0.05  0.00  0.18  0.79
Western Australia 0.07  0.07  0.00  0.21  2.25
Tasmania 0.06  0.06  0.00  0.18  0.33
Northern Territory 0.06  0.06  0.00  0.18  1.21
ACT 0.03  0.03  0.00  0.08  0.54
a ‘to 5%’ means reducing automotive tariffs from 10% to 5%.  
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Table E.6 Simulation results — automotive industry, Victoria 
Percentage changes relative to the database 
Scenario O1  O3  O4  O7  O8 
Tariffa to 5%  to 5%  10%  to 0  to 5%
ACIS Stage 3  Stage 2  Stage 3  to 0  Stage 3
Other settings  ACIS as
grants
    Commodity 
price increase 
Automotive assembly       
Output -3.66  -1.95  -0.48  -9.12  -10.62
Employment -4.38  -2.37  -0.56  -10.90  -12.33
Domestic sales from 
domestic production -4.24
 
-3.00
 
-0.35
  
-10.77 
 
-7.47
Domestic sales — total -0.20  -0.10  -0.04  -0.51  -4.31
Export volume -0.02  4.64  -1.26  1.24  -30.50
Import volume 3.92  3.19  0.19  10.34  5.57
Component manufacturing       
Output -1.58  -2.34  -0.06  -4.10  -9.98
Employment -1.92  -2.84  -0.06  -4.99  -11.63
Domestic sales from 
domestic production -2.09
 
-2.95
 
-0.07
  
-5.46 
 
-8.57
Domestic sales — total -0.20  -0.10  -0.04  -0.51  -4.31
Export volume 4.50  5.02  0.01  12.04  -26.66
Import volume -0.81  2.05  -0.25  -1.58  -3.63
a ‘to 5%’ means reducing automotive tariffs from 10% to 5%.  
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Table E.7 Simulation results — automotive industry, South Australia 
Percentage changes relative to the database 
Scenario O1  O3  O4  O7  O8 
Tariffa to 5%  to 5%  10%  to 0  to 5%
ACIS Stage 3  Stage 2  Stage 3  to 0  Stage 3
Other settings  ACIS as
grants
    Commodity
price increase
Automotive assembly      
Output -2.81  -0.52  -0.62  -6.76  -12.79
Employment -3.37  -0.68  -0.73  -8.12  -15.02
Domestic sales from 
domestic production -4.36
 
-3.33
 
-0.28
  
-11.16 
 
-4.45
Domestic sales — total -0.12  0.04  -0.05  -0.28  -3.07
Export volume -0.18  4.23  -1.18  0.69  -26.87
Import volume 4.00  3.37  0.17  10.61  5.82
Component manufacturing      
Output -1.49  -2.31  -0.08  -3.90  -8.25
Employment -1.84  -2.87  -0.09  -4.85  -9.91
Domestic sales from 
domestic production -1.72
 
-2.60
 
-0.09
  
-4.53 
 
-7.67
Domestic sales — total -0.12  0.04  -0.05  -0.28  -3.07
Export volume 4.91  5.54  0.07  13.28  -24.05
Import volume -0.55  2.87  -0.35  -0.73  -4.84
a ‘to 5%’ means reducing automotive tariffs from 10% to 5%.  
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Table E.8 Simulation results — component manufacturing industry 
Percentage changes relative to the database 
Scenario O1  O3  O4  O7  O8 
Tariffa to 5%  to 5%  10%  to 0  to 5%
ACIS Stage 3  Stage 2  Stage 3  to 0  Stage 3 
Other settings  ACIS as
grants
    Commodity 
price increase 
New South Wales       
Output -0.90  -1.00  -0.03  -2.32  -2.82
Employment -1.15  -1.27  -0.04  -2.97  -3.81
Domestic sales from 
domestic production -0.98
 
-1.08
 
-0.03
  
-2.51 
 
-2.45
Domestic sales — total 0.08  0.06  0.01  0.23  -1.42
Export volume 3.80  3.79  -0.08  9.60  -25.94
Import volume 4.87  4.71  0.01  11.79  8.57
Queensland      
Output -0.78  -0.91  -0.02  -2.01  3.79
Employment -1.02  -1.16  -0.03  -2.62  2.83
Domestic sales from 
domestic production -0.87
 
-1.00
 
-0.02
  
-2.21 
 
4.16
Domestic sales — total 0.15  0.09  0.02  0.39  4.31
Export volume 3.98  3.87  -0.07  10.05  -18.34
Import volume 4.75  4.57  0.03  11.54  14.39
a ‘to 5%’ means reducing automotive tariffs from 10% to 5%.  
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Sensitivity analyses 
Table E.9 Simulation results — automotive industry 
Percentage changes relative to the database 
Scenario S1  S2  S3  S4  S5 
Tariffa to 0%  to 5%  to 5%  to 5%  to 5%
ACIS to 0  to 0  to 0  to 0  to 0
Other settings General
tariff
 to 0%
 Export
elasticity 
of 5
 Endogenou
s
budget
 Rate of 
return 
closure 
 Short
run
closure
Automotive assembly       
Output -8.36  -4.27  -4.64  -4.54  -3.29
Employment -10.04  -5.07  -5.52  -5.36  -5.17
Domestic sales from 
domestic production -10.72
 
-5.00
 
-4.97
 
-5.05
 
-4.26
Domestic sales — total 0.22  0.02  0.06  -0.03  -0.03
Export volume 1.24  -1.31  -3.30  -2.50  0.65
Import volume 8.82  3.68  3.83  3.60  3.13
Component manufacturing     
Output -2.94  -1.47  -1.39  -1.37  -1.05
Employment -4.07  -1.88  -1.80  -1.72  -1.66
Domestic sales from 
domestic production -3.58
 
-1.63
 
-1.60
 
-1.63
 
-1.37
Domestic — total 0.22  0.02  0.06  -0.03  -0.03
Export volume 12.02  2.30  3.65  4.50  6.26
Import volume 3.77  1.23  1.20  1.09  1.20
a ‘to 5%’ means reducing automotive tariffs from 10% to 5%.  
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Table E.10 Simulation results — by jurisdiction 
Percentage changes relative to the database 
Scenario S1  S2  S3  S4  S5 
Tariffa to 0%  to 5%  to 5% to 5%  to 5%
ACIS to 0  to 0  to 0  to 0  to 0 
Other settings General 
tariff 
 to 0% 
 Export
elasticity 
of 5
 Endogenous
budget
 Rate of 
return 
closure 
 Short 
run 
closure 
Real GSP        
New South Wales 0.25  0.10  0.17  0.05  0.00
Victoria -0.51  -0.23  -0.22  -0.28  0.00
Queensland 0.68  0.21  0.21  0.14  0.00
South Australia -0.28  -0.16  -0.17  -0.21  0.00
Western Australia 1.63  0.37  0.24  0.42  0.00
Tasmania 0.75  0.18  0.23  0.15  0.00
Northern Territory 1.39  0.25  0.25  0.28  0.00
ACT -0.01  -0.05  0.10  -0.15  0.00
GSP/worker 
 
    
New South Wales 0.22  0.03  0.05  -0.01  0.00
Victoria 0.26  0.05  0.07  0.01  0.00
Queensland 0.30  0.05  0.06  0.01  0.00
South Australia 0.28  0.06  0.08  0.03  0.00
Western Australia 0.37  0.06  0.06  0.02  0.00
Tasmania 0.29  0.05  0.06  0.02  0.00
Northern Territory 0.35  0.05  0.06  0.02  0.00
ACT 0.13  0.02  0.05  -0.03  0.00
a ‘to 5%’ means reducing automotive tariffs from 10% to 5%.  
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